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Developing a Jurisprudence of
Process-Oriented Federalism Under
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t This article was submitted for publication August 4, 1998. In order to avoid any further
delay in publication, several subsequent developments are not fully addressed herein but warrant
brief mention here and in footnotes throughout the article. On September 3, 1998, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit invalidated the Act in Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d
453 (4th Cir. 1998), based in part on the theory outlined herein. The United States petitioned for
rehearing and suggested rehearing en banc. On December 22, 1998, the Fourth Circuit denied the
petition. Condon, No. 97-2554 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998). The United States filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari on March 15, 1999. Reno v. Condon, 67 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. Mar. 15, 1999)
(No. 98-1464).
On December 3, 1998, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the
Act in State of Oklahoma ex. rel Oklahoma Department of Public Safety v. United States, 161
F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter "Oklahoma"]. The State of Oklahoma filed a timely
petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc. The Tenth Circuit denied rehearing
on February 2, 1999. Oklahoma, No. 97-6389 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). The State of Oklahoma
sought and the Tenth Circuit granted a stay of the mandate pending the filing of a petition for a
writ of certiorari. Oklahoma, No. 97-6389 (10th Cir. Feb. 11, 1999). Any petition for a writ of
certiorari is due on or before May 3, 1999. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1.
On December 16, 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld
the Act in Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998). The State of Wisconsin filed a timely
petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc which the court denied on February
11, 1999. Travis, No. 98-2881 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 1999). The State of Wisconsin moved for a stay
of the mandate pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari which the Seventh Circuit
denied on February 19, 1999. Travis, No. 98-2881 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 1999). Circuit Justice
Stevens granted the stay on March 31, 1999. Administration of the Division of Motor Vehicles v.
Reno, No. A-795 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1999). Any petition for a writ of certiorari is due on or before
May 12, 1999. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1.
These decisions create a circuit split that warrants Supreme Court review. The appellate
decisions in each of the district court cases discussed herein and other subsequent developments
are addressed in a forthcoming article. Thomas H. Odom & Marc R. Baluda, The Department of
Process-Oriented Federalism:
Harmonizing the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment
Jurisprudence From Garcia Through Prinz, 30 URB. LAW. (Summ. 1997) (forthcoming).
* Thomas H. Odom (B.A., Rutgers College 1984; J.D., University of Pennsylvania 1988) is
lead counsel for States appearing as amici curiae in several of the cases discussed in this article.
He is a Partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Arter & Hadden LLP, where he practices
appellate litigation and administrative law.
** Gregory S. Feder (B.A., University of Virginia 1992; J.D., University of Virginia 1997) is
an Associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Arter & Hadden LLP, where he practices appellate
and business litigation.
The authors would like to thank Professors Saul Levmore, Ronald D. Rotunda, and Gerald L.
Neuman for their comments on earlier drafts of this article; their colleagues, Marc R. Baluda,
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INTRODUCTION

The constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of
19941 ("DPPA") is on a fast track for review by the United States
Supreme Court. At present, the DPPA is being challenged in five
actions around the country.2 Although State Attorneys General and
State legislators initiated the challenges, government watchdogs, 3 public

interest groups,4 and the press5 have joined the fray as amici curiae in
support of the challengers. The diversity of the challengers highlights
the breadth and importance of the interests involved.
1. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1766, 2099-2102 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725)
(1994).
2. Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998), argued on appeal, No. 98-6261 (11 th
Cir. Nov. 30, 1998); State of North Carolina v. Reno, No. 5:98-CV-27-BR(3) (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29,
1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-2676 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1998), stay granted pending filing and
disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorariin Condon v. Reno, No. 98-2676 (4th Cir. Jan. 28,
1999) [hereinafter North Carolina];Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Wis. 1998), rev'd,
163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, No. 98-2881 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 1999), stay of
issuance of mandate pending filing of a petition for a writ of certioraridenied, No. 98-2881 (7th
Cir. Feb. 19, 1999), stay of issuance of mandate pending filing of a petitionfor a writ of certiorari
granted sub nom. Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles v. Reno, No. A-795 (U.S.
Mar. 31, 1999) (Sevens, Circuit Justice); State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub.
Safety v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D. Okla. 1997), rev'd, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir.
1998), reh'g denied, No. 97-6389 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999), stay of issuance of mandate pending
filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari granted, No. 97-6389 (10th Cir. Feb. I1, 1999)
[hereinafter Oklahoma]; Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997), aff'd, 155 F.3d 453
(4th Cir.), reh'g denied, No. 97-2554 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998), petitionfor cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W.
3588 (U.S. Mar. 15, 1999) (No. 98-1464).
3. For example, Better Government Bureau, Inc. participated in the South Carolina and
Oklahoma appeals.
4. For example, Pacific Legal Foundation participated in the South Carolina, Oklahoma, and
Alabama appeals.
5. For example, in South Carolina's challenge the following press organizations intervened
in the district court and sought to appear on appeal as amici curiae: South Carolina Press
Association, Virginia Press Association, North Carolina Press Association, West Virginia Press
Association, Maryland/Delaware/District of Columbia Press Association, The Newspaper
Association of America, and the American Society of Newspaper Editors. See Condon, 155 F.3d
at 455 n.l.
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Challenges to the DPPA raise issues under six constitutional provisions: the Tenth Amendment,6 section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 the First Amendment,8 the Eleventh Amendment,9 the Commerce
Clause,' ° and the Guarantee Clause." The first district court decision on
the matter, Condon v. Reno,"2 established that the DPPA violated the

Tenth Amendment and that the Act could not be viewed as an enactment
pursuant to Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. In State of
Oklahoma ex rel. The Oklahoma Department of Public Safety v. United
States, 3 a second district court reached the same conclusion, addressing
the Fourteenth Amendment issue. In addition to these bases, the pending cases raise several other bases for striking down the DPPA. In Pryor
v. Reno, 4 however, a third district court rejected most of these bases
and upheld the validity of the DPPA.' 5 Subsequently, in Travis v.
Reno, 6 a fourth district court struck down the DPPA on Tenth Amendment grounds and held that the DPPA could not be saved by the Fourteenth Amendment. In State of North Carolina v. Reno, 17 the fifth and
final district court summarily held the DPPA unconstitutional on the
basis of the Condon decision. This division of authority on significant
constitutional issues reinforces the view that Supreme Court review will
8
be certain and swift.'

6. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
7. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
8. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ......
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign state." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
10. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes ....
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
11. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government ..
" U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
12. 972 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997).
13. 994 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
14. 998 F. Supp. 1317.
15. Id. (On March 13, 1998, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama found the DPPA to be constitutional.).
16. 12 F. Supp. 2d 921.
17. No. 5:98-CV-27-BR(3) (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-2676 (4th
Cir. Nov. 17, 1998) [hereinafter "North Carolina"]. The Fourth Circuit held this appeal in
abeyance pending its resolution of the pending petition for rehearing in Condon. North Carolina,
No. 98-2676 (4th Cir. Dec. 7, 1998). The court denied the petition in Condon. Condon, No. 972554 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998). The Fourth Circuit then issued an order granting a second stay of
the appeal, pending the filing and disposition by the United States Supreme Court of a petition for
a writ of certiorari in Condon. North Carolina,No. 98-2676 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1999). The United
States filed its petition in Condon on March 15, 1999.
18. As this article goes to press, the division in authorities has developed into a split between
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The decisions in the DPPA cases and the subsequent appellate
briefing hinge on several of the most prominent Supreme Court decisions of the last decade. Condon, Oklahoma, and Travis expressly relied
on Tenth Amendment limitations articulated in Printz v. United States' 9
and New York v. United States.2" An alternative Tenth Amendment

analysis2" derives force from free press and free exercise decisiQns
including Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,"
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,23 and Employment Division, Departmentof
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 4 Any argument regarding
whether the DPPA is a valid enactment under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment must address City of Boerne v. Flores.25 An Eleventh Amendment analysis must consider Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida.6 A commerce clause challenge relies heavily upon United
States v. Lopez 7 and, to a lesser extent, upon Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.2 8 A guarantee clause argument derives its force
from discussion in New York 29 and Gregory v. Ashcroft. 3' The DPPA
litigation presents the vehicle for building upon or retreating from one or

more of these recent decisions.
Condon and Oklahoma are now fully briefed and pending before
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Tenth Circuits,
respectively. 3' The decision in Pryor in the State of Alabama's Elevthe Fourth Circuit, on one hand, and the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand. See supra
note t and infra note 31. The United States has requested Supreme Court review.
19. See Travis, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 927-29 (citing Printz); Oklahoma, 994 F. Supp. at 1361,
1363 (same); Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 984-86 (same).
20. See Travis, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 926, 928-29 (citing New York); Oklahoma, 994 F. Supp. at
1361, 1363 (same); Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 982-86 (same).
21. See infra, discussion in Part V.B.
22. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
23. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
24. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
25. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
26. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
27. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28. 513 U.S. 374 (1995). Lebron may be viewed as the precursor to Lopez in that Lebron
held that, although Congress may be free to define terms and declare their meaning for statutory
purposes, its exercise in applying a counterfactual name cannot change the substance of matters
for purposes of constitutional analysis. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392.
29. 505 U.S. at 183-86.
30. 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991).
31. Since the time this article was written, both the Fourth and Tenth Circuits have ruled in
those appeals. On September 3, 1998, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed and held the
DPPA is unconstitutional. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998). On October 15, 1998,
the United States sought rehearing of the panel decision before the en banc Fourth Circuit. On
November 2, 1998, South Carolina filed its answer and on November 9, 1998, the Fourth Circuit
accepted the amici curiae's tendered memorandum in support of South Carolina's position that
rehearing was unwarranted. On December 22, 1998, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition
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enth Circuit appeal is currently being briefed.32 The United States
appealed to the Seventh Circuit from the district court's decision in
Travis on July 22, 1998.11 Finally, one additional case is pending at the
trial level in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina.34 Given the importance of the issues involved and the
nature of the parties (States and the federal government), the DPPA liti-

gation is prime for the Supreme Court. The number of independent
challenges make it extremely unlikely that the constitutional issues will
be uniformly resolved without such review.
The DPPA litigation also highlights the conflict between an interest

in privacy with respect to information and long-held beliefs in the public
good that flows from open records and open government. Concern with
appearing to oppose a privacy interest has chilled the political leadership
of more than one State from raising a constitutional challenge to the
DPPA.
Part II of this article presents an historical background addressing

the impetus for the DPPA, its legislative history, and the legal context in
without issuing any further opinion. The United States filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on
March 15, 1999. See 67 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. Mar. 15, 1999) (No. 98-1464).
On December 3, 1998, a panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed and held the DPPA is
constitutional. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Public Safety v. United States, 161
F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998). The State of Oklahoma filed a timely petition for rehearing with
suggestion for rehearing en banc on January 19, 1999. The Tenth Circuit denied rehearing on
February 2, 1999. Oklahoma, No. 97-6389 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).
32. Briefing is now completed and the Eleventh Circuit heard oral argument on November 30,
1998.
33. Briefing is now completed, the Seventh Circuit heard oral argument on November 12,
1998, and the panel issued its decision reversing the district court on December 16, 1998. Travis
v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998). The State of Wisconsin filed a petition for rehearing with
suggestion for rehearing en banc which the Seventh Circuit denied on February 11, 1999. Travis,
No. 98-2881 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 1999). The State of Wisconsin moved for a stay of the mandate
pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari which the Seventh Circuit denied on
February 19, 1999. Travis, No. 98-2881 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 1999). Circuit Justice Stevens granted
the stay on March 31, 1999, Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles v. Reno, No. A-795
(U.S. Mar. 31, 1999) (Stevens, Circuit Justice).
34. That case, State of North Carolina v. Reno, No. 5:98-CV-27-BR(3) (E.D.N.C. filed Jan.
13, 1998), has moved forward during the pendency of this article. Based on the panel decision in
Condon, the district court granted summary judgment to North Carolina in its challenge. See State
of North Carolina v. Reno, No. 5:98-CV-27-BR(3) (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 1998). The Fourth Circuit
docketed the United States' appeal on November 17, 1998. The Fourth Circuit held proceedings
in abeyance pending a ruling on the rehearing petition in Condon. North Carolina, No. 98-2676
(4th Cir. Dec. 7, 1998). The court denied the petition in Condon. Condon, No. 97-2554 (4th Cir.
Dec. 22, 1998). Thereafter, the Fourth Circuit granted the United States' motion for a second stay,
pending the filing and disposition by the United States Supreme Court of a petition for a writ of
certiorari on Condon. North Carolina, No. 98-2776 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1999). The United States
filed its petition in Condon on March 15, 1999.
35. With the subsequent rulings by panels of the Fourth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits, and the
refusal of each of those courts to considered the panel rulings en banc, a circuit split currently
exists.
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which it was enacted. Part III discusses the public policies and historical
tradition displaced by the DPPA, with emphasis on the pre-existing law
in the States that are now challenging the DPPA. Part IV outlines, summarily, the full range of constitutional issues presented in the DPPA
litigation. Part V analyzes the Tenth Amendment issues in greater depth
and explains how the DPPA litigation directs attention to the next logical development in process-oriented federalism.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1994, Congress enacted the DPPA, which compels States to regulate disclosure of information from their motor vehicle records in
accordance with a declared uniform national policy. The DPPA is
directed exclusively at the States and does not address records containing any or all of the same information independently compiled by the
national government or by private parties.
Part II(A) describes the statutory scheme created by the DPPA.
Part II(B) addresses the impetus for enactment of the DPPA, a law
directed solely to one specific source of information. Part II(C) summarizes the legislative history of the DPPA's enactment, including testimony alerting Congress that its measure might be underinclusive. Part
II(D) discusses the legal context within which Congress legislated,
including references to the numerous federal sources of the same information subject to the DPPA which Congress did not address.
A.

The DPPA Statutory Scheme

The DPPA establishes a general rule for State disclosure of "personal information"3 6 from a "motor vehicle record, '"" a series of exceptions to that rule, and rules for re-disclosure of information by those
authorized to obtain it. The DPPA criminalizes engaging in actions that
would circumvent its restrictions, and provides a series of penalties and
remedies.
1.

GENERAL RULE OF NON-DISCLOSURE

The centerpiece of the DPPA is its general prohibition articulated in
the very first subsection of the Act: "[A] State department of motor
36. This term is defined to mean "information that identifies an individual, including an
individual's photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but

not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information, but does not
include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2725(3) (1994).
37. This term is defined to mean "any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator's
permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card issued by a
department of motor vehicles." Id. § 2725(1).
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vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor, thereof, shall not
knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person or entity
personal information about any individual obtained by the department in
connection with a motor vehicle record."3 8 For purposes of this prohibition to a "person," the DPPA provides that the term "means an individual, organization or entity, but does not include a State or an agency
39
thereof.
2.

EXCEPTIONS MANDATING DISCLOSURE

The general prohibition on the release of personal information is
qualified by a five exceptions which mandate disclosure. Several of the
five exceptions contain numerous subparts. The DPPA provides that personal information
shall be disclosed for use in connection with matters of [1] motor
vehicle or driver safety and theft, [2] motor vehicle emissions, [3]
motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories, [4] performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers, and [5] removal of non-owner records from the original
owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the Automobile Information Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1231 et seq.), the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), and chapters 301, 305, and
321-331 of title 49.40
The scope of these mandatory disclosure exceptions is subject to several
ambiguities.
It is unclear how expansively one should construe the phrase "for
use in connection with matters of."''4 This phrase potentially swallows
the general prohibition of disclosure and permits anyone to claim entitlement to personal information from motor vehicle records. For example,
a criminal desiring access to her victim's personal information could
purport to be preparing comments for submission to the Secretary of
Transportation regarding bumper safety standards.42 She could claim
that in order to support her comments she needs to contact owners of a
particular type of automobile (matching her victim's automobile) in
order to survey their experience. The criminal could even assert that she
is contacting only a sample of the owners and that she needs only the
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (1994).
39. Id. § 2725(2). It was on this basis that the district court in Pryor rejected Alabama's
Eleventh Amendment argument. See Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (flush language) (brackets added).
41. A similar issue arises with respect to the phrase "to carry out the purposes of' the
specified federal statutes.
42. See 49 U.S.C. § 32502(3) (1994).

1998]

THE FEDERAL DRIVER'S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

79

same personal information that would permit her to locate intended victim. Faced with such a request, a State could be required to disclose the
information. This problem could be mitigated by reading the phrase narrowly.43 The text of the DPPA, however, provides little guidance to
States seeking to administer the general prohibition against disclosure
with the mandated disclosure requirements. Moreover, California's formal analysis of the DPPA concluded that the mandatory disclosure provision is not subject to a narrow reading so that the DPPA actually
mandates the disclosure of more information than was the case prior to
the DPPA."
The mandatory disclosure requirements contain another significant
ambiguity. A natural reading of the text suggests that the five exceptions may be defined in the manner suggested by the inserted bracketed
numbers which do not appear in the statute.45 An alternative but less
grammatical reading suggests that the language "to carry out the purposes of' the specified statutes modifies all five of the preceding exceptions rather than simply the final one. 46 This alternative reading gathers
support from the correlation between the subject matter of the referenced
statutory provisions and all five of the exceptions.47
43. Traditionally, rules of statutory construction favor narrow readings of exceptions and

provisos. See 2A

NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 47.11 (5th

ed. 1992 & 1998 Supp.) [hereinafter "SUTHERLAND"]. This rule of construction has been followed
in the federal courts. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955);
Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 286 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1931);
Spokane & Inland Empire R.R. v. United States, 241 U.S. 344 (1916).
44. See Attorney General's Opinion No. 95-805, 79 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 76, 81 (1996)
(concluding the DMV must disclose personal information "to anyone effectuating the purposes of"
the specified federal statutes).
45. "Had the modifying phrase been intended to relate to more than its last antecedent, a
comma could have been used to set off the modifier from the entire series." National Sur. Corp. v.
Midland Bank, 551 F.2d 21, 34 (3d Cir. 1977) (citation omitted); see also 2A SUTHERLAND, supra
note 43, § 47.33 ("Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention
appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.").
46. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 43, § 47.26 (modifying words "should be applied to the
subjects that seem most properly related by context and applicability") (citing United States v.
Simms, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 252 (1803)). The California Attorney General's analysis silently adopts
this approach. See Attorney General's Opinion No. 95-805, 79 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 81.
47. Titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384,
3384-89, 3400-01, are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1901 note, 2041 note, 18 U.S.C. §§ 553(a),
981(a)(1)(F), 982(a)(5), 2119, 2312, 2313(a), 2322, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1646(b), 1646(b) note &
1646(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3750. Title I provides enhanced penalties for auto theft, targeted law
enforcement to curb motor vehicle theft and related violence, and establishes a task force to study
State motor vehicle titling programs to combat motor vehicle thefts and fraud. Title IV provides
for random inspection of automobiles being exported to determine whether the automobiles were
stolen.
Title 49, chapter 301 addresses motor vehicle safety through the imposition of safety
standards prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169. Title 49,
chapter 305 establishes the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System which is designed to
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One may argue that the exceptions should be construed narrowly
under a canon of statutory construction. 4 8 The narrower reading is the
one that limits all five of the exceptions to the context provided by the
cross-referenced statutes rather than a reading that broadly exempts disclosure without such additional limiting language. The purpose of reading the mandatory disclosure exceptions in that narrower sense is so that
the DPPA as a whole can be harmonized. For example, a narrow reading of the mandatory disclosure for "use in connection with matters of
motor vehicle or driver safety and theft" 4 9 avoids rendering redundant
the permissive disclosure for "use in connection with matters of motor
vehicle or driver safety and theft" contained in the very same section of
the Act.5 °
The fourth mandatory disclosure provision, however, lends no supfacilitate access to information maintained by the States on automobile ownership. 49 U.S.C.
§§ 30501-30505. States may receive grants for participating in the system. Id. § 30503(c). Title
49, chapter 321 simply provides appropriations and defines terms with respect to information,
standards, and requirements addressed in subsequent chapters. 49 U.S.C. §§ 32101-32102. Title
49, chapter 323 establishes a program for the preparation and dissemination of information to
consumers regarding crashworthiness, vehicle operating costs, insurance cost, and similar matters.
49 U.S.C. §§ 32301-32309. Title 49, chapter 325 addresses motor vehicle safety through the
imposition of safety standards for bumpers as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation. 49
U.S.C. §§ 32501-32511. Title 49, chapter 327 addresses the integrity of motor vehicle odometers.
49 U.S.C. §§ 32701-32711. Title 49, chapter 329 addresses automobile fuel economy, authorizes
the President to prescribe standards for vehicles leased by federal executive agencies, and
authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe standards: setting average fuel economy
standards for manufacturers, and relating to vehicles that operate on alternative fuels and
incentives to manufacture such vehicles. 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901-32919. Title 49, chapter 331
addresses theft prevention by requiring the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe standards
addressing major automobile parts of models subject to high theft rates. 49 U.S.C. §§ 3310133118. The chapter also establishes the National Stolen Passenger Motor Vehicle Information
System which inventories stolen motor vehicle parts and motor vehicles by their vehicle
identification number. Id. § 33109.
48. See note 43 supra.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (flush language).
50. Id. § 2721 (b)(2). A broad reading of the second and third mandatory exceptions would
similarly render meaningless permissive exceptions contained within the same section. Both a
mandatory and a permissive exception address disclosure for use in connection with "motor
vehicle emissions." Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (flush language) with id. § 2721(b)(2). Similarly,
both a mandatory and a permissive exception address disclosure for use in connection with "motor
vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories." Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (flush language)
with id. § 2721 (b)(2). Because the limiting language at the end of the fifth and final mandatory
exception must modify the terms of that exception under either view, it is largely irrelevant to this
analysis. A comparison of the parallel provisions does weakly support the unavoidable narrow
reading of the fifth and final mandatory exception. By limiting the mandatory exception "to carry
out the purposes of" the specified laws, the permissive exception is not rendered redundant. The
parallel permissive disclosure provision addresses disclosure for use in connection with"removal
of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers." 18
U.S.C. § 2721(b)(2). The permissive provision does not purport to limit such disclosures with
reference to the purposes of specified federal laws and thus (at least theoretically) permits broader
disclosure than the mandatory exception.
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port to this line of reasoning. This exception addresses disclosure for
use in connection with "performance monitoring of motor vehicles and
dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers,"51 while the parallel permissive
exception addresses disclosure for use in connection with "performance
monitoring of motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts and dealers."52
Because of the differences in the language of these provisions, the
broader and more natural reading of the mandatory exception would not
render the permissive disclosure exception wholly redundant. The permissive disclosure exception expands coverage to reach "motor vehicle
parts" and is not limited to monitoring "by motor vehicle manufacturers." While comparison of the fourth mandatory disclosure exception to
its parallel permissive disclosure exception does not depend on a narrow
construction of the mandatory disclosure provision to avoid redundancy,
there is nothing in the comparison to bar a further narrowing construction. Consequently, considering the text of the mandatory disclosure
provisions in light of their parallel permissive disclosure provisions supports a narrow construction of the exceptions mandating disclosure.
Viewing the DPPA in its entirety, however, reveals serious
problems with a narrow construction of the exceptions mandating disclosure. For example, a narrow reading of the mandatory disclosure
provisions with a concomitantly broad reading of the parallel permissive
disclosure provisions (so as to give different meaning to each provision)
potentially renders meaningless other permissive disclosure provisions.
One may broadly read the permissive disclosure provision for "use in
connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft;
motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or
advisories; performance monitoring of motor vehicles, motor vehicle
parts and dealers; motor vehicle market research activities, including
survey research; and removal of non-owner records from the original
owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers." 53 Doing so, however,
leaves little, if any, independent meaning for the exception permitting
disclosure "[f]or any other use specifically authorized under the law of
the State that holds the record, if such use is related to the operationof a
motor vehicle or public safety."54
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (flush language).
52. Id. § 2721(b)(2).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(2).
54. Id. § 2721(b)(14) (emphasis added). Conceivably one could construe the mandatory
disclosure provision to address only disclosures "to carry out the purposes of' the specified
federal laws, the permissive (b)(2) exception to address only disclosures under any other federal
law, and the permissive. (b)(14) exception to address only disclosures under State law. While such
a reading gives independent meaning to each of the provisions, it entails writing into (b)(2) "to
carry out the purposes of any federal law not previously referenced in this section," as well as
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In addition, a narrow reading of the mandatory disclosure provisions may render them meaningless within the framework of the entire
DPPA. As noted above, the DPPA only prohibits disclosure of information that is derived, directly or indirectly, from a "motor vehicle record."55 The DPPA defines a "motor vehicle record" in terms that
suggest only official State records are addressed: "'motor vehicle record' means any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator's permit,
motor vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card
issued by a department of motor vehicles." 56 It is difficult to understand
how some of the statutes cross-referenced at the end of the final exception mandating disclosure involve any "motor vehicle record" as defined
by the DPPA rather than records compiled and maintained by motor
vehicle manufacturers, dealers, insurers and other private parties.
For example, title 49, chapter 323, establishes a program for the
collection of information to be disseminated to consumers. The Secretary of Transportation is authorized to "require an insurer, or a designated agent of the insurer" to provide information "by make, model, and
model year of passenger motor vehicle" with respect to personal injuries
and property damage (including repair costs).5 7 The Secretary is also

authorized to require an insurer to provide actuarial data linking insurance premiums to the risk of personal and property damage.5 8 The Secretary may request necessary information "from a department, agency,
or instrumentality of the United States Government."59 No provision
appears to be directed to "motor vehicle records" as defined by the
DPPA. Indeed, the only provision that seems broad enough to encompass such records is the Secretary's investigative power to "inspect and
copy records of any person at reasonable times." 6 It is unlikely, howignoring the grammar of the mandatory disclosure provisions. While such a construction is
possible, it is certainly not obvious.

55. See 18 U.S.C. 2721(a).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2725(1).
57. 49 U.S.C. § 32303(a)(1).
58. Id. § 32030(b).

59. 49 U.S.C. § 32305(a) (emphasis added). A State is not an instrumentality of the United
States Government. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188 ("State governments are neither regional
offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government."); see also First Agric. Nat'l Bank
v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 341 (1968) (holding State-chartered banks are not
instrumentalities of the United States); 49 U.S.C. § 3251 l(c) (separately listing the "United States
Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State"). Moreover, the specific provision
authorizing the Secretary to request information only from other parts of the federal government

suggests the lack of power to require information from State governments.
60. 49 U.S.C. § 32307(a)(1). Neither the section nor the chapter define the term "person."
Title 49 does not contain its own definition of "person" applicable throughout the Title. The
public laws that added these provisions contained no such definition. The Dictionary Act, 1
U.S.C. § 1, does provide a definition of "person" for purposes of statutory construction. That
definition includes "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
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ever, that the broad language employed in the inspection provision is
sufficiently specific to permissibly extend to State records.61
As such, the referenced statutes appear to be mere surplusage if the
mandatory disclosure provisions are read as though the referenced stat-

utes modify each of the exceptions. In short, the scope of the mandatory
disclosure provisions is ambiguous at best and unconstitutionally vague
at worst.6 2

3.

EXCEPTIONS PERMITTING DISCLOSURE

The general prohibition on the release of personal information is
subject to additional exceptions, allowing for ten broad permissible uses,
including disclosure for use: (1) by any government agency "in carrying
out its functions," 63 (2) "in connection with matters of motor vehicle or
driver safety and theft,"64 (3) "in the normal course of business by a
stock companies, as well as individuals." Id. Even if that definition was incorporated into 49
U.S.C. § 32307(a)(1), the definition does not include States despite an extensive list of other
entities. Under similar circumstances, the Supreme Court interpreted provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115, not to apply to the United States despite language
sufficiently general to go so far. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272-73
(1947). The Court's rationale - that express language is required to subject a sovereign to the
general terms of a statute - is equally applicable with respect to the Dictionary Act and to States.
61. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464, 467 (1991).
A second example further demonstrates the point. Title 49, chapter 325 addresses motor
vehicle safety through the imposition of safety standards for bumpers. The Secretary is required
"to conduct research" in order to formulate the appropriate standards without any reference to the
sources of data she may command. 49 U.S.C. § 32502(g). Manufacturers and distributors are
required to certify compliance with the standard. 49 U.S.C. § 32504. The Secretary may require
the manufacturer to maintain records and provide reports. 49 U.S.C. § 32505(a)(I)(A)-(B). The
Secretary may also request necessary information "from a department, agency, or instrumentality
of the United States." See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464, 467. As in the previous example, the only
provisions apparently applicable to DPPA-defined "motor vehicle records" are those that permit
the Secretary to require "any person" to permit inspection of records, provide written reports, and
appear as a witness with such records the Secretary requires. 49 U.S.C. § 32505(b). Here again,
one of the statutes referenced after the final mandatory disclosure exception does not seem to
reach "motor vehicle records" as defined by the DPPA.
62. The DPPA is a penal statute imposing potential criminal liability. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2722,
2723(a). As such, courts generally require greater clarity. See 3 SUTHERLAND, supra note 43,
§ 59.04.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1).
64. Id. § 2721(b)(2). This exception includes disclosure relating to emissions regulations as
well as motor vehicle alterations, recalls or advisories. It also permits disclosure for
"performance monitoring of motor vehicles" and "motor vehicle parts and dealers." This
exception also extends to "motor vehicle market research activities, including survey research."
Id. In addition, the DPPA contains a separate exception for "any other use specifically authorized
under the law of the State that holds the record, if such use is related to the operation of a motor
vehicle or public safety." Id. § 2721 (b)(14). It is unclear what, if anything, the (b)(14) exception
adds which is not already encompassed in the (b)(2) exception. Moreover, it is extremely difficult
to read the (b)(2) exception narrowly because doing so makes it redundant of the mandatory
disclosure exceptions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (flush language); supra notes 45-52.
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legitimate business or its agents, employees, or contractors, but only" for
very limited purposes,6 5 (4) in connection with proceedings before any
court, governmental agency, or self-regulatory body,6 6 (5) in research
activities and in preparation of statistical reports,67 (6) by insurers in

connection with claims investigations, antifraud activities, rating, or
underwriting,68 (7) "in providing notice to the owners of towed or
impounded vehicles," 69 (8) "by any licensed private investigative agency
or licensed security service for any purpose permitted" by any of the

other enumerated exceptions, 7° (9) "by an employer or its agent or
insurer to obtain or verify information relating to a holder of a commercial driver's license, ' 7' and (10) "in connection with the operation of
private toll transportation facilities. 72
In addition to these exceptions, the DPPA contains three special
exceptions that require further analysis. First, the DPPA permits disclosure of personal information for "any other use" provided that the State
65. Id. § 2721(b)(3). The permitted uses are "to verify the accuracy of personal information
submitted by the individual to the business or its agents, employees, or contractors" and, if the
information provided by the individual is incorrect, "to obtain the correct information, but only for
the purpose of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal remedies against, or recovering a debt or
security interest against, the individual." Id. This exception would appear to permit any
legitimately employed individual to obtain personal information about a co-worker under the
pretext of acting on his employer's behalf.
This exemption would appear to permit States to disseminate photographs or digital images
to legitimate businesses that sought to verify the accuracy of a purchaser's identification in
connection with the presentation of a check or credit card. In fact, the United States encouraged
the development of such a system using information contained in State motor vehicle records. See
Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Liz Leyden, U.S. Helped Fund Photo Database of Driver IDs, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 18, 1999, at Al.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4). This exception specifically permits use of the information in
connection with "service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and the execution
or enforcement of judgments and orders." Id. (emphasis added). By permitting disclosure with
respect to potential litigation, the DPPA appears to allow the release of information to anyone who
claims to be a tort victim exploring his or her remedies.
67. See id. § 2721 (b)(5). The personal information obtained under this exception may not be
published, redisclosed, or used to contact individuals. Id. It would seem that virtually anyone,
including criminals of any sort, could claim to be engaged in some sort of research.
68. See id. § 2721(b)(6). This exception is available to "any insurer or insurance support
organization, or by a self-insured entity, or its agents, employees, or contractors." Id. (emphasis
added). It is unclear whether use of the undefined term "entity" permits disclosure to any
individual, including a potential stalker, who does not carry homeowners' or tenants' insurance
policies.
69. Id. § 2721(b)(7).
70. Id. § 2721(b)(8). This exception would appear to permit any criminal employed as a parttime security guard to obtain personal information under the pretext of a job-related inquiry. With
respect to the provision for licensed private investigators, it is notable that some States-including
Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Mississippi, and South Dakota-do not require private investigators to
have licenses. See Peter Maas, How Private is Your Life?, PARADE, Apr. 19, 1998, at 4, 6.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(9).
72. Id. § 2721(b)(10).
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implements an "opt-out" procedure whereby individuals can choose to
avoid disclosure of personal information. This "opt-out" exception
explicitly requires State legislative or administrative action for
implementation:
For any other use in response to requests for individual motor vehicle
records if the motor vehicle department has provided in a clear and
conspicuous manner on forms for issuance or renewal of operator's
permits, titles, registrations, or identification cards, notice that personal information collected by the department may be disclosed to
any business or person, and has provided in a clear and conspicuous
manner on such forms an opportunity to prohibit such disclosures.7 3

Second, the DPPA permits disclosure for "bulk distribution for surveys,
marketing, or solicitations" provided that States adopt an "opt-out"
procedure:
For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations if
the motor vehicle department has implemented methods and procedures to ensure that(A) individuals are provided an opportunity, in a clear and conspicuous manner, to prohibit such uses; and
(B) the information will be used, rented, or sold solely for bulk distribution for surveys, marketing, and solicitations, and that surveys,
marketing, and solicitations will not be directed at those individuals
who have requested in a timely fashion that they not be directed at
them.74

Implementation of these "opt-out" provisions imposes significant
administrative and financial burdens on States that adopt them. Moreover, States willing to shoulder these burdens still lose the benefits of a
public policy of open disclosure to the extent that individuals choose to
opt out.
Third, the DPPA also allows disclosure to any requester provided
"the requester demonstrates it has obtained the written consent of the
individual to whom the information pertains."7 5 The DPPA does not
require that such written consent be verified. It would appear that any
potential criminal need only forge his victim's consent to comply with
the DPPA.
The DPPA also contains a "waiver" procedure that appears to
largely duplicate the exemption for disclosure on written authorization.
This provision states:
A State motor vehicle department may establish and carry out
73. Id. § 2721(b)(11).
74. Id. § 2721(b)(12).
75. Id. § 272 1(b)(13).
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procedures under which the department or its agents, upon receiving
a request for personal information that does not fall within one of the
exceptions in subsection (b), may mail a copy of the request to the
individual about whom the information was requested, informing
such individual of the request, together with a statement to the effect
that the information will not be released unless the individual waives
such individual's right to privacy under this section.76
This apparently redundant waiver provision may serve as more than
merely a catch-all provision. Because the waiver provision waives all
rights under the entire section, which includes the general prohibition,77
it raises the possibility of a loophole that could permit circumvention of
the redisclosure limitations.
4.

LIMITATIONS ON REDISCLOSURE

The DPPA also restricts certain redisclosure of information
obtained in accordance with its terms. An authorized recipient of information under the basic "opt-out" provision "may resell or redisclose
information for any purpose. ' 78 An authorized recipient of information
under the (b)(12) bulk distribution exception "may resell or redisclose
personal information pursuant to subsection (b)(12)" only. 79 Any other
authorized recipients of personal information "may resell or redisclose
the information only for a use permitted" by the specified exceptions
other than exceptions (b)(1 1) and (b)(1 2).8" In order to monitor compliance with the redisclosure restrictions, records of any redisclosure must
be maintained for a period of five years. 8
The restriction on redisclosure indicates that, with one exception, it
applies to any authorized recipient which should include not only recipients under the exceptions, but also recipients of personal information
under the waiver provision. Because the waiver provision 82 is a separate
subsection, however, there is the danger that it might be read in isolation, thereby opening an avenue to unrestricted redisclosure.
5.

RELATED PROHIBITED CONDUCT

The DPPA declares that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information, from a motor
76. Id. § 2721(d).
77. Id. § 2721(a).
78. Id. § 2721(c).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. The person making such redisclosure must record each person or entity to which
the information was disclosed and "the permitted purpose for which the information will be used."
Id.
82. Id. § 2721(d).
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vehicle record, for any use not permitted under section 2721(b) of this
title."'8 3 That prohibition overlooks the permitted disclosure under the
waiver provision. 84 The DPPA also criminalizes the making of "false
representation [s] to obtain any personal information from an individual's
motor vehicle record." 85
6.

PENALTIES AND REMEDIES

The DPPA imposes a criminal fine on any "person" 86 who knowingly violates its terms. Although a State and its agencies are excluded
from the DPPA definition of a "person," it appears that the definition
does not exclude counties, municipalities, and other local
governments. s7
In addition, the DPPA provides for the imposition of civil fines on
States:
Any State department of motor vehicles that has a policy or practice
of substantial noncompliance with this chapter shall be subject to a
civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General of not more than
$5,000 a day for each day of substantial noncompliance.88
Thus, entities entitled to Tenth Amendment protection are subjected to
civil (and possibly criminal) fines.
The DPPA also creates a private cause of action for civil liability
and establishes the United States district courts as the fora to hear those
claims.8 9 The court has authority to award a broad range of relief in
these actions. The court may award "actual damages, but not less than
liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500. " 90 Upon finding willful or
reckless disregard of the law, the court may also award punitive damages without any stated cap. 9 ' The court may shift the expense of reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs, 92 thereby removing
much of the disincentive to bring an action. Finally, the court may order
83. Id. § 2722(a).
84. Id. § 2721(d).

85. Id. § 2722(b).
86. See supra text accompanying note 39 (defining "person").
87. This failure to exclude local governments from potential criminal liability is significant as

local governments benefit from the same Tenth Amendment protections as the State itself. See
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 n.15 (1997).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b) (1994).
89. Id. § 2724(a) ("A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information,
from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be liable to the
individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring a civil action in a United States
district court.").
90. Id. § 2724(b)(1).

91. Id. § 2724(b)(2).
92. Id. § 2724(b)(3).
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other preliminary and equitable relief as it deems necessary.9 3
From the perspective of State and local governments, the DPPA's

penalties and liabilities appear substantial. Avoidance of those penalties
and liabilities requires changes in State law and administration, as well
as displacement of State public policy. Yet the exceptions to the general

rule of nondisclosure appear to open numerous loopholes in the statute.
Thus, a cursory review of the DPPA invites an inquiry into its impetus
and legislative history.
B.

The DPPA Was Enacted as an Anti-Stalking Measure

Congress enacted the DPPA primarily as an anti-stalking measure
after the highly-publicized stalking death of actress Rebecca Schaeffer
on July 18, 1989. 9' Prosecutors successfully alleged that Robert John
Bardo was an obsessed fan who had "stalked" and fatally shot Schaeffer

after obtaining her address and other personal information from a private
detective.95 The private detective agency reportedly obtained the information from Schaeffer's motor vehicle records.9 6

In 1990, in response to this stalking and murder, California enacted
an anti-stalking law. Under that law, a stalker is someone "who willfully, maliciously and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and
who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in rea-

sonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate
family." 97 State law thus erected a penalty for stalking itself, rather than
93. Id. § 2724(b)(4).
94. See Bill Loving, DMV Secrecy: Stalking and Suppression of Speech Rights, 4 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 203, 203 (1996); James L. Hankins, Comment, Criminal Law: Criminal "AntiStalking" Laws: Oklahoma Hops on the Legislative Bandwagon, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 109, 114,
(1993); see also Thomas H. Moore, Comment, You Can't Always Get What You Want: A Look at
North Carolina's Public Records Law, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1527, 1537 n.96 (1994) ("The federal
legislation is primarily aimed at protecting people from stalking and other crimes, since it is
believed that the easily availability of home addresses and telephone numbers through public
records encourages such crimes."). But see Brief of Appellees at 3-5, 13, Pryor v. Reno, No. 986261 (1 1th Cir. argued Nov. 30, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. Alabama Brief] (arguing that the DPPA
was primarily intended to regulate direct marketers and other commercial compilers of databases).
If the DPPA truly was about direct mail, Congress could have taken the easier route of regulating
the direct mailers rather than the States. By not doing so, the DPPA permits direct mailers to
obtain name and residential addresses from numerous sources other than DMV records.
95. See Hankins, supra note 94, at 114 n.15; see also Loving, supra note 94, at 203 (citing
Stephen Braun & Charisse Jones, Victim, Suspect From Different Worlds: Actress' Bright Success
Collided With Obsession, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1989, at Al, A38).
96. See Loving, supra note 94, at 203; Hankins, supra note 94, at 114 n.15. Bardo was found
guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. See also Loving,
supra note 94, at 203 (citing Eric Malnic, Man Who Killed TV Actress Gets Life Without Parole,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1991, at B3); Hankins, supra note 94, at 114 n.15 (citing Mike Tharp, In the
Mind of a Stalker, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 17, 1992, at 30). State law thus condemned
Bardo's actions and imposed punishment.

97.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 646.9 (1998).
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requiring police to await until stalkers act upon their threats.
Following California's lead, all fifty States and the District of
Columbia enacted anti-stalking statutes by the end of 1993.98 States had
thus developed laws to address this criminal behavior even before Congress had held any hearings on the proposed DPPA.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Anti-Stalking Act, which
made it a crime for a stalker to cross State lines in violation of
restraining orders with the intent to harass or injure a person. 99 Congress thereby directly regulated the interstate aspect of stalking. 100
In addition to direct regulation of "stalking" and other criminal
conduct, Congress attempted to indirectly regulate the same conduct by
enacting the DPPA. The DPPA, however, allows States to provide personal information to private detective agencies, the very type of intermediary Bardo successfully employed to obtain Schaeffer's address.1"1 In
light of that and a laundry list of other exceptions, commentators have
noted that "the efficacy of such legislation in actually stopping a determined stalker is questionable" so that "[p]romoting such initiatives as
'anti-crime' measures is misleading at best, and fraudulent at worst."'02
"The breadth of the list of enumerated users of the driver information,
and the absence of controls over their conduct, makes the restrictions on
10 3
the access and use of the information ineffective."
C.

State Motor Vehicle Records were Only One of Many Sources of
Similar Information Potentially Subject to Misuse
by Criminals

The DPPA legislative history shows that Congress was advised that
State motor vehicle records were only one of many sources of similar
98. See Hankins, supra note 94, at 125 & n.77 (collecting citations); see, e.g., 1992 Ala. Acts
675 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-90 to 13A-6-94 (Supp. 1993)); 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws ch.
804, § 1 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (Supp. 1992)); Act of Apr. 20, 1992, ch. 107,
1992 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 337 (West) (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1173 (Supp. 1993));
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 (Supp. 1992); Act of Dec. 10, 1993, Wis. Legis. Serv. 96 (West)
(codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.32 (Supp. 1992)).
99. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110
Stat. 2422, 2655-56 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2261A).
100. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 165 (1992) (noting that the Framers of the
Constitution chose a system "in which Congress would exercise its legislative authority directly
over individuals rather than over States").
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(8) (1994); see also Drivers' Privacy Protection Act, 1994:
Hearings on H.R. 3365 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, available in 1994 WL 14168013 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of David
Beatty) [hereinafter Hearings].
102. Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data Protection Directive and the First Amendment: Why a
"Press Exemption" Won't Work, 80 IowA L. REV. 639, 644 (1995) [hereinafter Press Exemption].
103. Loving, supra note 94, at 212.
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information potentially subject to misuse by criminals. The testimony
before Congress made clear that there was nothing unique about motor
vehicle records. Other records contained much of the same information
and had been similarly misused to facilitate stalking and other crimes.
Therefore, Congress was well-informed that it was the relatively easy
access to "government records" that facilitated stalking. For example,
Subcommittee hearings demonstrated that "[t]he post office and the
DMV will divulge the address of the victim's hiding place-no questions asked."1 °4 Moreover, during the Subcommittee hearings, Congress
was advised that:
Even a perfect Driver's Protection law will not foreclose the possibility of potential abusers and stalkers finding their victims through public records. Policies that allow access to forwarding addresses
supplied by the post office, and voter registration records have provided equally fertile sources of address information for offenders.
Similar measures are needed to address these problems as well.' 0 5
Yet Congress responded with a provision imposing upon States the burden to restrict motor vehicle records while ignoring many of the federal
sources of the same information.
The primary sponsor of the DPPA made express reference to a
book entitled "You Can Find Anyone" that was found in a stalker's possession.'0 6 The Senator expressed her concern that the book "spelled out
how to do just that using someone's license plate."' 1 7 The Senator did
not mention, however, that the very same book identified numerous federal sources that supply the same information to potential stalkers.
* "The F.C.C. licenses every form of communication including telephones and computer interface systems. These records and applications are also public. Call or write your nearest office for
details."' 08
* "The F.A.A. regulates and licenses all aspects of aviation including
balloons and gliders. If appropriate, check with them. Their
records are public."' 0 9
" "As a matter of practice, the I.R.S. will provide the 'date of last
return' on anyone or any business, which includes the address to
which the return was sent. All you need to provide is the full name
and Social Security Number."" 0
104. Hearings, supra note 101.

105. Id.
106. 139 CONG. REC. S15,762 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
107. Id.
108. EUGENE FERRARO, YOU CAN FIND ANYONE § 4.5, at 76 (10th ed. 1989).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 77. Federal agencies publicly disseminate Social Security number ("SSN")
information as well. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text. The Internal Revenue
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- The Interstate Commerce Commission "regulate[s] and license[s]
all forms of interstate commercial transportation. If your subject is
a trucker, or in the trucking or transportation business, you will find
them in these records. All records are public and phone searches
are accepted."11' 1

The author of "You Can Find Anyone," also discusses finding individuals through the "Armed Services Locators," the Civil Service Commission's Bureau of Retirement and Insurance, and other federal sources.

112

Congress Enacted the DPPA Despite Widespread Dissemination
of the Same Informationfrom Numerous Federal Sources

D.

As the hearing testimony disclosed, the federal government disseminates the same information that the DPPA directs States to keep private.

Clearly, the federal government sources of an individual's residential
address are numerous. Indeed, the Information Policy Committee of the

National Information Infrastructure Task Force recognized that "[t]he
federal system of data protection, though comprehensive, is criticized,

however, as a1 3'paper tiger' with significant enforcement and remedial
1
deficiencies." '
Perhaps the most telling and most analogous source of disclosure is

the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"). A database of the operators of vehicles licensed by the federal government (in this case, aircraft)
is available on the Internet, providing names, home addresses, and information regarding physical examinations.114 A related database permits
anyone to obtain the name and address of the owner of an airplane simply by providing the "N-number" required to be displayed on the air-

plane's tail."'

This information originates with the FAA and is

Service itself will disclose the SSN of a former spouse. See RICHARD S. JOHNSON, How TO
LOCATE ANYONE WHO IS OR HAS BEEN IN THE MILITARY 218 (7th ed. 1996). Moreover, the

Internal Revenue Service prints the taxpayer's SSN on publicly-recorded liens. See Flavio
Komuves, We've Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and Decisions to Control the Use
of Social Security Numbers as PersonalIdentifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529,
541 (1998). In this manner, the Internal Revenue Service may serve as a one-stop source of
information for someone intent on stalking a former spouse or anyone who is, or ever has been,
subject to a government lien.

11. FERRARO, supra note 108, at 77.
112. Id. at 77-79, 81.
113.

INFORMATION

POLICY

COMMITTEE,

NATIONAL

INFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTURE

TASK

FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 19

(Apr. 1997 draft), available at <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/ipc-pub.html> (last visited Jan. 31,
1999) [hereinafter "NIITF Draft"].
114. See AVweb, U.S. Certified Airman Database (visited Apr. 17, 1998) <http://
www.avweb.com/database/airmen/>.
115. See AVweb, U.S. Registered Aircraft Database (visited Apr. 17, 1998) <http://

www.avweb.com/database/aircraft/>.
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disseminated by a company under contract with the FAA.' 16

Similarly, when individuals register certain boats with the United
States Coast Guard, it appears that the federal government discloses the

information collected."' 7 If the Coast Guard fails to do so, the FCC may
disclose the information if the boat owner registers a ship-to-shore

radio. '18
The United States Postal Service remains an easy source of forwarding addresses. Although the Service recently discontinued its dis-

closure to individuals of a list of all requests to forward mail,' 19 it still
discloses the information one entry at a time. To obtain a forwarding
address, one need only send a letter to the former address with instructions on the envelope not to forward the mail and to provide address

correction. 2 ° Moreover, the Postal Service continues to sell data collected from Change of Address forms to mailing-list firms, direct mailers, and credit bureaus. 121
In some instances, the United States orders some private parties to
disclose residential addresses to other private parties. For example, the
federal government routinely mandates disclosure of names and residential addresses to collective bargaining representatives. 12 2 In that context,
the federal government orders the disclosure of less-public information
123
such as home telephone numbers and even Social Security numbers.
The federal government provides virtually no protection for medical and health care records. 124 Consequently, much of this data is acces116. Telephone Interview with Bill Culbertson, Aerodata, Inc. (Mar. 4, 1998); see also Condon
v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 465 n.9 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting the availability of such data on the
Internet); CAROLE A. LANE, NAKED IN CYBERSPACE: How TO FIND PERSONAL INFORMATION
ONLINE 160 (1997) ("If you own any type of aircraft, the [FAA] may have sold your name and
profile.")
117. See LANE, supra note 116, at 160.
118. Id.
119. See Moore, supra note 94, at 1537 n.96.
120. See JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 236.
121. BETH GIVENS, THE PRIVACY RIGHTS HANDBOOK: HOW TO TAKE CONTROL OF YOUR
PERSONAL INFORMATION 128 (1997).
122. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766-67 (1969); Lear Siegler, Inc. v.

NLRB, 890 F.2d 1573, 1580-81 (10th Cir. 1989); Smith & Smith Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 735 F.2d
1215, 1217 n.1 (10th Cir. 1984). Although the Supreme Court has held that collective bargaining
representatives of federal employees may not compel disclosure of names and residential
addresses, the Court clearly stated that there was no constitutional bar to such disclosure. See
United States Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 503 (1994) ("Congress may correct
the disparity" in treatment of classes of unions).
123. See NLRB v. Illinois-American Water Co., 933 F.2d 1368, 1377-78 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Social Security numbers in addition to names and addresses); NLRB v. Burkart Foam, Inc., 848
F.2d 825, 833 (7th Cir. 1988) (telephone numbers in addition to names and addresses); Lucky
Markets, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 836, 840 (1980) (names, ages, race, sex, and marital status). See also
infra text accompanying notes 133-37.
124. PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW

308 (1996)
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sible.' 2 5 There is no comprehensive federal legislation regarding how
employers must treat personal information they collect regarding their

data protection
employees. 126 Further, there is no federal law addressing
27
marketing.
direct
of
context
the
specifically in
Ironically enough, in some ways, the federal government is acting
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERGI; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics
of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6-7, 39-41 (1997) [hereinafter Health
Care] (noting broad consensus that medical data protection is insufficient).
125. See Jay Greene, Your Secret's Out: Your Medical Records-PerhapsYour Most Personal
Information-Are Also the Most Vulnerable to Public Scrutiny, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER
(Cal.), Apr. 24, 1996, at Cl; see also WAYNE MADSEN, HANDBOOK OF PERSONAL DATA
PROTECTION

126.

127-28 (1992) (describing databanks of medical information).
& REIDENBERG, supra note 124, at 350; Patrick J. Murray, Comment, The

SCHWARTZ

Adequacy Standard Under Directive 95/46/EC: Does U.S. Data Protection Meet this Standard?,

21

FORDHAM INT'L

127.

SCHWARTZ

L.J. 932, 988 (1998).
& REIDENBERG, supra note 124, at 308; William J. Fenrich, Note, Common

Law Protection of Individuals' Rights in PersonalInformation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 962
(1996); see also Jennifer L. Kraus, Note, On the Regulation of Personal Data Flows in Europe
and the United States, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 59, 63 (noting the lack of federal legislation

protecting individuals from misuse of information by direct marketers). People can become a
record in a database by calling an 800 number, cashing a coupon, filling out a warranty card,
subscribing to magazines, or making hotel reservations. Kraus, supra, at 62. The Direct
Marketing Association has established its own recommendations and guidelines for the protection
of personal information, but as mere recommendations for self-regulation, they are not
enforceable. Id. at 76. The absence of regulation of direct marketers is particularly significant in
this context, where the United States has painted the DPPA as an effort to control one source of
information for the direct mail industry. See U.S. Alabama Br., supra note 94, at 16-18. As
discussed below in Part II.B., the DPPA was introduced, promoted, and reported primarily as a
response to a highly-publicized stalking death (and, to a lesser extent, other criminal activity).
Indeed, following amendment of the proposed DPPA to its current form, the direct marketing
industry actually supported the legislation. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY:
TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 102-03 (1995); Joshua B. Sessler, Note &
Comment, Computer Cookie Control: Transaction Generated Information and Privacy
Regulation on the Internet, 5 J.L. & Pol'y 627, 655-56 (1995).

These examples of sectors not subject to data protection limitations rebut the mistaken
impression that virtually all collections of data already are regulated by the federal government.
See Travis, 163 F.3d at 1005. In fact, the federal government's own studies and scholars in the
field generally reject this view. See Joseph I. Rosenbaum, Privacy on the Internet: Whose
Information is it Anyway?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 565, 569 & n.6 (1998) (citations omitted); see also
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 124, at 215, 382 (federal data protection laws applicable to
the private sector address only discrete issues; "existing legal protections tend to focus on access
[by the subject of the record] and correction"); Murray, supra note 126, at 980, 1013-14 (sectoral
approach to legislation results in large gaps); NIITF Draft, supra note 113, at i ("[linformation
privacy policy in the United States consists of various laws, regulations and practices, woven
together to produce privacy protection that varies from sector to sector. . . . Sometimes this
approach leaves holes in the fabric of privacy protection."). This consensus is not surprising in
light of our strong political tradition of resisting limits on information dissemination. See
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 124 at 382; Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standardsfor Fair
Information Practicein the U.S. PrivateSector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500-01 (1995) [hereinafter
Setting Standards]. Based on that tradition, in the private sector the United States generally favors
the free flow of information. See id. at 503-06; Murray, supra note 126, at 952 n.130. Thus, even
viewed as a whole, federal regulation of personal information in the private sector does not
aggregate to form a generally applicable law.
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to make personal information more available. For example, while the
Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") 128 limits information that may be
disclosed about individuals, it does not prohibit the disclosure of names,
residential addresses, or other personal information. Moreover, the Fed-

eral Trade Commission ("FTC"), which is charged with administering
the FCRA, specifically excludes such data from its definition of "consumer reports" and permits unrestricted dissemination of this informa-

tion so long as the data is not linked to credit information through "prescreening." ' 129 The "header information" that the FTC permits to be
freely disclosed includes "name, telephone number, mother's maiden
name, address, zip code, year of birth, age, any generational designation,

social security number, or substantially similar identifiers, or any combination thereof."' 3 ° This FTC policy reversed its 1989 position regarding
header information, and now allows this information to be sold without
limitation by credit bureaus like Equifax, Experian and TransUnion.' 3 '
Federal agencies do not limit their disclosures to names and residential addresses. Despite the fact that an individual's Social Security
number is often used as proof of permission to access other records, the
federal government discloses Social Security numbers with little hesitation. 132 "Since June 1974, the [Department of Veterans' Affairs] has
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a-1681b (1994).
129. See FTC v. TRW, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 361, 362 (N.D. Tex. 1991), amended, FTC v. TRW,
Inc., CIV No. 3-91-CV2661-H at 1 (Jan. 14, 1993). The FTC defines "pre-screening" as "the
process whereby TRW, utilizing [c]redit [i]nformation, compiles or edits for a client a list of
[c]onsumers who meet specific criteria ...." 784 F. Supp. at 362.
130. FTC v. TRW, Inc., CIV No. 3-91-CV2661-H at 1 (Jan. 14, 1993). See also JOHNSON,
supra note 110, at 12-13 (describing a trace using "header information from credit files" to find
"Cindy" based only on her maiden name and previous address); id. at 136 ("Ninety percent of the
time a Social Security trace will provide the most current reported address from the header
information of 160 million credit files."); see also Maas, supra note 70, at 4 (describing the
successful search for a company's former consultant through a credit bureau); Murray, supra note
126, at 986 ("the three main credit bureaus together maintain files on nearly ninety percent of
American adults"). Moreover, credit reports may be purchased by anyone with a "permissible
business purpose." See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. "The FCRA defines permissible purposes broadly,
encompassing employers, landlords, private investigators, and others." NIITF Draft, supra note
113, at 41; see Laura B. Pincus & Clayton Trotter, The Disparity Between Public and Private
Sector Employee Privacy Protections: A Call for Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private Sector
Workers, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 51, 67 (1995); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information
Economy: A Fortress or Frontierfor Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 210-213
(1992) [hereinafter Fortressor Frontier].
131. See Leslie L. Byrne, Who's Selling Your Secrets? Government Units Sell or Give Away
Personal Data, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 17, 1997, at 19. Additionally, the federal
government is limiting the encryption technology that may be used in the United States which
otherwise may have permitted concerned individuals and databank holders to better protect
personal information from disclosure. See generally Jaleen Nelson, Comment, Sledge Hammers
and Scalpels: The FBI Digital Wiretap Bill and its Effect on the Free Flow of Information and
Privacy, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1139 (1994).
132. Armed with a name and Social Security number, anyone may obtain access to records
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Similarly,

"[t]he Armed Forces switched from using Service Numbers to using
Social Security numbers as a means of identification" in July 1969
(Army and Air Force), July 1972 (Navy and Marine Corps) and October
1974 (Coast Guard).' 34 The Department of Defense itself is another

source of such information: "The Social Security numbers of many
retired officers and warrant officers may be obtained from the Officer's
' 35
Registers."'
One need not go any farther than a law library to find a list of

individuals' names and Social Security numbers. For decades, the
United States Department of Labor has published the Social Security
numbers correlated together with the names of claimants under the
Black Lung Benefits Act (the "BLBA"). The Department of Labor

assigns each claimant's Social Security number as its case number,
resulting in public disclosure whenever a decision is designated for publication.' 36 The United States government also makes a debtor's Social

Security number a matter of public record when it petitions for a writ of
garnishment to collect a debt.'

37

As a result of all these federal sources

of information, it can now be said that "[i]n the United States, a person's
social security number ('SSN') has attained the status of a quasi-univer' 38
sal personal identification number."'
maintained under the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2177. Telephone Interview
with Judy Street, FAA Privacy Act Officer (Mar. 9, 1998). See also FERRARO, supra note 108, at
77.
133. See JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 89; see also id. at 6-7, 87-88, 206-07.
134. Id. at 135. Consequently, the name and Social Security number of individuals are
published in unit orders, reassignment orders, orders for promotions, awards, and numerous other
orders. See id. at 138. They are also disclosed in response to Freedom of Information Act
requests. See id. at 146-47.
135. Id. at 81.
136. Comparison of the "OWCP number" in published decisions with the claim filed in several
of those cases confirms that practice. The OWCP number reported in Hite v. Eastern Associated
Coal Co., 21 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-47 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1997), matches the miner's Social
Security number as reflected in Director's Exhibit 3 filed therein. Similarly, the OWCP number
reported in Church v. Eastern Associated Coal Co., 21 Black Lung Rep. 1-52 (Ben. Rev. Bd.
1997), correlates with the miner's Social Security number as reflected in Director's Exhibit I filed
therein. Finally, the OWCP number reported in Bates v. Creek Coal Co., 20 Black Lung Rep. 1-37
(Ben. Rev. Bd. 1996), matches the miner's Social Security number shown in Director's Exhibit I
filed therein.
137. See Komuves, supra note 110, at 541 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3205(b)(1)(A)); see George B.
Trubow, Protecting Informational Privacy in the Information Society, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 521,
525-26 (1990).
138. Komuves, supra note 110, at 531. For example, credit bureau records are keyed to Social
Security numbers ("SSNs"). Id. at 536. Recent changes to federal laws allow SSNs to be used as
identifying numbers in the collection of blood donations. Id. at 537 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(c)(2)(D)(1994)).
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Other information frequently used as a means to test authorization

to receive data is itself freely disclosed. For example, the National Personnel Records Center, in responding to individuals' Freedom of Information Act requests, provides a person's date of birth.139

That

information is sufficient to permit the person to be located through a
computer database. 4 ° Date of birth information also is publicly available from Selective Service classification records of men who registered
for the draft from 1940 to 1975.'
The federal government also discloses more information than

name, residential address, Social Security number and date of birth. For
example, information released from an individual's military records
includes: dependents (including name, age, and gender), salary, educational level, and official photographs.' 4 2 However, this information will

not be released by the armed forces for those individuals on active duty,
in the reserve or National Guard.' 43
As the preceding examples demonstrate, federal limitations on the
disclosure of information constitute exceptions rather than the general
rule.' 44 Moreover, even the few statutes frequently cited as imposing

disclosure limitations "similar" to the DPPA generally fail to fulfill that
claim. As discussed above, 4 5 unlike the DPPA, the Fair Credit Report-

ing Act' 46 has been construed by the Federal Trade Commission to per147
The Bank Secrecy Act 148
mit disclosure of names and addresses.
does not, by its own terms, prohibit the disclosure of names and
addresses; 49 the only restriction on disclosure is that a party to a transaction may not be notified that a "suspicious activity report" has been

filed with the government concerning the transaction. 1 51 Unlike the
DPPA, in regulating data maintained by phone companies, the Stored
JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 98, 146-47.
140. See id.; see also id. at 8-9, 11 (locating "Darrell Schultz" and "Fred Q. Smith").
141. Id. at 92.
142. Id. at 147. Ironically, Members of Congress may assist their constituents in obtaining this
information when federal agencies are not responsive. See id. at 215.
143. Id. at 147.
144. One author noted that the private sector in the United States is "virtually unregulated" for
privacy, with the exception of the credit reporting industry, which is governed by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act. COLIN J. BENNETT, IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY CODES OF PRACTICE 8, 42 (1995); see
also Rosenbaum, supra note 127, at 569 (discussing the United States' sectoral approach).
145. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
147. See also Trubow, supra note 137, at 531 (observing the FCRA does not significantly limit
the sale or exchange of personal information).
148. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 & 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.
149. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.51; see also SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 124, at 262-63
(observing there is no federal regulation of the treatment of personal information by banks and
other financial institutions).
150. 31 C.F.R. § 103.21(e).

139. See
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Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access
Act 15 does not prohibit the disclosure of names and addresses. The
prohibition on unauthorized disclosure covers only the "contents" of
stored electronic communications.152 The "contents" are defined as
information concerning the "substance, purport, or meaning of [the]
communications." 153 Moreover, in another context, the Federal Communications Commission clarified that customer names, addresses, and
telephone numbers are not protected information. 54 The Commission
55
relied, in part, on the general public availability of such information.
The Video Privacy Protection Act ("VPPA") prohibits the disclosure of "personally identifiable information." 156 "Personally identifiable
information" is defined as "information which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a
video tape service provider." 15 7 As a general rule, this information may
not be disclosed by any person.158 The definition of the protected information, however, parallels that of the Fair Credit Reporting Act: names
and addresses may be disclosed as long as not pre-sorted or otherwise
linked to convey additional information (such as credit history or tapes
rented, respectively). In addition to exempting names and addresses
from the definition of protected information, the VPPA also expressly
allows the disclosure of names and, addresses, so long as they are not
tied to the title, description, or subject matter of the video tapes. 159
Moreover, there is an express exception under which such information,
including the subject matter of video rentals, may be released to direct
marketers.1 60 Thus, even the law upon which the DPPA purportedly
was based apparently does not restrict disclosure of names and residential addresses to the same degree as the DPPA.
The Privacy Act 61 does not function as written. "[T]he enforcement, oversight, and scope of the Act are inadequate."'' 62 Even on its
151. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11.
152. Id. § 2702.
153. Id. § 2710(8).
154. See Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information
and Other Customer Information, Order, CC Docket No. 96-115, DA 98-971 (rel. May 21, 1998).
155. Id. at 8.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).

157. Id. § 2710(a)(3).
158. Id. § 2710(a)(4).
159. Id. § 27 10(b)(2)(D). This express provision purports to place additional limitations on the
disclosure of names and addresses but the basis for imposing an "opt-out" provision and other

terms appears inconsistent with the definition of "personally identifiable information."
160. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(D)(ii) ("however, the subject matter of the materials may be disclosed if

the disclosure is for the exclusive use of marketing goods and services directly to the consumer").
161. 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
162. Trubow, supra note 137, at 530 n.34 (1990) (citation omitted).
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face, the "Act is also riddled with broad exceptions that severely limit its
usefulness."' 63 Like the Privacy Act, few of the laws self-imposed upon

the federal government produce general compliance. For example, in
1990, the General Accounting Office reported that only 35% of federal
databases containing personal data had been identified in the Federal
Register as required.' 6 4 Of the computer systems engaged in "computer

matching" of information, very few complied with federal regulations
and procedures. 61 5 Few, if any, of the federal statutes identified by the
United States in litigation impose burdens on the disclosure of such

common information as names and addresses.
The DPPA did not address any of these federal sources of information. Nor did Congress explain how forcing States to restrict one source
of data made sense while the federal government continues to disseminate the same information. In fact, at the Subcommittee hearings, Congress did not even hear from a representative of any State or local
66

government. 1
III.

THE

DPPA

ADDRESSES RECORDS HISTORICALLY MAINTAINED BY

STATES THAT MOST STATES KEPT OPEN TO PUBLIC INSPECTION
BASED ON PUBLIC-POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Historically, it has been States, rather than the federal government,
that have licensed drivers and registered motor vehicles. As a result,
States have collected information through those processes and required
that their agencies maintain records compiled in the course of such
duties.' 67 Traditionally, States have determined for themselves the
scope and conditions of disclosure of information contained in their
records: the overwhelming majority historically have treated motor
vehicle records as public records. 168 Indeed, a vast majority of States
have long recognized the public good that flows from open records and
163. Id.
164. MADSEN, supra note 125, at 109.

165. Id.
166. Marshall Rickert, Motor Vehicle Administrator for the State of Maryland, did testify at
the hearings. Hearings, supra note 101, 1994 WL 14167960 (Feb. 4, 1994). But Rickert
expressly prefaced his remarks by explaining that he was testifying in his capacity as First Vice
Chairman of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, a nongovernmental,
voluntary organization of individuals. He offered no testimony in his capacity as a State of
Maryland official. Although Rickert called for a uniform law, States can and do adopt uniform
laws, so it is not evident that his goal would require federal legislation.
167. See infra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 173-177 and accompanying text. Cf Bruce D. Goldstein, Confidentiality
and the Dissemination of Personal Information: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data
Protection, 41 EMORY L.J. 1185 (1992) (discussing state "laws limiting, to varying degrees, the
availability of certain records").
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169

open government.
By enacting the DPPA, Congress attempted to instruct the States as
to how they must regulate the dissemination of information from the
records States create and maintain through the regulation of their drivers
and motor vehicles. In doing so, Congress considered neither the long
historical tradition of State regulation in this field nor the important public policies it displaced. Part Ill(A) discusses the historical tradition of
State regulation of motor vehicles and motor vehicle records. Part Ill(B)

examines the public policies served by permitting open access to these
records. Part Ill(C) summarizes the impact of the DPPA upon those
State policies.
A.

States Historically have Licensed Drivers and Registered Motor
Vehicles, and Maintained Records Associated with
Those Functions

Since the turn of the century State governments consistently have
licensed drivers and registered motor vehicles. 70 By 1916, the Supreme
Court could characterize the "common" features of such regulation and
treat the constitutionality of such regulation as a settled matter. 17 1 By
1941, the Supreme Court acknowledged such regulation by the States
'72
was "universal."'
169. Citizens have an interest in the workings of their government and the basic data of those
government operations are official records and documents. Matthew D. Bunker, et al., Access to
Government-Held Information in the Computer Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging
Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 543, 543 (1993). "Access to government-held information is
grounded in the American political ideal of self-government. The Framers of the United States
Constitution said self-governing people should be well-informed about the workings of
government to make intelligent political choices. In a discussion of the First Amendment, James
Madison said: 'The right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free
I d. at 545
communication thereon, is the only effectual guardian of every other right ......
(citing, among other authorities, 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 398 (1906), reprinted in Note,
Access to Official Information: A Neglected ConstitutionalRight, 27 Ind. L.J. 209, 212 (1952)).
170. See Xenophon P. Huddy, The Law of Automobiles, 9 LAW NOTES 147, 148 nn.8 & 12
(1905) (discussing State of New York's motor vehicle registration requirements and State of
Missouri's driver's license requirements); Xenophon P. Huddy, The Motor Car'sStatus, 15 YALE
L.J. 83, 85 & n.16 (1905) (noting "statutory enactments concerning the registration and licensing
of automobiles" and citing Rhode Island's 1904 registration statute); H.B. Brown, The Status of
the Automobile, 17 YALE L.J. 223, 225 (1908) (explaining that it had already been determined
necessary to require automobiles "to be registered or licensed"); Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242
U.S. 160, 164 (1916) (upholding the New Jersey Automobile Law of 1908 which "provides in
substance that no person ...shall drive an automobile upon a public highway unless he shall have
been licensed so to do and the automobile shall have been registered under the statute"); Hendrick
v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 619 (1915) (upholding Maryland's "comprehensive scheme
for licensing and regulating motor vehicles" under its Act effective July 1, 1910).
171. See Kane, 242 U.S. at 167 ("The power of a state to regulate the use of motor vehicles on
its highways has been recently considered by this court and broadly sustained.").
172. See Keitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36 (1941).
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The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation
apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of
automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means
adopted by the States to insure competence and care on the part of
licensees and173to protect others using the highway is consonant with
due process.

The national government has never sought to create a uniform national
system to supplant these long-established State functions, although Congress did consider a national licensing system for commercial drivers.
However, that plan was aborted because Congress was advised that the
creation of such a system would exceed its authority. 174 Moreover, the
licensing of drivers was classified as a traditional State governmental
function (when that was the applicable constitutional test) and it contin1 75
ues to receive judicial protection from federal interference.
The laws of the five states challenging the DPPA (Alabama, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin) are demonstrative
173. Id. (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 638
(1971).
174. A bill was introduced that would have displaced States as the primary licensing authority
of commercial motor vehicle drivers. See S. 1903, 99th Cong. (1986). Hearings on the bill
demonstrated that the consensus favored State issuance and administration of licenses,
recognizing "that, traditionally, driver licensing has been a State function." See S. Rep. No. 99411, at 12 (1986). Consequently, Congress abandoned the plan. See id. The Secretary of
Transportation's own representative explained at hearings on that bill that the contemplated
regulations' ability to survive "judicial scrutiny" was problematic because "unnecessary or
inappropriate preemption of responsibilities traditionally exercised by the States [was] a concern."
Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 1903 Before the Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong. 15, 22 (1986) (statement of Associate
Deputy Secretary of Transportation Jennifer L. Dor).
175. See United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding that "there is
little question that the licensing of drivers constitutes 'an integral portion of those governmental
services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their
citizens"') (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976)). While
overruling the National League of Cities test, the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), explicitly acknowledged the Best holding.
See id. at 538. Despite the demise of National League of Cities, lower courts continue to hold that
the Tenth Amendment and federalism concerns preclude federal interference with State licensing
of drivers. E.g., United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 475 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that
"Garcia does not affect the validity of our reasoning or holding in Best"); United States v.
Chalmers, Nos. AD 092121 & 092122, 1986 WL 12680 at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 9, 1986) ("I agree with
the Ninth Circuit's holding in Best that it would be an unwarranted intrusion on state regulation to
suspend a state-created privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the state's highways"). For further
discussion of the Best decision, see Bernard Schwartz, National League of Cities Again-R.LP. or
a Ghost That Still Walks?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 141, 154 & n.123 (1985) [hereinafter R.I.P.]; see
also Paul J. Hartman & Thomas R. McCoy, Garcia: The Latest Retreat on the "States' Rights"
Front, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE, Spr.-Summ. 1985, at 8, 9 (recognizing that under
National League of Cities, the "[l]icensing of automobile drivers was insulated from congressional
control.").
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requiring drivers to
of this "universal" regulation. Each State has laws
177
be licensed' 7 6 and automobiles to be registered.

While carrying out their registration and licensing functions, States
acquire certain information about the individuals who register a motor
vehicle or apply for a driver's license. The information collected by the
States as an essential part of the process includes names, addresses,

dates of birth, physical descriptions, license tags, and the make and models of automobiles.' 78 Historically, each State has determined what
information it needs to collect through these processes. The States issue
licenses and registration certificates reciting much of this information.
79
1
In addition, the States maintain records of this information.

Historically, each State has determined the conditions under which

it would release information from motor vehicle records. A majority of
States maintained open records prior to implementation of the DPPA.
The leading Sponsors of the DPPA observed that motor vehicle records
were open to the public in thirty-four States. 180 The Reporters Commit-

tee for Freedom of the Press, listed the following thirty-four States
which permitted open access to records before enactment of the DPPA:

Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
176. See Ala. Code § 32-6-1 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-7(a) (1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47,
§ 6-106 (1988); Wis. STAT. §§ 343.05 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-20 (Law Co-op. 1996); see
also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.1 (1995) (reciprocal agreements with other States recognizing
licenses).
177. See ALA. CODE § 32-6-5 1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-50(a); OKLA. STAT. it. 47, § 1112; Wis.
STAT. § 341.04; S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-110; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-83 (registration by
non-residents).
178. For example, in North Carolina, the applicant for a license is required to provide his or
her full name, mailing and residential addresses, physical description (including gender, height,
eye color, and hair color), date of birth, and Social Security number. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 207(b) (1995); see also ALA. CODE § 32-6-6 (1975) (stating that the contents of a driver's license
include color photograph, name, birth date, address, and physical description); OKLA. STAT. tit.
47, § 6-106 (1988) (stating that the contents of a driver's license include full name, date of birth,
gender, residence of applicant, whether the applicant is deaf or hearing impaired, license plate
number and State of registration of vehicle, and a brief description of applicant); Wis. STAT.
§ 343.17 (1991) (stating that the contents of a driver's license include color photograph, full
name, date of birth, gender, address, and physical description); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-80(3)
(1991) ("every application for a driver's license or permit must... contain the full name, date of
birth, sex, race, and residence address of the applicant and briefly describe the applicant.").
179. E.g., ALA. CODE § 32-6-14 (1975) (requiring maintenance of records of license
applications and accident reports); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-117 (1988) (maintaining records of
license applications, accident reports, court abstracts and moving violations); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-26(a) (1993) (maintaining records of all applications for a driver's license); Wis. STAT.
§ 343.23 (1991) (maintaining records of driver's license information, including every application
for a license and every suspension, revocation and cancellation); id. § 343.17 (maintaining records
of vehicle registration); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-40 (1991) (maintaining records of license
applications, accident reports, and abstracts of court records).
180. See 139 Cong. Rec. S15,762 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer);
Hearings, supra note 101, 1994 WL 14167988 (Feb. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Moran).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:71

Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wis-

consin, and Wyoming.181 There is ample authority to support the assertion that a majority of States permitted public access to motor vehicle
records. 18 2 Prior to enactment of the DPPA, the federal courts recognized that motor vehicle records were public records.' 83 A closer exami181. See Federal Judge Vows Quick Decision in Challenge to License Secrecy Law, THE
(Rock Hill, SC), Sept. 4, 1997, at 8A; see also Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent
TransportationTechnology, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, tbl. c (1995)
(identifying 27 States providing open access to motor vehicle and driver records).
The Reporters Committee also compiled citations showing that "[a]ll fifty states and the
District of Columbia have statutes providing public access to government records." Bunker, supra
note 169, at 555. See generally REPORTERS COMMrrTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, TAPPING
OFFICIALS' SECRETS, THE DOOR TO OPEN GOVERNMENT IN THE 50 STATES AND D.C. (3d ed. 1997)
(reproducing, with annotations, the various freedom of information acts and public records laws),
available at <http://www.rcfp.org/ tapping/index.cgi>) [hereinafter "REPORTER'S COMMITTEE"]).
The States of Louisiana, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and Florida have open records laws
HERALD

written into their constitutions. LA. CONST. art. XI1, § 3; N.D.
pt. I, art. 8; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24.

CONST.

art. XI, § 6; N.H.

CONST.

182. E.g., Birmingham News Co. v. Perry, 21 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2125 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1993)
(compelling Alabama Department of Public Safety to copy and deliver electronic databases to
requesting party); Olim v. Mayberry, 524 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1974) (finding that the Department of
Public Safety must maintain and release records including driver's license information as well as
moving traffic offenses resulting in convictions and bond forfeitures); McCray v. State, 581 A.2d
45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (affirming conviction on conspiracy to make false entries in public
records arising from issuance of fraudulent driver's licenses); Pressman v. Elgin, 50 A.2d 560,
562 (Md. 1947) (acknowledging that Maryland's 1943 statute guarantees public access to all
records of the Department of Motor Vehicles); Direct Mail Service, Inc. v. Registrar of Motor
Vehicles, 5 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Mass. 1937) ("The very object of requiring registration of
automobiles is to make readily available to the public at all times accurate information as to their
ownership and as to the persons responsible for their operation. There can be no doubt, therefore,
that the registrar's records are fully impressed with the character of public records, and that the
public generally has with respect to them all the privileges of examination and use which that
status affords.") (citations omitted); State ex. rel. Beacon Journal Pub. Co. v. Andrews, 358
N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ohio 1976) ("all documents in the possession of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles
are public records open to the public") (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation omitted);
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Paul, 245 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951) (recognizing
that "the registration records in the County Clerk's Office" represented a means to identify the
owner of an automobile); Stewart v. Maybury, 3 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1931); Hechler v. Casey, 333
S.E.2d 799, 811 (W.Va. 1985) (stating that individuals' names and residential addresses "are not
'personal' or 'private' facts but are public in nature in that they constitute information normally
shared with strangers and are ascertainable by reference to many publicly obtainable books and
records," including specifically on "drivers' licenses and other identification that is routinely
shown to strangers"); see also Dunhill v. Director, Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Transportation, 416
A.2d 244 (D.C. 1980); Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Publication of Address as Well as Name
of Person as Invasion of Privacy, 84 A.L.R.3d 1159 (1978).
183. E.g., United States Dep't of Health & Human Services v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority, 833 F.2d 1129, 1135 n.8 (4th Cir. 1987) (observing that an individual's name and home
address are "a matter of public record in motor vehicle registration and licensing records"); see
also Kelly v. City of Sterling Heights, 946 F.2d 895 (table), 1991 WL 207548 (6th Cir. 1991)
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nation of the law in the five States challenging the DPPA (Alabama,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and South Carolina), demonstrates the long history and public policies promoted by this approach.
1.

ALABAMA

Since 1935, Alabama has enacted specific statutes which treat

motor vehicle records as a matter of "public record."

18 4

Prior to enact-

ment of the DPPA, Alabama law declared:
The director of public safety shall file every application for a
license received by him and shall maintain suitable indices thereto.
The director of public safety shall also file all accident reports and
abstracts of court records of convictions received by him under the
laws of this state and in connection therewith maintain convenient
records or make suitable notations in order that an individual record
of each licensee showing the convictions of such licensee and the
traffic accidents in which he has been involved shall be readily ascertainable and available for the consideration of the director of public
safety upon any application for renewal of license and at other suita-

ble times. 18-

State law further provided: "The director shall upon request furnish any
person an abstract of the operating record of any person subject to the
provisions of this chapter, which abstract shall also fully designate the
...name of such person .... ,,86 These provisions were in accord with
Alabama's public records law.' 87 Thus, Alabama's highest courts have
made clear that the legislative policy contemplated broad public access
to public records 8 8 and that the purpose of permitting open access is to
(finding district court correctly concluded that "information contained on an individual's vehicle
registration application, including a residential address is not, in the Court's opinion, of the
character entitled to constitutional protection. This is particularly so given the public nature,
under Michigan law, of this information.") (unpublished opinion); cf Horvath v. Lindenhurst
Auto Salvage, Inc., 60 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing registration records as a method
of proving motor vehicle ownership).
184. See 1935 Ala. Acts No. 331. Before 1935, the right of access to public documents was
governed by State common law. "Public writings," however, had been broadly defined by the
courts to include such varied items as prisoner records, Holcombe v. State ex rel. Chandler,200
So. 739 (Ala. 1941), real property records, Randolph v. State, 2 So. 714 (Ala. 1887), and tax
records, Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299 (1887).

185.
186.

ALA. CODE
ALA. CODE

§ 32-6-14 (1975).
§ 32-7-4 (1975).

187. ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (1975). "Every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of
any public writing of this state, except as otherwise expressly provided by statute." See Stone v.
Consolidated Pub. Co., 404 So. 2d 678, 680 (Ala. 1981) (explaining that "§ 36-12-40 first
appeared in the 1923 Code").
188. See Holcombe, 200 So. at 746 ("the public generally have the right of a reasonable and
free examination of public records required by law to be kept by public officials").
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promote open government. 189
Alabama law also exposes another error in the assertions made by
the United States in defending challenges to the DPPA. Contrary to the
suggestion of the United States, "Alabama does not and has never trafficked in the commercial sale of public motor vehicle registration
records. Any commercial activity involving Alabama driver's license

information is only incidental to its release" '1 90 because the State does
not sell its information at a profit; it charges only a nominal administra-

tive fee.191
2.

NORTH CAROLINA

Since 1935, North Carolina has by statute treated motor vehicle
records as a matter of "public record."' 92 Prior to enactment of the
DPPA, North Carolina law provided:
All records of the Division pertaining to application and to drivers' licenses, except the confidential medical report referred to in
[N.C. GEN. STAT.] § 20-7, of the current or previous five years shall
be open to public inspection in accordance with [N.C. GEN. STAT.]
§ 20-43.1 at any reasonable time during office hours and copies shall

be provided pursuant to the provisions of [N.C.
193
26.

GEN. STAT.]

§ 20-

State law further provided: "The division shall furnish copies of license
records required to be kept by subsection (a) of this section... to other
persons for uses other than official upon prepayment of the following
fees . . ."19 These provisions were in accord with North Carolina's
public records law, enacted in 1935.195
3.

OKLAHOMA

Oklahoma has long mandated that its motor vehicle records be open
189. See Stone, 404 So. 2d at 681 (recognizing importance of access to public records to
citizen knowledge of government affairs); Holcombe, 200 So. at 744 ("it is not necessary that the
interest be private, capable of sustaining a suit or defense on the personal behalf of the party
desiring that inspection; but he has the right of inspection whenever, by reason of his relation to
the common interest, he may act in such a suit as the representative of a common or public right").
190. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Pryor v. Reno, 998 F.
Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (CIV. No. CV-97-D-1396-N).
191. Alabama charges only an administrative fee of $5.75. Ala. Code § 32-7-4. Many federal
agencies charge comparable or larger sums to provide addresses. See JOHNSON, supra note 110, at
17-19 (armed forces each charge fees ranging from $3.50 to $5.20).
192. Before 1935, the right of access to such documents was governed by State common law.
North Carolina appellate courts had not been called upon to define public records.
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-27(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
194. Id. § 20-26(c) (1993) (emphasis added).
195. See Act of May 2, 1935, ch. 265, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 288 (codified as amended at

N.C. GEN.

STAT. §

132-1 (1995)).
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to public inspection. By 1943, Oklahoma had passed the Oklahoma
Open Records Act, which explicitly "made [it] the duty of every public
official ... who [is] required by law to keep public records ... to keep
the same open for public inspection ... to the citizens and taxpayers of
this state ... 196
In explaining the purpose of the Oklahoma Open Records Act, 197
the State legislature declared: "The purpose of this act is to ensure and
facilitate the public's right of access to and review of government
records so they may efficiently and intelligently exercise their inherent
political power. The privacy interests of individuals are adequately protected in the specific exceptions to the [Act] or in the statutes which
authorize, create or require the records." 1 98
The Oklahoma appellate courts have recognized the State's public
policy. In Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission, 199 the Oklahoma Supreme Court favorably discussed the policy of
disclosure while nonetheless finding non-statutory exceptions. 2 00 The
State legislature promptly acted to supersede Tulsa Tribune by amending the Open Records Act so as to reinforce the disclosure requirement.2 °1 Oklahoma appellate courts now recognize the strength and
breadth of the statutory provisions.
There is ... no provision in the Open Records Act which allows
a court to balance an individual's interest in having records remain
private and the public's interest in having access to the records. The
Legislature has determined by statute that the public's interest is
greater, except where specific statutory exemption is given.20 2
The Oklahoma Supreme Court itself acknowledged that the amendments
"show beyond credible argument to the contrary that the legislature disagreed with our interpretation, in Tulsa Tribune, of the Act. ' 20 3 The
State's highest court explained: "The legislature expressly said that the
public policy of the state is 'to ensure and facilitate the public's right of
access to and review of government records so they may efficiently and
196. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 24 (1943). To bolster this general provision, Oklahoma explicitly
requires the release of any Department of Public Safety Record, including any individual's traffic
record. Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 6-117 (1961).
197. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 24A.1-24A.20.
198. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.2.

199. 735 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1986).
200. Id. at 555 (explaining that "disclosure of information is to be favored over a finding of
exemption").
201. See 1988 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 187, § 2.
202. State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Oklahoma State Bd. of Med. Licensure and Supervision v.
Migliaccio, 917 P.2d 483, 487 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
203. City of Lawton v. Moore, 868 P.2d 690, 692 (Okla. 1993).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

intelligently exercise their inherent political power.'

(Vol. 53:71

9204

Oklahoma's public access provisions are guaranteed by its State
constitution. Oklahoma does not release its motor vehicle records in
bulk. Oklahoma does not sell its records; it charges only a $3.00 administrative fee for issuing a certified record.2 °5 That sum is less that the
sum charged by many federal agencies to provide addresses.2 °6 The
United States has appealed from a district court decision in which
20 7
Oklahoma successfully challenged the constitutionality of the DPPA.

4. WISCONSIN
Wisconsin's very first statutes, enacted in 1849, protected open
records and open meetings. 20 8 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
explained that its open records policy predates that enactment as section
19.35 "is a statement of the common law rule that public records are
open to public inspection. 20° 9 The State has made clear that "[t]he primary purpose of the open records law is to ensure an informed electorate,' 210 and draws no distinction between motor vehicle records and
other records. 2 1
Wisconsin recognizes that in specific cases an individual's interest
in privacy in information may outweigh the public interest in disclosure.
These determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, "giving much
' 2 12
weight to the beneficial public interest in open records.
Consistent with this balancing approach, the Wisconsin legislature
204. Id. (emphasis omitted).
205. Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 6-117(G).
206. See JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 17-19 (armed forces each charge fees ranging from
$3.50 to $5.20).
207. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision in Oklahoma v. United States, 161
F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
208. Wis. Stat. Ch. 10, §§ 29, 37, 137 (1849). "The original statute requiring constitutional
officers to open their records 'has survived virtually unchanged."' Bunker, supra note 169, at 555
n.101 (quoting prior edition of Robert A. Christensen & David Lucey, Tapping Officials' Secrets:
The Door to Open Government in Wisconsin, in REPORTERS COMMITTEE, supra note 18 1, at WI2). The provision's citation has changed over time, requiring a careful reading of the caselaw.
See 1917 Wis. Laws, ch. 178 § 2 (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.35 (West 1996)).
209. State of Wisconsin ex rel. Bilder v. Township of Delavan, 334 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Wis.
1983). Although the case actually makes reference to § 19.21, that cite is to the 1979 code
effective at the time of the 1983 decision. The historical notes to the current § 19.35 indicate that
it is the successor provision.
210. State of Wisconsin ex rel. Young v. Shaw, 477 N.W.2d 340, 348 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Wis. Stat. § 19.35).
211. See also Beckon v. Emery, 153 N.W.2d 501, 503-04 (Wis. 1967) (holding traffic citation
records are public records subject to disclosure); Shaw, 477 N.W.2d at 348 (addressing fight to
inspect accident reports).
212. Township of Delavan, 334 N.W.2d at 259; see also Beckon, 153 N.W.2d at 504 (finding
that "there is an absolute fight to inspect a public document in the absence of specifically stated
sufficient reasons to the contrary"); State of Wisconsin ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 137 N.W.2d
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has directed that disclosure of a "record containing personally identifiable information" is not required if it would "[e]ndanger an individual's
life or safety."2 3 That approach provides protection to individuals reasonably concerned with stalking or other menaces while not eviscerating
the State's general policy favoring open records. In passing the DPPA,
Congress failed to consider any similarly narrowly-tailored solution that
turned on such individualized determinations.
Wisconsin releases motor vehicle records for an administrative fee
"at a rate of $3-4 per record. 21 4 Such fees only cover the "major share"
of compiling the records, not even the cost of photocopying, let alone
providing any profit.2" 5 Many federal agencies charge comparable or
larger sums to provide addresses.21 6
Prior to the enactment of the DPPA, any person who registered a
car or applied for a driver's license could, at his or her option, require
the Wisconsin Department of Transportation ("WISDOT") to keep confidential his or her "personal identifiers" (consisting of name, street
address, post-office box number or nine-digit extended zip code) when
requested by anyone who seeks the personal information of ten or more
people.21 7 WISDOT was authorized, however, to disclose such personal
information to "law enforcement agencies, insurers, motor vehicle manufacturers and their agents and other persons requesting the information
to perform a legally authorized function, even over an individual's
request to keep his or her personal identifiers confidential. 21 8 In reaction to the passage of the DPPA, WISDOT requested that Assembly Bill
338 be introduced in the legislature. That bill would have prohibited
WISDOT from disclosing personally identifiable information to all but
those specifically authorized to receive the information. 19 Notably, as
adopted by the Assembly, the bill provided that the new law would not
apply after a court of competent jurisdiction either declared the DPPA
invalid, or the DPPA was amended. 2z2 The Wisconsin Senate took no
470, 475 (Wis. 1965) ("public policy favors the right of inspection of public records and
documents, and, it is only in the exceptional case that inspection should be denied").
213. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.35(l)(2)(a) (West 1996).
214. Travis, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 923.
215. See Aff. of Barbara J. Wehrle, Chief, Vehicle Records Section, Division of Motor
Vehicles, Wisconsin Department of Transportation, State Plaintiffs Appendix at 107, 115, Travis
v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Wis. 1998); see also Wis. Stat. § 341.17(6).
216. See JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 17-19 (armed forces each charge fees ranging from
$3.50 to $5.20).
217. Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau, 1997 Assembly Bill 338 (introduced May
6, 1997, passed as amended, May 22, 1997).

218. Id.
219. 1997 Assembly Bill 338 § 1 (proposing enactment of Wis. Stat. § 85.05(3)).
220. Assembly Substitute Amendment 1 to 1997 Assembly Bill 338 § 1 (introduced May 13,
1997, passed May 22, 1997).
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action on the bill, however, and it lapsed.
5.

SOUTH CAROLINA

South Carolina follows a more narrowly-tailored approach to limiting access to records than does the DPPA. For example, South Carolina's statutes provide that driver's license and motor vehicle records
may be released to anyone, as long as the requester verifies his or her
name and address, and confirms that the information will not be used for
telephone solicitation. 22 ' The South Carolina statute also contains an
"opt-out" provision, by which individuals may choose to prevent the
release of their records for purposes of marketing and solicitations. 2 2
While South Carolina has not traditionally considered motor vehicle and
driver's license records to be public records subject to a right of inspection,22 3 the DPPA nonetheless would require South Carolina to regulate
in a manner different from the system already established by the State.
The DPPA thus would "impose appreciable cost and effort on the state
department of motor vehicles. 2 2 4
The South Carolina challenge is presented in a unique context.
South Carolina did not require motor vehicle records to be open for
public inspection. Instead, South Carolina simply has a different system
of regulating dissemination of information in motor vehicle records.22 5
In some ways, the State's regime may provide protection superior to the
DPPA without the added burdens and potential liabilities associated with
the DPPA. 2 6
B.

Public Policies Displaced by the DPPA

As demonstrated by an examination of the pre-DPPA status of the
laws in the States now challenging the DPPA, there are strong public
policy reasons for the determination by some States to permit open
access to State motor vehicle records. There is a long- and well-recog221. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-510 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
222. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-540.
223. See 1965 S.C. Op. Att'y. Gen. 82 (No. 1829).
224. Appellee's Brief at 3, Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-2554)
[hereinafter South Carolina Br.].
225. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3-510 through 56-3-540 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
226. See South Carolina Br., supra note 224, at 3. A suit filed by the State after the Fourth
Circuit invalidated the DPPA and enjoined its enforcement in South Carolina further evidences
this point. Although a set of digital images from the State's motor vehicle records could be
permissibly sold under the DPPA, see supra note 65, the State Attorney General brought suit to
rescind the sale premised upon broader protections afforded under South Carolina law. See
Condon v. Image Data, LLC, Civ. Action No. 99-CP-40-0290 (C.P. Richland County Feb. 12,
1999) (denying preliminary injunction).
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nized public interest in open government.227 Public access to government records plays a large part in ensuring open government. Open

records allow citizens to monitor the functions of their government
directly. Thus, although privacy advocates raise legitimate concerns,
there are substantial countervailing interests in open government
records.
The accuracy of the information obtained by government has his-

torically prompted third parties to trust this information as a means of
verifying assertions by a registered or licensed individual. Most obviously, a State-issued driver's license has become accepted as a common
form of identification when cashing checks, using credit cards, or
purchasing alcoholic beverages. Officers of State and local governments
routinely access State motor vehicle records for law enforcement purposes, to enforce zoned parking restrictions, and for other matters.
In addition, the State and local governments benefit from the avail-

ability of this data to many citizen groups. Private citizens in Madison,
Wisconsin, used motor vehicle records to identify men searching for
prostitutes in order to send the men letters to discourage their
patronage. 2 8 Other citizens used this technique to discourage street-cor-

ner drug sales.229 Until thwarted by the DPPA, a Regional Ozone Coalition planned to use motor vehicle records to identify owners of polluting
cars in Ohio and Kentucky to encourage them to clean up their
exhaust.2 30 Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD") chapters have

used information from motor vehicle records to protect children from
alcohol abusers. 23 1 Advocacy groups for the handicapped use the

records to discourage illegal parking in parking spaces reserved for the
handicapped.23 2
227. See, e.g., GIVENS, supra note 121, at 124 ("Information should flow freely in a democratic
society so citizens can keep an eye on what their government is doing."); 66 Am. JUR. 2D, Records
and Recording Laws § 12, at 349 (1973) ("Good public policy is said to require liberality in the
right to examine public records."); cf. Speech of Daniel Webster (Jan. 26, 1930) in JOHN
BARTLETr, FAMLIAR QUOTATIONS 450 (No. 14) (15th ed. 1980) ("The people's government,
made for the people, made by the people, and answerable to the people."). These policies are the
impetus behind the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
228. See Dave Zweifel, Your Right to Know: Law Closing Vehicle/Driver Records Deserves
a Challenge, THE CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, WI), Dec. 16, 1997, at 9A; see also Bruce Landis,
Battle Looms Over Access to Motor Vehicle Files, THE PROVIDENCE SUNDAY JOURNAL
(Providence, RI), Nov. 24, 1996, at B1.
229. See Landis, supra note 228, at B 1; Joseph Neff, New FederalLaw Set to Close Some State
Records, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Sept. 1, 1997, at A3.
230. See Ben L. Kaufman, Privacy Act Blocks Smog Scheme: Coalition Hoped to Send Letter
to Owners of Polluting Cars, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 21, 1997, at B1.
231. See Mike Hendricks, Unrelenting Erosion of our Privacy, THE KANSAS CITY STAR, Sept.
22, 1997, at B1.
232. See Landis, supra note 228, at B I.
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State motor vehicle records are also commonly used to verify information by insurance companies in underwriting and claims handling.
These records are commonly used to locate parties and witnesses in both
civil and criminal proceedings.
Reporters have frequently relied upon motor vehicle records to
facilitate their news-gathering and reporting. For example, following
allegations that Northwest Airlines pilots had flown while intoxicated,
the Minneapolis Star-Tribune searched State motor vehicle records and
published a story relating the number of licensed pilots who had been

charged with alcohol-related driving offenses.2 33 The story prompted
changes in Federal Aviation Administration regulations.2

34

The Kansas

City Star used motor vehicle records to investigate school bus drivers for
speeding, driving with suspended licenses, and driving while intoxicated. 2

5

The Providence (Rhode Island) Journal-Bulletin used motor

vehicle records to identify and interview owners of particular
automobiles that were being recalled. 236 The Detroit News used motor
vehicle records to question whether four State legislators lived in the
233. See Allen Short, Joe Rigert & Norman Draper, 41 Pilots Lost State Driver's Licenses:
Their Alcohol Offenses Over Past 7 Years Included 25 DWI Convictions, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis, MN), Mar. 25, 1990, at 1A; Randy Furst, Accused Pilot Involved in '77 Airport
Incident Appeared Drunk, Court Documents Say, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Mar. 14,
1990, at 4B; see also Randy Furst, Fired NWA Crew to Appeal Revocation of Licenses, STAR
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Mar. 18, 1990, at 1A (reporting on 1990 incident that triggered
investigation of pilots' backgrounds); David Phelps, Cecchi Takes Blame in Alleged Drinking
Case But he says Evidence was Lacking to Ground Crew, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN),
Mar. 21, 1990, at ID (same); All 3 Members of Northwest Cockpit Crew are Indicted, STAR
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Apr. 5, 1990, at 2B (same); Moorhead: City Starts Probe of Speak
Easy Bar Where NWA Cockpit Crew Allegedly Drank, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Apr. 7,
1990, at 5B (same); Donna Halvorsen, Flight Crew Trial to Focus on FAA, NWA and Safety, STAR
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), July 24, 1990, at 3B (same); Doug Grow, Northwest Pilots Caught
in a Hurricane-ForceShift in Attitudes Toward Alcohol, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Aug.
21, 1990, at 1B (same); Randy Furst, Northwest Crew Found Guilty: 3 Convicted of Flying While
Under Influence of Alcohol, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Aug. 21, 1990, at LA (same);
NWA Pilots Face Trial Monday in N.D., STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Aug. 22, 1990, at 3B
(same); Randy Furst, NWA Crew Conviction Weighs Heavily on Airline Industry, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis, MN), Aug. 22, 1990, at 3B (describing momentum for legislative or regulatory
changes to impose stricter standards on pilot alcohol levels); Ex-Northwest Pilots Plead Guilty in
Fargo, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Aug. 24, 1990, at 3B (reporting on 1990 incident that
triggered investigation of pilots' backgrounds); Margaret Zack, NWA Crew Members get Terms
Rangingfrom 12 to 16 Months, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Oct. 27, 1990, at IA (same);
Tony Kennedy, Pilot Ruined by Alcohol Rises to Challenge, Finishes Career, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis, MN), Nov. 7, 1998, at AI (describing post-conviction life of one of the pilots who
gave rise to the investigation); cf Randy Furst, Pilot had Several Drinking Arrests, Completed
Treatment, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), July 14, 1994, at 1B (detailing prior alcohol related
arrest record of another pilot more recently accused of flying while intoxicated).
234. See Jane E. Kirtley, Individual Security vs. Media Access, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec.
16, 1997, at A26 [hereinafter Media Access].
235. See Hendricks, supra note 231, at B1.
236. See Landis, supra note 228, at B 1.
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237
district they were elected to represent.
Following a review of these many governmental and commercial

uses of the data in question, one State found that only three percent of all
requests for access to individual records came from individuals.238
Moreover, State governments have taken measures to prevent the
abuse of personal information obtained through State-maintained drivers' records. In addition to enacting anti-stalking laws,23 9 some States
have placed restrictions on the permitted uses of motor vehicle
records.24 °
C.

The DPPA has Impacted States Differently

Because States had established different public policies regarding
the disclosure of motor vehicle information, the DPPA produced different consequences in different States. As noted above, most States con-

sidered their motor vehicle records to be public records.
Several States with such laws are challenging the DPPA.
Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and North Carolina successfully defended their
open records policies in district court. 24 ' In district court, Alabama lost
its challenge to the DPPA's displacement of its open records policy, but
237. See Ben Bums, Public Disclosure of Driver Records Should be the Norm, MICHIGAN
CHRONICLE, Oct. 1, 1996, at 7A. While many of the previous uses of information identified in the
preceding four paragraphs are arguably permitted under the DPPA, this final example is clearly
prohibited. Although press investigation into the eligibility of legislators would seem to represent
an interest at the very core of the First Amendment and legitimate governmental concern with
maintaining open records, the DPPA would bar the disclosure of the pertinent information for
legislative candidates who did not consent to the release of their records.
In similar fashion, the DPPA erects a barrier to press investigation of whether jury pools are
fairly selected from those eligible to serve (at least in jurisdictions where the jury pool is selected
from all individuals licensed to drive). At least sixteen federal districts supplement jury source
lists with lists of licensed drivers. See John P. Bueker, Note, Jury Source Lists: Does
Supplementation Really Work?, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 390, 390-91 (1997) (collecting citations);
see also Aff. of David Williams, Senior Programs Specialist, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts at 2, United States v. Ramsey, No. CRIM. A.93-131 (E.D. Pa. 1993), (identifying
thirteen districts that supplement voter registration lists with lists of licensed drivers), cited in
Bueker, supra, at 391 n.2.
238. See Editorial, Shutting Down DMV, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 17, 1997, at B8.
239. See supra notes 97, 98 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., supra note 221.
241. State of North Carolina v. Reno, No. 5:98-CV-27-BR(3) (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 1998),
appeal docketed, No. 98-2676 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1998), stay granted pending filing and
disposition of a petitionfor a writ of certiorariin Condon v. Reno, No. 98-2676 (4th Cir. Jan. 28,
1999); Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Wis. 1998), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir.
1998), reh'g denied, No. 98-2881 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 1999), stay of issuance of mandate pending
filing of a petition for a writ of certioraridenied, No. 98-2881 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 1999) stay of
issuance of mandate pending filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari granted sub nom.
Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles v. Reno, No. A-795 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1999)
(Stevens, Circuit Justice); Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D. Okla. 1997),
rev'd, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, No. 97-6389 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999), stay of
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its appeal is pending.242
South Carolina successfully defended its alternative method of limiting disclosure of information from motor vehicle records in district
court.24 3 The United States has not accepted that determination as
final.2 44
California presents another unique context. California ascertained

that the DPPA would require it to disclose more information than under
State law. 24 5 In that setting, the DPPA's requirements produce results
seemingly at odds with congressional intent.
IV.

OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE

DPPA

LITIGATION

Challenges to the DPPA raise six constitutional issues. This sec-

tion discusses each one individually, specifically: the Tenth Amendment,24 6 section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First
Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the

Guarantee Clause.
A.

247
The Tenth Amendment

The DPPA improperly directs States how to regulate their records.
The DPPA does not establish a national system for licensing drivers and

registering motor vehicles. Instead, it directs States as to how they must
regulate the dissemination of information from State-created and -maintained records obtained in performing those tasks. In short, the national
government purports to instruct each State how it must regulate in this
field. The United States Supreme Court has held that Congress may not
issuance of mandate pending filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari granted, No. 97-6389
(10th Cir. Feb. 11, 1999).
242. See Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998), argued on appeal, No. 98-6261
(1 th Cir. Nov. 30, 1998).
243. See Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997).
244. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir.) (affirming the district court), reh'g denied,
No. 97-2554 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. Mar. 15,
1999) (No. 88-1464).
245. See Attorney General's Opinion No. 95-805, 79 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 76 (1996); see also
supra note 44.
246. A more detailed alternative analysis of the Tenth Amendment issues is presented in Part
V below.
247. A brief discussion of the Tenth Amendment issues discussed in this Section as well as in
Part V(B) below was previously published in Thomas H. Odom, A Victory for the l0th
Amendment: 4th Circuit Strikes Driver's Privacy Act as not Generally Applicable, FULTON
Coutwr DAILY REPORT (Georgia), Oct. 6, 1998, at 7, reprinted from Going the 10th Amendment's
Way: 4th Circuit Reaches Decision on Motor Vehicle Records Law, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998,
at 29 [hereinafter Victory].
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legislate in this manner, and the DPPA will not likely survive Tenth
Amendment review.
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."2'48 In New York v. United States,2 49 the Supreme Court
relied on the Tenth Amendment to strike down a statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. z" ° The Supreme Court held that the statute
was an example of federal "co-option" of State legislatures, in violation
of the Tenth Amendment:
While the Framers no doubt endowed Congress with the power
to regulate interstate commerce in order to avoid further instances of
the interstate trade disputes that were common under the Articles of
Confederation, the Framers did not intend that Congress should exercise that power through the mechanism of mandating state
regulation.25
In 1997, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding in Printz v. United
States. 2 The Supreme Court relied, in part, on the way that national
mandates requiring States to regulate specific areas shift accountability.
"By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take
their constituents to
credit for 'solving' problems without having to ask
253
pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.
The DPPA suffers from this same defect. The States challenging
the DPPA have presented uncontradicted testimony calculating the
added expense the States must bear in order to comply with the DPPA's
dictates.2 54 Congressional debate fairly branded the DPPA as an
248. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
249. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
250. New York, 505 U.S. at 180, 188.
251. Id. at 180 (emphasis in original).
252. 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 (1997). "[T]he Framers rejected the concept of a central
government that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in which
the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people." Printz,

117 S. Ct. at 2377. "'The Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the
power to regulate individuals, not States."' Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at

166).
253. Id. at 2382.
254. See South Carolina Br., supra note 224, at 3; Affidavit of L.N. Hagan, Director, Alabama

Department of Public Safety, Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Civ. Action
No. 97-D-1396-N); Affidavit of Barbara J. Wehrle, Chief, Vehicle Records Section, Division of
Motor Vehicles, Wisconsin Department of Transportation, State Plaintiffs Appendix at 107, 115,
Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (No. 97-C-701-C); Affidavit of Carol
Howard, Director, Vehicle Registration Section, North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles,
attached as Exhibit 2 to Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in Support of
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"unfunded mandate. ' 5 5
The district courts in Oklahoma and Condon properly relied upon
New York and Printz to resolve the cases before them and find the DPPA
unconstitutional. On appeal, the United States asserted that those cases
are not controlling. Proponents of the DPPA argue that the DPPA does
not "compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory problem, '2 56 but rather seeks to regulate State conduct in order to address a
problem created by State activity.25 7 Neither of those assertions withstand analysis.
In fact it is difficult to fathom how the DPPA can be read as anything other than a mandate for a State to administer a federal policy
regarding disclosure of information from State files. A detailed comparison to the situation in New York demonstrates the parallels.
In New York, the Supreme Court examined the proper division of
authority between the federal government and the States in the context
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985.258 The Act required States either to take ownership of low-level
radioactive waste in their borders or else to regulate the waste in accordance with federal instructions. The Court concluded that while Congress
has significant power to encourage States to undertake certain tasks valued by Congress, "the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the

ability to compel the States to do

so.

''259

After an extensive analysis of

the history and basis for the Tenth Amendment, the Court concluded that
the Amendment serves an important purpose of republican government,
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, State of North Carolina v. Reno, Civ. No. 5:98-CV-27BR3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 1998).
255. 139 CONG. REC. S15,763 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (the DPPA
"places unfunded mandates on the States which may result in the States prohibiting all uses of
DMV records for any purpose, including legitimate business and press purposes"). The
"unfunded mandate" label has limited direct impact because the September 13, 1994, enactment of
the DPPA preceded the March 22, 1995 enactment of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995 ("UMRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1996) (codified at scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.). The UMRA applies only to legislation considered on or after its delayed effective date; it
has no impact on unfunded mandates enacted prior to the effective date of the UMRA. Pub. L.
No. 104-4, § 110, 109 Stat. at 64; see Tracey A. Kaye, Show Me the Money: Congressional
Limitations on State Tax Sovereignty, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 149, 158 (1998). Consequently,
even the limited procedural limitations on an "unfunded mandate" imposed by the UMRA were
inapplicable to the DPPA.
256. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
257. E.g., Brief of Appellants at 16, Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 972554) [hereinafter U.S. Condon Br.]; Brief of Appellants at 15, Oklahoma v. United States, 161
F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter U.S. Oklahoma Br.].
258. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b et seq. (1994).
259. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). See Ronald D. Rotunda,
Resurrecting Federalism Under the New Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 29 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 953, 959 (1998) [hereafter Resurrecting Federalism] ("New York v. United States says that
you cannot single out states for special legislation.").
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specifically, to ensure that the powers of the States remain distinct from
those of the federal government.2 60 The Court concluded that where the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 ordered
the States to perform certain acts, Congress had exceeded its authority in
violation of the Tenth Amendment.2 6'
The statute at issue in New York presented States with two alternatives: "A state could (1) provide for the disposal of all low-level radioactive waste generated within the state by 1996 or (2) take title to that
waste at that time. ' 6 2 The DPPA offers parallel alternatives. States can
choose between (1) being coerced to enact new laws regarding access to
motor vehicle records which permit individuals to "opt out" of the public database, at significant added expense in terms of mailing, data entry,
and record keeping,2 63 or (2) being coerced to limit disclosures from the
State's public records only in compliance with federal policy.2 64 As in
New York, the first alternative is a "command [to] state government to
enact state regulation. 2 6 5 Yet. it is clear that "Congress itself must legislate in furtherance of federal interests, and may not 'conscript' states to
266
legislate for it.'",
The second alternative is also beyond the authority of Congress.
Just as in New York where the States could not be forced to acquire
property, likewise States may not be instructed how to regulate public
access to property in their custody.2 67 Printz recognized that this second
alternative would have effectively required States "to implement an
administrative solution. '2 68 In Printz, the Supreme Court reviewed provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.26 9 Several
mechanisms were enacted to prevent persons ineligible to possess a
handgun from obtaining one. In States which did not adopt a specific
mechanism under the Act, the Act required the chief law enforcement
officer ("CLEO") in the county of residence of the gun permit applicant
to make a reasonable effort to determine if the applicant's possession of
a handgun would violate the law.2 7 ° The Court concluded that the Brady
260. 505 U.S. at 155-56.
261. Id. at 188.
262. The quoted description represents the United States' own characterization of New York.
U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 14; U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 12-13.
263. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(d) (1994).
264. See id. § 2721(a)-(c) (1994).
265. 505 U.S. at 178.
266. The United States concedes this limitation on Congress. U.S. Condon Br., supra note
257, at 14 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 178); U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 13
(quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 178).
267. See New York, 505 U.S. at 175.
268. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2380 (1997).
269. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
270. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369.
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Act purported to direct State law enforcement officers to participate in
the administration of a federal regulatory scheme, in violation of the
Tenth Amendment.2 7 '
Similarly, to comply with the DPPA, States must affirmatively
adopt legislative or administrative measures enforcing the Act's disclosure limitations in order to avoid liability for maintaining "a policy or
practice of substantial noncompliance" with the DPPA.2 72 State officials
confronted with a request for information must "administer" the federal
program. In Printz, the Supreme Court stated that the Framers of the
Constitution specifically chose not to have the federal government rule
through the States or their officers and concluded that the federal government is constitutionally prohibited from compelling the States to
implement, by legislative or executive action, federal regulatory
programs.2 73
Indeed, it was the very recognition that States would be required to
address the issue legislatively or administratively that prompted Congress to delay the effective date of the DPPA for three years. The Senate
sponsors recognized that their bill proposed an effective date 270 days
following enactment in order to allow the States sufficient time to
develop such responses.27" Following hearings, Congress determined
that the time permitted to States to formulate and implement legislative
or administrative responses was too short.275 States overwhelmingly
recognized the mandate to regulate, and many of the new State statutes
enacted in the wake of the DPPA expressly recited that the State legislatures were responding to that mandate. The Colorado legislature
declared:
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that [its law] is mandated by the provisions of the [DPPA] and that the state may be subject to penalties if legislation to comply with the federal act is not
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 2369-70.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b) (1994).
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380.
See 139 CONG. REC. S15,764 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer) ("This

bill takes a national problem and gives the States broad latitude and nine months to enact a
national solution.") (emphasis added); see also id. (statement of Sen. Warner) (the bill gives
States "room to craft their own specific responses to the regulations").
275. See Hearings supra note 101, 1994 WL 212836 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of Richard A.
Barton) (stating that the bill's proposed 270-day delayed effective date-rather than the three-year
delayed effective date adopted-provided inadequate time for States to appropriate funds,

promulgate legislative and regulatory responses, and implement their new programs); W. Kent
Davis, Drivers' Licenses: Comply with the Provisions of the FederalDriver's Privacy Protection
Act; Provide Strict Guidelinesfor the Release of PersonalInformation from Drivers' Licenses and
Other Records of the Department of Public Safety, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 196, 197 (1997) ("the

enactment of the federal Act was a watershed event for all American states, for it gave them three
years to prepare their own regulations") (emphasis added).
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enacted on or before September 13, 1997. The general assembly
therefore finds that . . . the act creates a new program or service
required by federal law ....

The Wisconsin legislature refused to change its law and, instead, legislators initiated suit to challenge the constitutionality of the DPPA.27 7 The
sponsor of the legislation designed to bring North Carolina into compliance with the DPPA stated that the General Assembly would not have
adopted the DPPA's provisions except for the civil penalties to which
State officials and employees would have otherwise been subject.27 8
Even if the DPPA did not commandeer State legislatures to enact
new laws, it seems indisputable that the DPPA requires State employees
to "administer" the Act. State employees are the ones who receive
requests for DMV records; the DPPA does not provide any federal
officers to perform these functions. 279 Because the DPPA mandates the
disclosure of information in some situations,2 8 ° the State employees may
not simply refuse to respond to the request. Instead, the State employees
must determine whether the requested information is subject to the
DPPA general disclosure prohibition.281 Next, the State employees must
determine whether the requested information is subject to one or more of
the DPPA mandatory disclosure exceptions. Even if States may avoid
compelled legislative action (thereby foregoing all the permissive disclosure exceptions at the cost of displacing State public policy), the result is
that State employees must administer the DPPA for the federal government. New York and Printz prohibit that result as much as they prohibit
Congress from requiring States to legislate. In New York, the Court
emphatically held that the federal government "may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."28' 2 Printz
explicitly reaffirmed that principle: "We adhere to that principle today,
and conclude categorically, as we have concluded categorically in New
York: 'The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
276. 1997 Colo. Sess. Laws H.B. 97-1348, § 1 (emphasis added).
277. See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
278. Affidavit of Senator David W. Hoyle, Chairman, Joint Legislative Transportation
Oversight Committee, General Assembly of North Carolina, attached as Exhibit 1 to Brief in

Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, State of North Carolina v. Reno, Civ. No. 5:98-CV-27-BR3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 1998).
279. The DPPA thus parallels the provisions of the Brady Act invalidated in Printz.
280. See supra Part ll(A)(2).
281. See supra Part II(A)(5).
282. New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added). The quoted statements reflect the Court's
repeated assertion on this point. E.g., id. at 176-77 (observing that the two choices permitted
under the Act "only underscore[ ] the critical alternative a State lacks: A State may not decline to
administer the federal program. No matter which path the State chooses, it must follow the
direction of Congress.") (emphasis added).
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administer a federal regulatory program. ' ' 2 83
The DPPA thus directly violates the Supreme Court's clear instructions in Printz: "The Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the

States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program. '"284

In defense of the DPPA, it is argued, nonetheless, that the "DPPA
regulates the dissemination of information-it does not 'require States
to regulate.' , 28 5 The plain language of New York and Printz rejects this
defense of the DPPA. Congress did not choose to establish a national

system for licensing drivers and registering automobiles. If Congress
had done so, it could decide for itself what information assembled from
those processes to make public. Instead, Congress left licensing and
registration to the States but purported to direct State officials to administer federal policy regarding dissemination of information, and it is this
approach that was foreclosed by Printz.28 6
The United States also argues for an overly narrow reading of New
York and Printz. The United States asserts that New York and Printz
only "hold that Congress, in addressing a problem created by private
parties,cannot conscript the states to enforce federal law. 2 87 The problem Congress sought to address in the DPPA was stalking, clearly a
problem created by private parties. Further, the United States concedes

in its brief in Oklahoma that prevention of stalking is the goal of the
DPPA.28 8 In order to battle the problem caused by criminals, Congress
283. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188) (emphasis added); accord
id. at 2380; see id. at 2372 n.2 (pointing to lack of early federal "statute compelling state executive
officers to administer federal laws) (emphasis added); id. at 2374 n.8 (reviewing the Federalist
Papers and noting "the curiousness of Madison's not mentioning the state executives' obligation
to administer federal law," and reviewing Story's Commentaries and noting all his examples
"involve not state administrationof federal law, but merely the implementation of duties imposed
on state officers by the Constitution itself") (emphasis added); id. at 2381 (explaining that forcing
State officers "into administering federal law" is not "compatible with this independence and
autonomy") (emphasis added); id. (distinguishing cases because they "say[ ] nothing about
whether state executive officers must administer federal law") (emphasis added); id. at 2384 ("The
federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer
or enforce a federal regulatory program.") (emphasis added).
284. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
285. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 17 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
178); see also U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 15-16.
286. 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
287. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 8 (emphasis added); see also U.S. Oklahoma Br.,
supra note 257, at 8.
288. U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 3-4 (noting that the DPPA was a response to
crimes across the country involving stalkers, robbers and other criminals who have used motor
vehicle records to locate victims and commit crimes"); see U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 34 (same).
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enacted a requirement that States must regulate their dissemination of
motor vehicle records in accordance with national law. Thus, the DPPA
fits squarely within the prohibition of New York and Printz as formu-

lated by the United States in the pending litigation.
The United States attempts to avoid New York and Printz by

recharacterizing the source of the harm. The United States asserts that
the harm is not caused by criminals, but by the States. The United States

claims that "the DPPA responds to a problem created by motor vehicle
department disclosures. '"289 This semantic sleight-of-hand does not
withstand analysis. Alabama, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and all of the other States criminalize stalking; they do

not condone behavior like the stalking death of Rebecca Schaeffer.29 °
Moreover, the United States fails to acknowledge that disclosures from
federal agencies provide the same information and result in the same
misuse by criminals. In
gress was informed that
and residential addresses
The argument that

the context of testimony on the DPPA, Conthe federal government itself released names
of potential victims.2 9 '
States caused the problem addressed by the

DPPA is the equivalent of blaming a State for registering an automobile
that a criminal subsequently uses in an armed robbery, or blaming the
United States Postal Service for the actions of Ted Kaczynski.2 92 The

only sense in which States "created" the problem is that they did not
regulate dissemination of information from their records in the manner
Congress now dictates. Yet, if all that is required to permit the national
government to dictate to States how they must regulate is a difference in
opinion as to the how the State should regulate, New York and Printz
would be so easily circumvented as to be meaningless.2 9 3 Instead, the
289. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 9; see also id. at 13 ("state activity itself is the source
of the problem to be regulated"); U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 8; id. at 12 (same).
290. One is not held liable for superseding conduct of a third party, which includes "those
intentional or criminal acts against which no reasonable standard of care would require the
defendant to be on guard," including "unforeseeable personal attacks upon the plaintiff." W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 44 at 313 (5th ed. 1984). This is

because "[u]nder all ordinary and normal circumstances, in the absence of any reason to expect
the contrary, the actor may reasonably proceed upon the assumption that others will obey the
criminal law." Id. § 33 at 201.
291. See supra Parts n.C. & II.D. and accompanying text.
292. In January of 1998, Theodore Kaczynski, also known as the "Unabomber," pled guilty to
federal charges stemming from his eighteen year mail bombing spree that targeted those he
considered to be "technocrats." Tamala M. Edwards, Crazy Is As Crazy Does: Why the
Unabomber Agreed to Trade a Guilty Plea for a Life Sentence, TIME MAG., Feb. 2, 1998, at 66.
The bombings killed three people and injured twenty-three. Id. As part of his plea bargain
Kaczynski accepted a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of appeal or release. Id.
For a thorough account of the Unabomber's activities, see ROBERT GRAYSMITH, UNABOMBER: A
DESIRE TO KILL

(1997).

293. Indeed, the harm at issue in New York and Printz could just as easily have been blamed on
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DPPA is directly parallel to the statutes at issue in New York and Printz
in that the "federal statutes addressed problems created by private per-

sons, and required the states to enact or enforce regulations in aid of a
federal scheme designed to address these problems."2'94
The United States acknowledges that the "DPPA regulates the
motor vehicle departments. 2 95 The United States asserts that "Congress

is not barred from regulating state activity." '96 The United States, however, cites no authority for the proposition that Congress may regulate
States directly and exclusively. The United States does not, and cannot,

assert that the DPPA is a law of general applicability that only incidentally applies to States. 97 The United States concedes that the DPPA is
directed to States. 98 Thus, a straightforward application of Printz and
New York can, and should, result in the invalidation of the DPPA under
the Tenth Amendment.

One of the fundamental bases for the decisions in New York and
Printz was concern with maintaining accountability for public policy
choices.
Throughout New York, the Court emphasized the constitutional
problems that arise when Congress declines to enact a federal legislative solution and instead commands states to enact a State regulation
or enforce a federal scheme. "Accountability is ... diminished when,
due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in
accordance with the view of the local electorate in matters not prethe States. It can be argued that States "created" the problem of radioactive waste disposal and
permitting the unauthorized purchase of firearms if one first ignores the primary conduct of
private individuals which was the most direct source of those harms.
294. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 13; U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 12.
The Printz court distinguished many other federal statutes that similarly are not drawn into
question by the DPPA litigation.
Some of these [federal laws] are connected to federal funding measures, and can
perhaps be more accurately described as conditions upon the grant of federal
funding than as mandates to the States; others, which require only the provision of
information to the Federal Government, do not involve the precise issue before us
here, which is the forced participation of the States' executive in the actual
administrationof a federal program.... Even assuming they represent assertion of
the very same congressional power challenged here, they are of such recent vintage
that they are no more probative than the statute before us of a constitutional tradition
that lends meaning to the text.
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376.
295. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 9; U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 8.
296. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 9; U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 8.
297. An alternative Tenth Amendment analysis addressing this issue is set forth below in Part
V.
298. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 16 ("DPPA is in every sense regulation of state
activity"); accord U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 15 (same).
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299
empted by federal regulation."
That loss of accountability is evident in the public debate today. State
officials are being blamed for closing access to traditionally-open motor
vehicle records.
Without public debate and against the will of the legislature, the
head of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles has closed down public access
to more than 5 million Indiana driver's license records.
The decision by BMV Commissioner Gary Gibson seems a
drastic over-reaction to the Driver's Privacy Protection Act passed by
Congress in 1994. It will surely thwart the ability of public and press
to scrutinize driving records for valuable information on topics like
drunk driving, repeat offenders and traffic safety. 3°
As a further example, the State of Wisconsin originally was named a
defendant in the DPPA challenge.3"' The State then moved for realignment as a plaintiff and filed its own complaint.30 2 Government watchdog organizations and citizens alike suffer from the uncertainty of which
sovereign to blame as well as from the loss of access to records that
permit private investigation of government corruption, fraud, and

abuse.3 o3

The Printz Court recognized the significance of these nonfinancial
burdens. "[E]ven when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of
implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects. 30 4 The Court
provided several examples of this point:
Under the present law, for example, it will be the CLEO and not
some federal official who stands between the gun purchaser and
immediate possession of his gun. And it will likely be the CLEO, not
some federal official, who will be blamed for any error (even one in
the designated federal database) that causes a purchaser to be mistak299. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 15 n.7 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 169); U.S.
Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 14 n.7 (same).
300. Editorial, Bad Law Made Worse, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 7, 1997, at A4; see also
Katherine Gregg, Privacy of Motor Vehicle Records Debated, THE PROVIDENCE JOURNALBULLETIN (Providence, RI), Mar. 22, 1997, at At ("Now lawmakers in states across the countryincluding Rhode Island-are debating whether to seal those records off from public scrutiny or
keep them open a crack."); Mary Beth Schneider, Motor Vehicle Chief Cuts Public Access to
Driver's Records, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 3, 1997, at Dl ("In effect, the BMV's action closes
the records to the public.").
301. See Complaint, Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (No. 97-C-701C).
302. See Complaint of Realigned Plaintiffs, Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Wis.
1998) (No. 97-C-701C).
303. See, e.g., R.L. Polk & Co. v. Ryan, 694 N.E.2d 1027 (Ill.
App. Ct.) (suit by commercial
purchaser of motor vehicle records against Illinois Secretary of State), appealdenied, 705 N.E.2d
449 (I11.
1998).
304. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 (1997).
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enly rejected.3 °5
So too, with respect to the DPPA. It will be a State DMV official and
not a federal official who stands between the individual requesting
motor vehicle records and the delivery of that information. Finally, it
will also likely be the DMV official, not a federal official, who will be
blamed for any error that causes either mistaken withholding or mistaken release of the information.
Under the foregoing analysis, application of Printz and New York to
invalidate the DPPA would not change Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
despite the United States' dire warnings to the contrary. The United
States contends that if New York and Printz are applied according to
their terms, so as to hold that the DPPA improperly conscripts State
employees into federal service, the "rule would read the Supremacy
Clause out of the Constitution and confound the premises of our federal
system."30 6 That hyperbole misses the point. The Tenth Amendment
poses no bar to congressional enactment of a national system of licensing and registration. Congress could even go so far as to occupy the
entire field. The Supremacy Clause would then result in preemption of
State laws.30 7 In contrast, New York and Printz forbid congressional

action that leaves a matter to State regulation and administration, while
purporting to direct States how they must go about their tasks and using
State officers to administer the program. Such indirect federal action
defies the accountability principles fundamental to democratic selfgovernment.
The Printz Court rejected the argument that indirect federal action
was acceptable as long as federal direction was clear:
It is permissible, the Government asserts, for Congress to command
state or local officials to assist in the implementation of federal law
so long as "Congress itself devises a clear legislative solution that
regulates private conduct" and requires state or local officers to provide only "limited, non-policymaking help in enforcing that law."30 8

The Printz Court recognized that State officers were not simply
impressed to perform ministerial functions; State officers were forced to
make policy decisions regarding the level of resources to divert to the
federal program.
It may well satisfy the Act for a CLEO to direct that (a) no background checks will be conducted that divert personnel time from
305. Id. See also Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 394-95 (1997)

(discussing accountability).
306. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 17; U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 16.
307. Of course, federal preemption only follows if Congress has authority to act under the
Commerce Clause. See infra Part IV(E).
308. 117 S. Ct. at 2380.
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pending felony investigations, and (b) no background check will be
permitted to consume more than one-half hour of an officer's time.
But nothing in the Act requires a CLEO to be so parsimonious;
diverting at least some felony-investigation time, and permitting at
least some background checks beyond one-half hour would certainly
not be unreasonable. Is this decision whether to devote maximum

"reasonable efforts" or minimum "reasonable efforts" not preemi30 9

nently a matter of policy?

The DPPA presents the same problem. It is a matter of policy to decide
how much time, if any, DMV officials must expend verifying a requesting individual's entitlement to claim an exemption mandating or permitting disclosure. Thus, the DPPA unconstitutionally requires State
officials to administer federal law.
B.

Section Five of the FourteenthAmendment

0

Legislation properly enacted pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is not subject to Tenth Amendment limitations.3"
The DPPA's defenders haphazardly argue that Congress had authority to
enact the DPPA pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 1 That argument does not withstand analysis because pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may enforce only pre-existing
constitutional rights. Congress lacks authority to declare new constitutional rights and there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information contained in motor vehicle records. An overwhelming majority
of States have a long tradition of treating motor vehicle records as public
records.31 3 Moreover, similar information is available from many other
309. 117 S. Ct. at 2381.
310. A skeletal outline of many of these points with respect to Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment was previously published in Thomas H. Odom, A Constitutional Right that Isn't:
Driver's Right to Privacy of Home Address is Not Guaranteed,FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT
(Georgia), June 19, 1998, at 7, reprintedfrom We Can Know Where You Live: No Constitutional
Right Permits Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act to Shield Motor Vehicle Records, LEGAL
TIMES, June 15, 1998, at 25 (reprinted in NEW JERSEY L.J., June 22, 1998, at 24) [hereinafter
Fourteenth Amendment].

311. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment "themselves embody significant limitations on state authority"); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) ("principles of federalism that might otherwise
be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the
Civil War Amendments" which "were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and
an intrusion on state sovereignty"); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) ("when
properly exercising its powers under § 5, Congress is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment
constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers").
312. On appeal in the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, the United States asserted that "the DPPA
was a valid exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers because the statute vindicates
drivers' protected interest in privacy." U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 7; U.S. Oklahoma Br.,
supra note 257, at 23.
313. See supra Part III.
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public sources.3 14 In addition, the national government maintains open
records of similar information when it licenses operators of vehicles and
registers vehicles.31 5 The DPPA is not proportionate to any limited ends
Congress could legitimately address under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Notably, the United States' briefs omitted any reference to the con-

trolling authority on this point: City of Boerne v. Flores.3 16 The United
States' opening briefs did not attempt to distinguish this authority and
cited only cases that predate its decision.31 7 City of Boerne explicitly
rejected the same arguments the United States presented with respect to
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as it now presents with respect to
the DPPA. The Supreme Court explained:
Congress' power under § 5, however, extends only to "enforc[ing]"
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has
described this power as "remedial." The design of the Amendment

and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress
has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not
the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.

Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer
be, in any meaningful sense, the "provisions of [the Fourteenth
Amendment]."318
Absent prior authority that names and addresses contained in State
motor vehicle records were protected by a federal constitutional right to
privacy, the DPPA cannot be said to enforce any such right. If the law
were otherwise, "[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment
314. See supra Parts II(C) & II(D).
315. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
316. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
317. The Fourth Circuit specificially noted this omission. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453,
463 n.7 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied, No. 97-2554 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998). The United States did not
even discuss this controlling precendent in response to the briefs of Alabama and amicus curiae
Oklahoma. See U.S. Alabama Br., supra note 94, at 37-44.
318. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). For further
discussion of the City of Boerne decision, see Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under
Section 5 of the Eighteenth Amendment After City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REV. 163 (1998)
[hereinafter Powers of Congress], and Marci A. Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores: A Landmark
for Structural Analysis, 39 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 699 (1998). For additional discussion of the
issues addressed in that case, see Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment:
Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1995),
and Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the
Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 357
(1994).
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process contained in Article V. 319 The DPPA does not satisfy the City
of Boerne standard for several reasons.
As a preliminary matter, it is not settled that there is any constitutional right to privacy entitling one to challenge dissemination of information. Two United States Courts of Appeals-for the Sixth Circuit
and for the District of Columbia Circuit-have refused to extend a constitutional right to privacy to require nondisclosure of information. In
J.P. v. DeSanti,32 ° juveniles sought to prevent State officials from disclosing information compiled by probation officers for use in the adjudication of cases against the juveniles. More recently, the District of
Columbia in American Federation of Government Employees v.

HUD,3 2 expressed "grave doubts as to the existence of a constitutional
right of privacy in the nondisclosure of personal information. 322
Although the court did not need to accept or reject such a right because
the case involved the gathering, rather than disclosure, of information,323
the court quoted approvingly from DeSanti and indicated that it would
reject the right when and if it had to address the issue. 324 This preliminary matter was not addressed in the DPPA litigation because each of
those cases arose in circuits that had previously established precedent
recognizing some right. If the Supreme Court reviews the constitutionality of the DPPA, however, the Court may find it necessary to address
this issue.
As noted above, the predominant historical tradition throughout an
overwhelming majority of the States was that records were publicly
available. The sponsors of the DPPA conceded that thirty-four States
permitted open access to these records.3 25 Most States have permitted
such access for decades, if not since the turn of the century. 326 This long

and widely-shared history of disclosure should defeat most claims of a
reasonable expectation of privacy.32 7 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.

653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981).
118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 787-88.
Id. at 793,
Id. at 792-93. For a discussion of whether such a privacy right has been recognized, see

William Watkins, Jr., The Driver's Privacy Protection Act: Congress Makes a Wrong Turn, 49

S.C. L. REV. 983, 1002-03 (1998).
325. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 182.

327. That fact dooms the United States' argument: precedent in the Fourth and Tenth Circuits
requires that information fall within an individual's reasonable expectations of confidentiality in
order to raise any privacy issue. See Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir.
1990); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986). In a footnote, the United States
observes that privacy advocates who testified before Congress asserted that the public does have a
privacy interest in disclosure from motor vehicle records of names and addresses. See U.S.
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found a reduced expectation of privacy due to the pervasive regulation
328
of automobiles, albeit in other contexts.
As hearing testimony on the DPPA made clear, this same "personal
information" is available from numerous other sources including many
federal governmental sources. Congress was advised that the Postal
Service handed out forwarding address information. 329 A book on
which the DPPA's chief sponsor relied indicated that the Internal Revenue Service and other federal agencies also disseminate this informa-

tion.33 ° It is perhaps most telling that databases of operators and owners
of vehicles licensed by the federal government (i.e., aircraft) are available on the Internet.3"3 ' The federal government is also acting to make

names and residential addresses more available, by excluding regulation
of such information from the Fair Credit Reporting Act.332 These federal sources of the same information should put the final nail in any
claim of reasonable expectation of privacy in one's residential address.
In defense of the DPPA, the United States argues that "individuals
only expect to produce their driver's licenses (like other means of identification) selectively and voluntarily. 33 3 The United States cites no

authority for that proposition, notwithstanding the fact that the Travis
court thoroughly rejected it. 33 4 It is difficult to imagine that a motorist
stopped by the police with probable cause reasonably believes that he is
free to decline to produce his driver's license without consequences. In

addition, the use of driver's licenses as identification is so pervasive in
every day life as to belie the notion that they are produced only selectively.33 5 Moreover, the United States' assertion is inapposite. The fact
Condon Br., supra note 257, at 25 n.8; U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 25 n.8. But the
quoted testimony does not support the notion that the public then reasonably believed that this
information was not subject to public disclosure. No such reasonable expectation would have
been possible in light of historical treatment of motor vehicles in a majority of States.
328. For example, the prerequisites to conduct a search of the automobile are lower. See
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (noting individuals have "reduced expectations of
privacy" that derive "from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public
highways") (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1973)); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (finding privacy interests are diminished because
"[a]utomobiles . . . are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and
controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements."); see also New York v. Class,
475 U.S. 106, 113 (1986) (finding "factors that generally diminish the reasonable expectation of
privacy in automobiles are applicable a fortiori to the [vehicle identification number]").
329. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
333. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 23-24; U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 22.
334. Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (W.D. Wis. 1998), rev'd 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir.
1998).
335. Courts have observed that names and residential addresses "appear[ ] on drivers' licenses
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that an individual controls the production of his driver's license does not
answer the question of whether the individual reasonably believes that
the same information may not be disclosed from the State's motor vehicle records. The overwhelming majority of States have long treated this
information as a matter of public record.336
The United States also fails to acknowledge that it disseminates the
very same information that, in the DPPA litigation, it claims is private.
The United States' publication (and release for Internet distribution) of a
database of aircraft registrations "is analogous to a requirement that each
[aircraft] owner display her name, address and telephone number on her
[airplane's tail]." 33' 7 An individual's reasonable expectation of privacy

in his residential address cannot be greater when disclosure is made by
the State rather than the national government. The federal disclosures
thus undermine this argument as well.
Of the few federal cases recognizing a constitutional right to privacy in nondisclosure of information, 338 none addressed motor vehicle
records. 3 39 Rather, all the records involved in those cases contained suband other identification that is routinely shown to strangers." Kotulski v. Mt. Hood Community
College, 660 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); accord Hechler v. Casey, 333 S.E.2d 799, 811
(W. Va. 1985).
336. The Condon district court found that "Walls clearly established, for example, that
information that is freely available in public records is not constitutionally protected." 972 F.
Supp. at 991 (citing Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990)).
337. See U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 24; U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 23.
See also notes 114-16.
338. The United States asserted in Condon that the Fourth Circuit "has repeatedly recognized
that the Constitution creates a privacy interest in limiting disclosure of personal information."
U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 22. However, "the federal government did not and could not
produce one case from the Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit finding a violation of privacy based
on government dissemination of private information." Watkins, supra note 324, at 1000. The
United States failed to cite the Fourth Circuit's prior statement that that privacy interest does not
apply to motor vehicle records. See United States Health and Human Services v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority, 833 F.2d 1129, 1135 n.8 (4th Cir. 1987) (observing that an individual's name
and home address "is a matter of public record in motor vehicle registration and licensing
records") (citation omitted).
The United States asserted the same of the Tenth Circuit's jurisprudence, U.S. Oklahoma Br.,
supra note 257, at 21, and of the Eleventh Circuit's cases as well, U.S. Alabama Br. supra note
94, at 38-39.
339. See Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir.) (excerpts from personal
diary containing "intimate and personal" information such as spouse's "written perceptions of
their marriage"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995); Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d
482, 484 (4th Cir. 1992) (medical records of blood donor infected with the HIV virus); James v.
City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539 (11 th Cir. 1991) (videotape depicting sexual activity); Walls v.
City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 190 (4th Cir. 1990) (background questionnaire for public
employment administered by city police inquiring as to family arrest history, individual and
spouse's debts, and individual's marital and homosexual relations history); Hester v. City of
Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11 th Cir. 1985) (polygraph control questions which avoided
issues related to marriage, sexual and family relations); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 837-38
(10th Cir. 1986) (internal police investigation report of two officers' use of contraband drugs);
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stantially less-public information, which have not been traditionally considered a matter of public record.34 °
Moreover, all the cases the United States cited in Condon involve
initial disclosure of information to the State, not the limitation on the

State's power to disclose information it compiled in its public records.
The United States acknowledged that these cases are distinguishable on
that basis. 34 1 However, the United States failed to acknowledge that

several courts of appeals have specifically recognized that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to motor vehicle
records.34 2

In fact, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Constitution
compels no protection of names and addresses. Although the Court held
that collective bargaining representatives of federal employees may not
compel disclosure of names and residential addresses, the Court clearly
indicated that the protection from disclosure rested exclusively on statutory grounds.3 43 Realizing that this would lead to a discrepancy between
the federal government's mandate for private employers to disclose this
344
information to their employees' collective bargaining representatives
and collective bargaining representatives' inability to compel the same

information from federal agency employers (at least with respect to
employees covered by the Privacy Act), the Supreme Court invited a

statutory change to the Privacy Act: "Congress may correct the disparity" in treatment of classes of unions because the only prohibition on
disclosure was statutory.34 5
Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d 220, 221 (4th Cir. 1984) (family background information sought to
facilitate rehabilitation of incarcerated felon); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir. 1981)
(plaintiff compelled pursuant to subpoena to provide information regarding "the most private
details of his life" during criminal investigation); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.
1978) (financial disclosure requirements for candidates for political office). Cf American
Federation of Gov't Employees v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786, 791-93 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (expressing doubt
that a constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal information exists; but not reaching a
conclusion because even if such a right existed, it would not have been violated on the facts of the
case).
340. See James, 941 F.2d at 1543 (sexual activity); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352
(1967) (disclosure of content of telephone conversation in a telephone booth); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 602 (1977) (prescription records); Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1388 (personal diary).
341. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 22-23.
342. See Kelly v. City of Sterling Heights, 946 F.2d 895 (table), 1991 WL 207548 (6th Cir.
1991); United States Health and Human Services v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 833 F.2d
at 1135 n.8.
343. In United States Deparment of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 510 U.S.
487 (1994), the Court explained that "[d]isclosure of the home addresses is prohibited by the
Privacy Act unless an exception to that Act applies." Id. at 498. It then concluded: "Disclosure of
the addresses in this case is prohibited 'by law,' the Privacy Act." Id. at 502.
344. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
345. United States Dep't of Defense, 510 U.S. at 502-03.
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Even if some constitutional interest in information privacy were
applicable, there is not an absolute right to nondisclosure. The information may be disclosed if the privacy interest is "outweighed by a coun-

tervailing government interest. 346 This important qualification
reconciles the DPPA's laundry list of exceptions permitting access by
private detectives and private security services, 34 7 tow truck operators, 34 8 employers, 34 9 researchers and statisticians, 350 insurance companies,35' tort victims and witnesses,352 and others.
The list is so long
that the only criminals likely to be foreclosed from obtaining the information are those too honest (or too stupid) to lie about their proposed
use of the data.
States may also have interests that outweigh privacy,35 4 permitting

them to maintain a system of open records for the benefit of the public
and the press (the two groups not falling within the stated exceptions).35 5
States that have open motor vehicle records relied on public policies
favoring broad access to records kept by the government. For example,
in Alabama, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and other States, the
public policy favoring open records is a means to promote democratic
self-government. 6 Individuals and the media are able to use their

access to information as a check on government fraud and abuse. The
DPPA "curtail[s] access to government-held information that historically has .been available and thereby reduce[s] public oversight of the
346. The United States concedes as much. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 10. The
United States recognizes that "[a]n individual's privacy interest in nondisclosure of personal
information is in no sense absolute." U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 23.
347. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 63-65 & 70-75 and accompanying text.
354. See U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 23 ("States plainly can place rational
conditions on owning and operating automobiles and can properly use the information they collect
related to the ownership and operation of automobiles.").
355. In the DPPA litigation, rather than arguing that the privacy interests protected by the
DPPA outweigh the States' interest in open government, the United States ignores the States'
interest in guaranteeing that their records are open to public inspection. U.S. Condon Br., supra
note 257, at 22-23.
356. 66 AM. JUR. 2 D, Records and Recording Laws § 12 at 349 (1973) ("Good public policy is
said to require liberality in the right to examine public records."). See also Stone v. Consolidated
Pub. Co., 404 So. 2d 678, 681 (Ala. 1981); Holcombe v. State ex rel Chandler, 200 So. 739, 744
(Ala. 1941); City of Lawton v. Moore, 868 P.2d 690, 692 (Okla. 1993); State of Wisconsin ex rel.
Young v. Shaw, 477 N.W.2d 340, 348 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); William McBlief, Note,
Administrative Law-Public Access to Public Records in North Carolina: The Key to Good
Government, 60 N.C. L. REv. 853, 853 (1982); Moore, supra note 62 at 1527, 1534.
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functioning of government. '357 Congress did not even consider this
weighty interest since the DPPA's sponsor purported only to "close a
loophole in State Law. 35 8
In the pending litigation, the United States failed to identify any

legislative precedent for a federal law that closed traditionally-open government records. Instead, the United States cites only to laws involving
information gathered by a variety of private entities.359 The DPPA "is

the first legislation that limits access to public records." 36 0 Different
357. Press Exemption, supra note 102, at 644; see also Murray, supra note 126, at 952 n.130
("[Alithough the United States values informational privacy, it places greater emphasis on the free
flow of ideas.") (citing Setting Standards supra note 127, at 503-06).
358. 140 CoNG. REC. H2522 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. Moran).
359. See Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988); Cable Communications
Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1991); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988);
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988). The United States conceded
these examples involve "information gathered by a variety of private entities." U.S. Condon Br.,
supra note 257, at 12 (emphasis added); U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 11 (same). In
addition, "they are of little relevance. Even assuming they represent the assertion of the very
same congressional power challenged here, they are of such recent vintage that they are no more
probative than the statute before us of a constitutional tradition that lends meaning to the text."
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376 (1997). Moreover, none of these examples restrict
disclosure of names and residential addresses to the extent of the DPPA. See supra notes 144-66
and accompanying text.
These isolated laws, even when considered cumulatively, do not establish a generally
applicable law of data protection. The United States has not adopted an omnibus approach to the
protection of personal data. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 49-50 (1997);
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 124, at 7; Murray, supra note 126, at 969-70. The United
States pursues only an ad hoc, sectoral approach to data protection. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG,
supra note 124, at 7; Michael D. Scott, United States, in DATA TRANSMISSION AND PRIVACY 487
(D. Campbell & J. Fisher eds. 1994); Murray, supra note 126, at 941 & n.53, 945, 969-70. This
approach of the federal government is "ad hoc" in that legislation is developed in reaction to
particular incidents. Id. at 941 n.53. It is "sectoral" in that narrow laws are adopted for specific
industries or industrial sectors. Id. This regulatory approach follows from the United States'
tradition of limited government, which permits the federal government to regulate its internal
information policies extensively while limiting its ability to interfere with private sector collection
of information. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 124, at 6, 382; Murray, supra note
126, at 970-71. The resulting set of laws has gaps indicative of the ad hoc, sectoral approach. See
SCHWARTZ & REIDENnERG, supra note 124, at 213; Murray, supra note 126, at 980. For example,
the United States has regulated virtually no data protection in health care, banking and other
financial institutions, direct marketing, or with respect to employers' treatment of workers' data,
thereby creating significant gaps in private sector data protection. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG,
supra note 124, at 154, 262, 308, 350; Murray, supra note 126, at 982, 985, 988 n.408, 1013-14;
see also supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (medical and health records, employee
records, direct marketing); supra note 130 and accompanying text (financial institutions).
Moreover, American business successfully engages in strong lobbying against increased
regulation of data protection in the private sector. See Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise GametPol, The FundamentalRole of Privacy and Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
105, 113 (1995) [hereinafter Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol]. The limited and spotty nature of federal
legislation bars the claim that States are merely being subject to the same regulation as the private
sector. See infra note 504.
360. Sessler, supra note 127, at 654 (emphasis added); see also Murray, supra note 126, at 975
n.289 (citing numerous examples of federal statutes throughout the publication which address data
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constitutional issues are implicated when Congress regulates private
entities as opposed to when it regulates the States directly.3 6 1 Moreover,

the policies favoring open government are inapplicable in the private
sector.362

Even if there were constitutional basis for providing some protection for an individual's residential address, City of Boerne made plain
that "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end. '363 "Remedial legislation under § 5 'should be adapted to the mis-

chief and wrong which the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to
provide against.' "364
The "link between motor vehicle records and the isolated actions of
unbalanced individuals has not been firmly established" since Congress
considered only "anecdotal" evidence. 365 Therefore, the legislative history "leaves unresolved the question of how frequently stalkers and

other criminals have used motor vehicle information to locate their victims. '3 66 One of the lead sponsor's staffers "recalled only twenty incidents where a stalker found his victim through motor vehicle
records. '3 67 This limited number of incidents nationwide strongly suggests that Congress legislated broadly without identifying a sufficient

nexus to the harm sought to be alleviated.
The DPPA has all the same indicia that it is not a true remedial or

preventative measure as were present in the statute at issue in City of
Boerne.3 68 Specifically, the DPPA lacks "termination dates, geographic
restrictions," and "egregious predicates" of intentional State action.36 9
When "a congressional enactment pervasively prohibits constitutional

state action in an effort to remedy or prevent unconstitutional state
protection, all of which-except the DPPA-apply to the federal government itself or to the
public sector).
361. See Barry D. Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State
Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 70 ("federal regulation of
private conduct raises issues which are different from those involved in federal regulation of state
governmental activity"); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991) ("the Fourteenth
Amendment does not override all principles of federalism").
362. In addition, the United States is incorrect that the laws it cites as examples "regulate the
dissemination of this information in much the same way." U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at
12; accord U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 11. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (1994), does not prohibit the dissemination of names and residential addresses. See supra
notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
363. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997).
364. Id. at 2170 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883)).
365. Loving, supra note 94, at 207.

366. Id.
367. Id.
368. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170-71.

369. Id.
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action, limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress' means are pro-

portionate to ends legitimate under § 5. ' ' 37 0 The DPPA is vastly overbroad because it does not limit its protection to individuals who are
likely subjects of stalking, and does not employ less-burdensome provisions such as simply requiring States to notify an individual when a third
party seeks a copy of her motor vehicle information.371
In sum, Congress sought to legislate a new right of privacy in the
dissemination of information. Without a previously established constitutional right to privacy regarding this information, Congress overstepped its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. This is
inconsistent with City of Boerne, and as a result, the DPPA cannot be

sustained on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment.
370. Id.
371. On appeal in Condon, the United States made a last-ditch attempt to preserve the entire
DPPA based on the district court's acknowledgment that the disclosure of some "medical or
disability information" raises privacy concerns. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 25; see also
Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 991. However, the United States did not raise this issue in its opening
brief on appeal in Oklahoma. See U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257. Consequently, it does not
appear that it preserved the issue in that case. "Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed
abandoned or waived." Coleman v. B-G Maintenance Management, 108 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th
Cir. 1997); see also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir.
1994).
The argument that the DPPA may be sustained based on its regulation of certain medical or
disability information is undercut by the United States' concession that it does not contest the
district Court's determination that limitations on disclosure of specific information, that is, Social
Security numbers, are not severable from the remainder of the DPPA. U.S. Condon Br., supra
note 257, at 25-26. That concession is well-advised in light of the national government's
disclosure of this same information. See supra notes 123, 129, 132-36 and accompanying text.
The same severability analysis dooms the DPPA regardless of whether individuals had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in "medical or disability information" contained in motor
vehicle records.
The "relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is whether the statute will function in a
manner consistent with the intent of Congress." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685
(1987). "Severance is improper if the unconstitutional provision is an integral part of the statutory
enactment viewed in its entirety." Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F. 2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985), affd
by equally divided court, 484 U.S. 171 (1986). See also, e.g., Scheinburg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476
(5th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1986);
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997). If the DPPA
were to survive containing only the medical information prohibitions, the statute would cease to
function as Congress intended. The Act was aimed at stalking, as indicated by its sponsors. See
Loving, supra note 94, at 203; Hankins, supra note 94, at 114.
Moreover, much, if not all, of the few items of "medical or disability information" contained
in motor vehicle records have been subject to the same historical tradition of open records. There
is significant agreement that medical data in the private sector is largely unregulated in the United
States. See Health Care, supra note 124, at 6-7; Murray, supra note 126, at 990 & n.427. As a
result, in the overwhelming majority of States, any expectation that this information would be held
confidential is entirely unreasonable. In addition, even if this limited information is viewed as
falling within a reasonable expectation of privacy which Congress could protect under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the entire DPPA cannot be sustained on that basis.
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First Amendment

The DPPA's provision of criminal 372 and civil remedies 373 for disclosing information gathered and maintained by the states raises particular concerns for the media, which was omitted in the list of statutory
exemptions.374 While the DPPA contains statutory exemptions for many
groups, it noticeably omits any provision for the press. The DPPA's
scope is so broad that "it exposes newspapers to criminal prosecutions,
injunctions and civil damages for the publication of many stories commonly published. ' 375 The imposition of criminal penalties or civil damages for publishing information contained in State records but declared
by law as confidential, has twice been held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.3 76

Landmark Communications v. Virginia377 presented to the Supreme
Court the question of whether there is a First Amendment privilege for
"the publication of truthful information withheld by law from the public
domain. '378 The case involved a newspaper article describing a pending
State judicial review commission inquiry into the alleged misconduct of
a judge. The article identified the judge by name even though the proceedings in question were declared confidential by the Virginia constitution and statutes. The Court held, nonetheless, that the article reported
on a matter of public interest, and was therefore protected in order to
serve the interests of public scrutiny and discussion of government
affairs. Thus, where the subject is a matter of public interest, criminal
penalties or civil remedies may be inconsistent with the First
Amendment.379
The Court in Landmark Communications did not address how the
information was obtained, but stated: "We are not here concerned with
the possible applicability of the statute to one who secures the information by illegal means and thereafter divulges it."'38° Thus, one may con372. See 18 U.S.C. § 2723.
373. See id. § 2724.
374. See id. § 2721(b).

375. Brief of South Carolina Press Association, Virginia Press Association, North Caorlina
Press Association, West Virginia Press Association, Maryland/Delaware/District of Columbia
Press Association, Newspaper Association of America, and American Society of Newspaper
Editors at 3, Condon v. United States, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-2554).
376. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1984); Landmark Communications v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).

377. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
378. Id. at 840.
379. Motor vehicle records are commonly used to report on matters of public interest. See
supra notes 233-37.
380. 435 U.S. at 837.
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clude that, so long as the newspaper legally obtains the information, it
may not constitutionally be penalized for subsequently publishing it.
Furthermore, if the personal information is provided to the press by
the government, the imposition of penalties upon the press for the publication of that information may be inconsistent with the First Amendment. In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,3 8 ' the Court reversed an award of
damages to a rape victim whose name was published in a newspaper
account of her rape. The Court held that where the press obtains the
information from the government-in this case, a police incident report
made available to the newspaper, notwithstanding a police duty to prevent the publication of the name-the imposition of sanctions on the

press for subsequent publication of the information is inconsistent with
the First Amendment.
Even if the DPPA were constitutional under the Tenth or Fourteenth Amendments, it would still raise serious issues under the First
Amendment. The very first challenge to the DPPA, based exclusively

on First Amendment grounds, was dismissed for lack of standing.382 In
Condon, the court dismissed First Amendment claims as moot after
resolving the case on Tenth Amendment grounds.38 3 In Travis, media

groups presented a First Amendment claim in the original complaint.
When the State of Wisconsin moved for realignment, its complaint spe-

cifically omitted the First Amendment claim. The United States moved
to dismiss the original plaintiffs for lack of standing and although the
district court did not rule on that issue,38 4 it nonetheless avoided addressing the First Amendment questions.385 Until a member of the media
actually violates the DPPA or demonstrates with specificity his intent to
do so, the standing hurdle may eliminate a First Amendment challenge.
D.

The Eleventh Amendment

In Pryor v. Reno, 386 Alabama argued that the DPPA violates the
381. 491 U.S. 524 (1984).
382. See Loving v. United States, 125 F.3d 862 (table) 1997 WL 572147 (10th Cir. Sept. 8,
1997). Although the district court considered the challenge premature and dismissed it without
prejudice because the claim was brought before the effective date of the DPPA, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal on the basis of standing.
383. 972 F. Supp. at 979 n.3. The media associations did not appeal that dismissal and,
instead, sought only to participate in the Fourth Circuit as amici curiae. See supra note 375.
384. The court found that despite "compelling doubts about the standing of the original
plaintiffs," it was not required to address that issue because the State had standing and the Tenth
Amendment issue was dispositive. Travis, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 923.
385. Id. The Seventh Circuit also avoided the issue stating that "this facial attack is not the
time or place to explore that subject." Travis, 163 F.3d at 1007.
386. 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala), argued on appeal, No. 98-6261 (11th Cir. Nov. 30, 1998).
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Eleventh Amendment. 38 7 The State's ability to even raise an Eleventh
Amendment concern follows directly from two recent Supreme Court

decisions clarifying the limited scope of congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Although Congress has the power

to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in legislation enacted pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,3 8 8 City of Boerne

made clear that Congress may only enforce already recognized rights
under that provision. 389 Thus, the same analysis that demonstrates the
DPPA was not a proper exercise of power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment for purposes of avoiding Tenth Amendment
limitations3 9 ° also demonstrates that Congress lacked such authority to

abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In addition, the Supreme
Court made clear in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida3 9 ' that when

Congress legislates under the Commerce Clause, it has no authority to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.3 9 2 Together, these precedents

387. Id. at 1322, 1331-33.
388. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445; see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 58-60 (1996).
389. 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
390. See supra Part IV(B).
391. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
392. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), a plurality of the Court held that
Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when legislating pursuant to its power
to regulate commerce among the States. Only four Justices joined the portion of the Union Gas
opinion holding that Congress had such power. Id. at 13-23 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). Justice Scalia, writing for himself and three other
members of the Court, repudiated Justice Brennan's analysis. Id. at 30-35 (opinion of Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.). The ninth Justice,
Justice White, would have disposed of the case without reaching the issue. Nonetheless, because
the other members of the Court addressed the abrogation issue, he offered his own view that
Justice Brennan reached the right result although Justice White did "not agree with much of his
reasoning." Id. at 45, 57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
None of the Court's subsequent cases endorsed the view of the Eleventh Amendment
articulated by Justice Brennan in Union Gas. In fact, several subsequent majority opinions drew
into question the continued validity of Union Gas.
In Seminole Tribe, the Court expressly overruled Union Gas. 517 U.S. at 66. The Court's
opinion leaves little doubt that Congress lacks authority to unilaterally abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity through legislation enacted pursuant to any of its Article I powers. See
Powers of Congress, supra note 318, at 168-69. See generally Thomas H. Odom, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity after Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, IMLA
Conf., Apr. 1996 (on file with the University of Miami Law Review). Nonetheless, several court
of appeals decisions have not read Seminole Tribe so broadly and the Supreme Court will address
the issue again shortly. See, e.g., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 790 (Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98149) (argument scheduled for Apr. 20, 1999) (addressing whether Congress may abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to
suits for unfair competition that allege false and misleading advertising); College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted
sub nom. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,
119 S. Ct. 790 (Jan. 11, 1999) (No. 98-531) (argument scheduled for Apr. 20, 1999) (addressing
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eliminate any claim that the DPPA abrogates Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The only issue then is whether the DPPA violates the terms
of the Eleventh Amendment.
Alabama argued that the DPPA violated the Eleventh Amendment
in two respects. The State argued that the DPPA grants federal district
courts jurisdiction to consider damages suits against State employees
and agents,39 3 which are essentially suits against the State. Alabama
also took issue with the DPPA provision authorizing the Attorney General of the United States to levy a civil penalty upon States which do not
comply with the DPPA. 394 The district court dismissed both arguments.
The court looked to the definitional section of the DPPA, which
declares that "'person' means an individual, organization or entity, but
'
does not include a State or agency thereof."395
The court thus concluded
that the DPPA's authorization for civil actions against a "person" does
not, in fact, authorize a suit against a State in violation of the Eleventh
Amendment.396 Second, the court observed that "'the Federal Government can bring suit in federal court against a State,' ,,397 rejecting the
argument that the Attorney General's imposition upon the State of a
civil penalty is unconstitutional.398
E.

The Commerce Clause

Application of the DPPA to the States may well exceed the commerce power delegated to Congress. Even under the expansive definition the Supreme Court has applied to the power of Congress "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian tribes,

39 9

there remain some areas in which Con-

gress may not regulate. The DPPA may well venture into one of these
areas.
"Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate comwhether Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under Section 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment with respect to suits for patent infringement); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (Jan. 25, 1999) (No. 98-

791) (addressing whether Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to suits under the ADEA).
393. See 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (1994). See supra notes 39, 89-92 and accompanying text.
394. See 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b) (1994) (civil penalty of up to $5,000 per day). See supra note 88
and accompanying text.
395. Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2725(2)
(1994)).

396. Id. at 1332-33.
397. Id. at 1333 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14, and citing

United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621,
641-47 (1892)).

398. See id.
399. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8.
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merce." 4° It is also within Congress' power "to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities."4 1 Finally, the Supreme Court has held that Congress is
empowered to "regulate those activities having a substantialrelation to
interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce." 4 °2 Because Congress made no findings that the
disclosure of personal information from motor vehicle records substantially affects commerce, and provided no jurisdictional limitation to
allow a case-by-case analysis of whether interstate commerce is substantially affected in a particular case, the DPPA appears to suffer from the
same defects as the statute in United States v. Lopez.4 °3
As in Lopez, the DPPA neither purports to regulate the channels of
interstate commerce, nor attempts to prohibit the transport of a commodity through interstate commerce, nor is it "a regulation by which Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate
Rather, as in Lopez, the Act challenged "by its terms has
commerce."'
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise. 40 5
The DPPA regulates the "release" and not the "sale" of information
maintained in motor vehicle records. Even if some direct marketers may
access States' databases, and most direct marketers participate in interstate commerce, the States themselves are not members of that industry.
The link to interstate commerce comes only after the release of records
from State control, due to the actions of some third parties who market
information similar to that contained in driver's license records. This
rationale does not make the States actors in interstate commerce, however.40 6 Any rationale finding a substantial effect on interstate com400. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 558-59 (emphasis added). "The 'affecting commerce' rationale requires that the
local activity have a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce." Matsumoto, supra
note 361, at 50 n.73. In that context, the "term 'close and substantial' calls for a judgmental
evaluation of the degree of the impact of the local activity, which requires more than an empirical
determination that the local activity does, in fact, affect interstate commerce." Id. (citing
Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations, 40 CINN. L. REV. 199,
224-26 (1971)).
403. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). One author erroneously cited Condon's challenge to the DPPA as
an example of post-Lopez challenges based on the Commerce Clause. Melvin R. Faroni, Printz v.
United States: FederalismRevisited or Madison and Hamilton are at it Again, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J.
491, 502 n.94 (1998). In fact, Condon presented no Commerce Clause challenge, a point made
emphatically clear at oral argument before the Fourth Circuit.
404. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. Lopez dealt with a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 992(q) (1994),
which made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that

the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 514 U.S. at 551.
405. 514 U.S. at 561.
406. A resident who wants the privilege of a State driver's license must apply and agree to be
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merce under those circumstances would be far reaching and appear to
lack any limiting principle. The lack of any articulable limiting principle that would uphold the DPPA without turning the Commerce Clause
into a general police power suggests that the DPPA may not survive
scrutiny after Lopez.4 °7
The DPPA does not contain a jurisdictional element which would
ensure that the disclosure in question affects interstate commerce.40 8
While Congress is not required to make specific findings in order to
legislate,4 °9 the absence of congressional findings together with the lack
of a jurisdictional element leaves the DPPA subject to challenge on

Commerce Clause grounds.
The Supreme Court has upheld various types of congressional regulation of intrastate activity on the ground it has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.4 10 In the absence of a showing that such a substantial effect does exist, the regulation of State disclosure of personal information maintained in the State's own motor vehicle records raises a

significant constitutional question.
F.

The Guarantee Clause

As noted above with respect to the Tenth Amendment, it appears
subject to various State laws, including the State's open records laws, which may make the
information available on his application a matter of public record, depending on the State. That
States charge a nominal fee to cover administrative and copying costs cannot be construed to
make the States commercial providers of personal information.
407. In fact, Lopez may be viewed as simply reaffirming a series of pre-existing
cases which
had refused to extend statutes to intrastate activities having only an insubstantial effect on
interstate commerce. Cf Matsumoto, supra note 361, at 58 n. 118 (citing as examples Employees
v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (construing the Fair Labor Standards Act as
not requiring States to submit to federal court jurisdiction); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808
(1971) (holding that Travel Act penalties, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, did not apply to lottery operation
solely because the operation was frequented by out-of-state bettors); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971) (holding that the firearms provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a), did not apply to firearms which were not proven to
have moved in interstate commerce); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441
(1953) (declining to apply federal criminal statute requiring registration of gambling machines to
machines with no interstate connection)).
408. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62; see also United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 655-56
(1st Cir. 1998) (upholding federal law criminalizing possession of child pornography); United
States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding federal arson statute); United
States v. Riley, 985 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding federal law criminalizing
murder committed to improve one's status in organized crime group).
409. See Lopez 514 U.S. at 562-63.
410. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (wheat grown for home consumption);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair Labor Standards Act). But see United States v.
Hickman, 151 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that purely local crime spree was "not the sort of
economic activity that can legitimately be viewed in the aggregate for traditional economic impact
purposes," but nonetheless affirming convictions because of circuit precedent), vacated pending
reh'g en banc, No. 97-40237 (5th Cir. Jan. 20, 1999).
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that the DPPA may violate the Constitution by conscripting the State
legislative and administrative processes into federal service.4"1 Some of
the challenges also contend that this same analysis demonstrates that the
DPPA violates the Guarantee Clause,4" 2 which provides that "[t]he

United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican
form of government ... ."413 "By guaranteeing the states a republican

form of government, the language of the clause implicitly promises the
states sufficient independence to maintain the responsiveness of their
governments to the popular will."4" 4 "[T]he distinguishing feature" of a
republican form of government "is the right of the people to choose their
own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own
laws.14 15 The DPPA takes away the local control necessary to ensure.

the responsiveness of the States' legislatures to the citizenry by overturning the legislatures' decisions to maintain open records and, instead,
requiring the maintenance of records according to federal terms. Ultimately, it is the local officials who will bear the brunt of the costs4 16 and
of public dissatisfaction with the new DPPA policy of closed records.

Traditionally, the courts have hesitated to address Guarantee Clause
claims, but there has been a recent trend towards accepting such claims
for adjudication.47 The Supreme Court in New York 4 .8 noted that Guarantee Clause claims may be heard, but declined to address the jus411. See supra Part IV(A).

412. See, e.g., Original Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 44-49, Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921
(W.D. Wis. 1998) (No. 97-C-701-C); State Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in Support of State Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
at 6-8, 23, Travis (No. 97-C-701-C).
413. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. "[I]n the guarantee clause the United States promises to secure
each of the states the autonomy necessary to maintain a republican form of government."
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (1988).

414. Merritt, supra note 413, at 29.
415. Inre Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891).
416. See supra note 254.
417. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) ("some questions raised under the

Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable, where 'political' in nature and where there is a clear absence
of judicially manageable standards") (emphasis added); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)
(case-by-case inquiry needed to determine justiciability); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 588-89
(3d Cir. 1966) (en banc) (suggesting that abrogation of immunity for State judges would violate
Guarantee Clause as basis for avoiding such a statutory interpretation), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1961) (Guarantee Clause
1021 (1967); United States v. Downey, 195 F. Supp. 581, 585 (S.D. I11.
prohibits federal government from prescribing rules of criminal procedure for State courts). See
also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (citing, inter alia, LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 398 (2d ed. 1988); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 118 & nn. 122-23 (1980); Merritt, supra note 413, at
70-78).

418. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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ticiability issue4 19 because it found the issue moot in light of its other
rulings. The Court found that the "take title" provision of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 violated the
Tenth Amendment. It further found that the other two challenged provisions at issue in the case offered the State a legitimate choice (rather
than constituting an unavoidable demand) such that the States retained
their ability to set their legislative agenda and remain accountable to
their local electorates. 42 0 By contrast, the DPPA commands States to
regulate and administer in accordance with the federal rules or face daily
fines.
While the federal government may directly regulate private activity
and preempt State regulation of private activity, it may not require States
and State officials to serve as the regulators of private activity.
The guarantee clause thus places a modest restraint on congressional
power to interfere with state operations. In order to assure states a
republican form of government, Congress must leave the states free
to define their own franchises; to design their own governmental
machinery; to set qualifications and wages for employees who exercise legislative, executive, or judicial power. In addition, Congress
cannot compel the states to adopt particular laws, to modify their legislative agendas, or to enforce federal regulatory programs. 42 1
Thus, the Guarantee Clause appears to constitute an additional basis for
challenging the DPPA.
V.

ADDITIONAL TENTH AMENDMENT ISSUES RAISED BY THE
LITIGATION: THE NEXT STEP IN DEVELOPMENT OF

DPPA

PROCESS-ORIENTED FEDERALISM

As explained in Part IV(A), a straight-forward application of
Print 422 and New York4 23 demonstrates that the DPPA is invalid under
the Tenth Amendment. It may be more intriguing to consider alternative
Tenth Amendment analyses brought into focus by some of the arguments the United States raises in an effort to save the DPPA from that
fate. Those arguments call for a response which suggests the next step
in the development of a process-oriented jurisprudence under the Tenth
Amendment. Entirely apart from the DPPA litigation itself, these arguments serve to map the battleground for the next major Tenth Amendment decision.
Part V(A) briefly describes the prior development of a process-ori419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id. at 183-85.
Id.
Merritt, supra note 413, at 69.
117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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ented jurisprudence under the Tenth Amendment. Part V(B) explains, in
the context of the DPPA litigation, the next probable step in the development of a process-oriented jurisprudence.
A.

The Development of Process-OrientedTenth
Amendment Protections

In 1985, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority.4 24 Prior to Garcia,the controlling authority, National League of Cities v. Usery,4 2 5 defined a substantive area of State authority entitled to Tenth Amendment protection.4" 6
Under National League of Cities,42 7 in order for a statute to be held

unconstitutional, the Court required that: (1) it must regulate "the 'States
as States,"' 42 8 (2) it must "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty,' "429 (3) it must "directly impair [the State's]
ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, ' '4 3 ° and (4) "the nature of the federal interest
advanced [must not] be such [as to] justif[y] state submission." 4 3 ' While
the four-part test and the concept that there are core areas of State auton-

omy immune from regulation under the Commerce Clause seemed
appealing to advocates of federalism, in practice, the test afforded little
protection.43 2
424. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
425. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). For a review of the background of the National League of Cities
case and a critical analysis of then-Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion, see Matsumoto, supra
note 361, at 62-71.
426. See Andrzej

Rapaczynski,

From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of

Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341, 362-63 ("The exception carved out from the
federal powers pertained exclusively to the immunity of internal state governmental processes.");
see also J.M. Balkin, Ideology and Counter-Ideologyfrom Lochner to Garcia,54 UMKC L. REV.
175, 195 (1986) ("[Tlhe point of National League of Cities was that the tenth amendment carved
out little islands of state immunity from otherwise permissible federal regulation, when the federal
regulation touched upon sensitive areas of state sovereignty."); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest
Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 650 (1993). ("[T]he National League of
Cities approach ... identified the federalism limit on congressional power as an analogue to Bill
of Rights limitations, a trump that invalidates legislation that is within the scope of a power
delegated to Congress.").
427. 426 U.S. at 845, 852-54. This test was subsequently clarified in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 & n.29 (1981). The Hodel reformulation is
generally cited for the definition of the test. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 537 (1985).
428. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287 (citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).
429. Id. at 288 (citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845).
430. Id. (citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).

431. Id. at 288 n.29 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), reaffirmed in National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852-53).

432. No Supreme Court decision applying the National League of Cities test invalidated any
federal law. All the cases were resolved adversely to the State interest. See EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long
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In Garcia,the Court overruled National League of Cities and abandoned its four-part test.4 33 The Supreme Court explained that State

interests "are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent
in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power. '4 34 The Court declared that "the principal and
basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all con-

gressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides
through state participation in federal governmental action. 4 35 Because
the Court concluded that the political process had not malfunctioned in

the context presented by Garcia, the Court found it unnecessary "to
identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure
might impose on federal action affecting States under the commerce
clause. 4 36 Many commentators asserted that Garcia rejected any limitations on congressional power under the Commerce Clause.43 7
Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface and Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); see also Rapaczynski, supra note

426, at 341 n.3 (noting that none of these decisions were favorable to the State interests at issue);
John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1325 (1997)

(same). For a discussion of the development of the four-part test and the application of each of its
prongs in the cases that applied the test, see R.LP., supra note 175, at 144-49, 151-56.
433. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531, 546-47. For a discussion of the Court's internal
deliberations on overruling National League of Cities which draws upon the files of Justice
Brennan, see Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47
VAND.

L.

REV.

1623, 1625-34 (1994).

434. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552. Although it was not cited in Garcia, Wickard v. Filburn,

previously had held that effective restraints on congressional exercise of its commerce power
"must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes." Hartman & McCoy, supra note
175, at 8 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (emphasis added by Hartman & McCoy)).
Wickard itself relied upon Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden. See 317 U.S. at
120 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824)). Both Wickard and Gibbons involved
challenges by individuals to the scope of the federal commerce power and so neither presented the
same federalism issues addressed in Garcia. Moreover, Wickard observed that judicial processes
had imposed limitations on the commerce power in numerous cases for most of our history up to,
and including, 1936. Id. at 121-22 (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)).
435. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
436. Id.
437. See, e.g., R.LP., supra note 175, at 151 ("Under Garciathe scope of Congress' authority
over the states under the commerce clause no longer presents any judicial question."); id. at 156
("Garcia holds that it is not for the Court to define the affirmative limits imposed on federal
activity under the commerce clause. Instead, it is for Congress alone to define and enforce 'the
limits on Congress' authority to regulate the States under the Commerce Clause."') (footnotes
omitted); William A. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MicH. L. REv. 1709,
1720 (1985) ("It is for Congress, not the Court, to measure the scope of the commerce power and
the countervailing weight of the tenth amendment. Such protection as the states may have from
direct imposition of congressional commands is thus in fact not constitutional and substantive, but
merely constitutive and political."). Some commentators continue to adhere to that view despite
the development of a process-oriented jurisprudence that has provided procedural protection for
State interests. See, e.g., Rex E. Lee, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Legacy of

Garcia, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 343 [hereinafter Rex E. Lee] (asserting that Garcia"effectively
remov[ed] the constraints imposed by the Tenth Amendment," and that Gregory v. Ashcroft and
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A few brave souls predicted that the Court invited the development
of process-oriented protections for States in lieu of the substantive protection envisioned in National League of Cities.4 38 "Rather than abdicating this function [as secondary protector of the States], the [Garcia]
Court states only that the justification for judicially imposed limitations
on congressional action under the commerce power must be processoriented rather than substantive. 4 39
[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the "States
as States" is one of process rather than one of result. Any substan-

tive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find
its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it
must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national
political process rather than dictate a 'sacred province of state
autonomy."'440
Garcia thus served as the stimulus for the development
of process-ori441
ented justifications for the protection of federalism.
New York v. United States alter that view of Garcia "but little"); Calvin R. Massey, The Tao of
Federalism, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 887, 889 (1997) [hereinafter Tao] (asserting Garcia
"rejected judicially enforceable limits upon Congress's use of its commerce power to regulate the
States"); Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette Tips: Some Implications of "Process Federalism," 18
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175 (1994) [hereinafter Etiquette Tips] (criticizing the post-Garcia
development of procedural rather than substantive limitations on Congress's power to regulate the
States); Merritt, supra note 413, at 15 ("Garcia's central assertion that the structure of federal
politics protects the autonomy of state governments is simply wishful thinking."); Yoo, supra note
432, at 1311 ("Garciaannounced that [the Court] no longer would examine the constitutionality
of federal legislation that threatened to violate the sovereignty of the states").
438. See e.g., Zoe Baird, State Empowerment After Garcia, 18 URB. LAW. 491, 492 (1986)
(Garcia is the foundation for "a more persuasive and lasting constitutional basis for protecting
state[s]"); Balkin, supra note 426, at 214 ("The Court is now left with the task of developing a
theory which explains when and how courts will protect state and local interests where the
national political process fails to do so."); Rapaczynski, supra note 426, at 359-60 ("[T]he
Supreme Court's decision in Garcia . . . should be viewed as the last logical step in a long
evolution of the sovereignty-based jurisprudence of federalism .... [lts main thrust is to reject the
usefulness of sovereignty-based analysis and to replace it with a focus on the nature of the
political process responsible for making the federalism-related decisions."). See generally
Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-BasedProceduralProtections,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1657 (1987) [hereinafter Process-Based ProceduralProtections].
439. Process-BasedProceduralProtections, supra note 438, at 1665.
440. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (emphasis added)
(citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)).
441. Professor John C. Yoo compellingly demonstrates that the process-oriented approach "is
at odds with the original understanding of the Constitution and its provisions on federalism and
judicial review." Yoo, supra note 432, at 1357; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 437, at 1727-33.
As these and other sources make clear, the convention and ratification debates anticipated judicial
intervention to protect the structural safeguards of the Constitution, not merely individual rights.
Having abandoned a rationale set in history which supported judicial review of State
assertions under the Tenth Amendment that Congress had abused its commerce power, the Court
formulated a new rationale to support judicial review under certain circumstances. H. Jefferson
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Powell, supra note 426, at 658 ("Justice O'Connor, of course, can defend her process approach as
the only law of federalism that is politically feasible in the late-twentieth century-as a type of
substitute for the federalism the Anti-Federalists wanted and many of the Federalists promised.").
This new rationale relies upon historical foundations at only the most general level. Justice
"O'Connor's observations in Garciaand New York about the 'spirit' of the Tenth Amendment and
the federal organization of the Union provide a textual and historical basis for the argument." Id.
at 684. The history upon which process-oriented federalism relies is that the Constitution was
understood to look to "'an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States"' so that
"reduction of the state governments to bodies with no independent governmental significance is
presumptively contrary to the Constitution." Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (quoting
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869))); see also Matsumoto, supra note 361, at 56
("Implicit in the constitutional plan is the notion that state governmental processes are to remain
free from direct federal intervention in the handling of local problems and concerns.") (footnote
omitted).
Because the process-oriented approach does not rely on historical analysis of specific
matters, the debate over how to interpret the historical sources on federal power to commandeer
State legislatures, executives, and courts is largely irrelevant. Compare Powell, supra note 426, at
652-64 (arguing that historical sources presented a "tentative refutation" of any constitutional
prohibition on federal commandeering of any branch of State government), with Evan H.
Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 199, 209
(arguing "that history provides no clear affirmative sanction for congressional commandeering,"
nor "confirm[s] the Framers' rejection of such authority," but that post-ratification history and
logic permit commandeering of State executive and judicial branches), and Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, Field Office Federalism,79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (arguing that New York properly
interpreted history as excluding a general federal power to command State legislatures; that New
York properly interpreted history as permitting a general federal power to command State courtsin terms of the supremacy clause-while recognizing that use of State court judges as inferior
federal judges would require Presidential appointment, Senate confirmation, life tenure, and
protection from diminishment of salary, but arguing that contrary to Printz, there is a general
federal power to command State executives), with Faroni,supra note 403, at 495 (asserting that
"all of the historical research indicated that Congress was limited to making recommendations and
it was assumed 'that the States would consent to allowing their officials to assist the Federal
Government."').
Much of the conflict between the State and federal government in recent decades may be
attributed to expansion of the federal government's commerce power so that it far exceeds any
historical basis. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-602 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (examining the common meaning of the term "commerce" at the time of ratification
based upon contemporary dictionaries and ratification debates; reviewing development of the
Court's early case law and contrasting the Court's mid-1930s shift toward more expansive
interpretations). Rarely in the past sixty years has the judiciary concerned itself with whether
legislation fits within any historical understanding of the national power. See Anne C. Dailey,
Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (1995) (Lopez "set limits on
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause for the first time in almost sixty years");
supra note 434; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 601 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring) (reviewing historical
view of congressional power to regulate commerce and acknowledging "that many believe that it
is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years"); cf id. at 608
(Souter, J., dissenting) (reviewing the 1937 shift to judicial deference to congressional views of
the scope of the commerce power and asking whether the Court's decision "does anything but
portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence from which the Court extricated itself almost 60
years ago"). Despite the benefits flowing from a sound historical basis for constitutional
interpretation, requiring a specific historical basis to justify a process-based limit on national
power is difficult to justify without first requiring a specific historical basis either to expand the
power sought to be limited or to eliminate judicial review of asserted substantive limits on
national power.

1998]

THE FEDERAL DRIVER'S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

145

Despite the irrelevance of the historical debate on specific matters to the validity of processoriented jurisprudence generally, a few observations are in order. None of these authors
challenging the conclusions of New York or Printz claim any affirmative textual support for their
conclusions. Professor Powell reviewed only very limited sources so that he offers only a
"tentative" conclusion. See Powell, supra note 426, at 664. Professor Caminker claims only
historical ambiguity. See Caminker, supra, at 209, 211. While Professor Prakash reviewed a
broad range of sources, he concedes that many of those sources could be read as only permitting
federal use of State executive officers when States voluntarily agree to do so. See Prakash, supra,
at 1998. Professor Prakash's reliance on historical discussion of federal power to call forth the
"posse comitatus," consisting of most citizens, as a basis for "deputizing" State officials, see id. at
2004 n.244, ignores the distinction between the capacity in which the individual answers the
federal call. Power over a State executive officer in his individual capacity does not imply power
over him in his official capacity. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2382, 2383 n.17. Were it otherwise, the
federal government's power to compel every State Governor to file a personal federal income tax
return would dictate a different outcome in Printz. Where the authority sought to be
commandeered is available to the individual only in his official capacity, a different analysis
applies. See infra note 507. In addition, Professor Prakash seeks to explain the distinction
between no federal power to commandeer State legislatures and federal power to commander
State executive officers on a notion of legislative sovereignty. See Prakash, supra, at 2033-34
("State legislatures, unlike state executives and judiciaries, were the direct representatives of the
people." "State legislatures, then, embodied the states 'in their political capacity."'). This
explanation ignores the development of popular sovereignty-sovereignty residing in the people
despite limited delegation to various governmental institutions-that was essential to overcoming
objections to the notion that sovereignty could not be divided. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 344-89, 527-32 (Norton Library ed. 1972)
(tracing the pre-Constitution development of shifts from theories of parliamentary or legislative
sovereignty to theories of popular sovereignty); James Wilson, Speech in the Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1, 1787), in II THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONs TUrION 448-53 (Merrill Jensen ed. 1976) (stating that the Constitution did not divide
sovereignty between the States and the federal government, but that sovereignty resided in the
people). Professor Prakash's alternative explanation for the distinction is recognition of the
practical difficulties in commanding and coercing a multimember body. See Prakash, supra, at
2033-34. He does not explain how that distinction accounts for the fact that some States lack a
unitary executive, permitting direct election of the attorney general, treasurer, or other officers, in
addition to the appointed executive officials (e.g., tax collectors, law enforcement officers). Thus,
the interpretation of historical sources regarding federal power to conscript elements of State
governments has not yet yielded a complete and satisfactory account. In addition, much of the
support for Professor Prakash's argument requires acceptance of a definition of "magistracy" that
includes all State judicial and executive officers, while excluding the legislature. It is far from
clear whether this definition is necessarily correct.
"Magistracy" is defined as follows:
This term may have a more or less extensive signification according to the use and
connection in which it occurs. In its widest sense it includes the whole body of
public functionaries, whether their offices be legislative, judicial, executive, or
administrative. In a more restricted (and more usual) meaning, it denotes the class
of officers who are charged with the application and execution of the laws. In a still
more confined use, it designates the body of judicial officers of the lowest rank, and
more especially those who have jurisdiction for the trial and punishment of petty
misdemeanors or the preliminary steps of a criminal prosecution, such as police
judges and justices of the peace. The term also denotes the office of a magistrate.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 951 (6th ed. 1990); see also 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 188 (2d
ed. 1989) (providing a similarly broad range of definitions); cf Caminker, supra, at 216 ("at the
,time of the Founding, the distinctions between judges and executive magistrates, and between
judicial and executive functions, were quite blurred"). In light of the range of the possible mean-
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed Garcia'sprocess approach in South
Carolina v. Baker," despite ultimately concluding that under the circumstances there presented Congress could directly regulate the States.
The Baker court rejected a claim that section 310 of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982" violated the Tenth Amendment, but
in doing so acknowledged that defective operation of the political process-including situations where States were "singled out" and "politically isolated"-would require a different result:
It suffices to observe that South Carolina has not even alleged that it
was deprived of any right to participate in the national political process or that it was singled out in a way that left it politically isolated
and powerless. Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938). Rather, South Carolina argues that the political
process failed here because § 310(b)(1) was "imposed by the vote of
an uninformed Congress relying upon incomplete information." But
nothing in Garcia or the Tenth Amendment authorizes courts to second-guess the substantive basis for congressional legislation. Where,
as here, the national political process did not operate in a defective
manner, the Tenth Amendment is not implicated.444
In Baker, the Court also considered and rejected a different Tenth
Amendment argument presented by an intervenor, the National Governors' Association ("NGA"). NGA argued that section 310 was "invalid
because it commandeers the state legislative and administrative process
by coercing States into enacting legislation authorizing bond registration
and into administering the registration scheme. '44 The Court rejected
that argument but expressly reserved judgment on whether the viability
of a Tenth Amendment basis for finding "some limits on Congress'
power to compel States to regulate on behalf of federal interests" either
"survives Garcia or poses constitutional limitations independent of
those discussed in Garcia."4 6 The Court avoided addressing those
questions on the basis of two independent rationales. First, the Court
characterized section 310 as a law that did not commandeer the State in
any meaningful manner: "That a State wishing to engage in certain
activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to
comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace
ings attributed to this term, much more research is required with respect to its common meaning at
the time of the ratification before accepting Professor Prakash's interpretation of the historical
sources.
442. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
443. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 103(j)(1) (1982)).
444. 485 U.S. at 512-13 (footnote and citations omitted).
445. Id. at 513.
446. Id.
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that presents no constitutional defect.' '447 Second, the Court classified
section 310 as a law of general applicability:
Nor does § 310 discriminate against States. The provisions of § 310
seek to assure that all publicly offered long-term bonds are issued in
registered form, whether issued by state or local governments, the
Federal Government, or private corporations. Accordingly, the Federal Government has directly imposed the same registration requirement on itself that it has effectively imposed on States. 44 8
Thus, Garcia and Baker may be read as establishing a rule to govern
only when the federal law at issue is found to be (or conceded by the

parties to be) one of general applicability which has only incidental
application to the States, while acknowledging that a different result
must follow if a law targets States for a unique burden.4 49

Process-oriented jurisprudence seeks to develop "an elaboration of
judicial standards, the justification of which does not rely on the desirability of specific substantive results but rests instead on the identification
of some defects in the political process that prevent it from operating in
accordance with the function assigned to it in the Constitution."45 Several of the process-oriented limitations advocated by commentators were
adopted by the Supreme Court.4 5 1
447. Id. at 514-15.
448. Id. at 526-27 (citation omitted).
449. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2383; New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
450. Rapaczynski, supra note 426, at 365.
451. Simultaneous with the Supreme Court's development of process-oriented jurisprudence,
however, courts have rejected constitutional challenges based on a substantive, rather than
process-oriented rationale despite the fact that a process-oriented approach may have invalidated
the federal law at issue.
For example, in 1996, Congress enacted both § 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and § 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2275 (1996)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644); Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546, at 3009-707
(1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373). The impetus for these laws was congressional interest in
increasing resources for internal enforcement of immigration laws, including deportation of
excludable aliens. Sections 434 and 642 established a federal policy permitting any State or local
government employee to freely report suspicions regarding an individual's immigration status.
The City of New York brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United
States, challenging the constitutionality of sections 434 and 642. These sections preempted a City
ordinance prohibiting City employees from furnishing information about the immigration status of
aliens directly to Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") officials except in accord with
City policy. See City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), argued
on appeal, No. 97-6182 (2d Cir. June 11, 1998).
The federal laws served to displace State and local government rules and policies that limited
individual employees' discretion to report information directly to the INS. New York City's
Executive Order 124 provides that "[n]o City officer or employee shall transmit information
respecting any alien to federal immigration authorities" unless (1) disclosure is "required by law"
or (2) the alien in question has given authorization or (3) the alien is suspected of having
committed a crime. City of New York, Executive Order No. 124, City Policy Concerning Aliens
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Commentators argued that Garcia's reliance on the national political process supported adoption of a clear statement requirement such as

the one the Supreme Court recognized to govern Eleventh Amendment

§ 2(a) (Aug. 7, 1989). In addition, Executive Order 124 requires City agencies to designate
officials responsible for making case-by-case disclosure determinations. Id. § 2(b). New York
City adopted that policy of limiting and channeling the reporting of information after finding that
the public at large was endangered by the undocumented immigrants' under-utilization of City
services. For example, the City concluded that the failure to seek medical treatment fostered the
spread of communicable diseases and the failure to report crime left unapprehended criminals who
would prey on citizens. See id. at 3 (statement of basis and purpose); Brief of Appellant at 9-11,
City of New York v. United States (2d Cir. argued June 11, 1998) (No. 97-6182).
Congress, the States, and local government may have different views regarding the weighing
of these competing policy interests. The supremacy clause ensures that the federal government's
views may prevail, even if the federal regulation thwarts contrary State and local policies. In
order to do so, however, the federal law must pass constitutional muster. Under Printz and New
York, this means that the federal law must neither "commandeer" State and local officials to
administer or enforce the federal law, nor otherwise require the State or local government "to
implement an administrative solution." Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2380 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at
175-76).
In the case of sections 434 and 642, as with the DPPA, Congress did not promulgate a law
that passes constitutional muster. Although Congress has criminalized illegal entry into the
United States, it has not criminalized continued presence after an individual gains entry.
Moreover, Congress has not, enacted a law requiring anyone who has information about
undocumented immigrants to report the information to the INS. Instead of taking these direct
measures, Congress sought to open communications with line workers in the delivery of State and
local governmental services, thereby by-passing the authority of those employees' supervisors.
The district court rejected the City's argument that sections 434 and 642 violate the Tenth
Amendment. See City of New York, 971 F. Supp. at 794-97. The district court noted that the City
argued that "by interfering with core functions of city government, by means of a statute directed
only at states and localities and not at private individuals, the United States has violated principles
of federalism and the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 797. The court rejected that argument, which it
considered as a "substantive analysis of the Tenth Amendment" inconsistent with Garcia. Id. at
797-98. Although the district court recognized that the Supreme Court followed Garcia with
cases striking down statutes under the Tenth Amendment (New York and Printz), the district court
concluded that those cases did not "revive[ ] a substantive analysis under the Tenth Amendment."
Id. at 798.
While the district court correctly concluded that current Supreme Court jurisprudence
eschews a substantive analysis of Tenth Amendment issues, it overlooked the fact that a processoriented approach consistent with Garcia shows that Sections 434 and 642 are unconstitutional.
By placing emphasis on the process failure-the fact that Sections 434 and 642 single out State
and local governments for a unique burden-rather than declaring a particular area off limits to
national regulation, the challenge, now pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, fits squarely within the judicial role preserved in Garcia. See City of New York v.
United States, No. 97-6182 (2d Cir. argued June 11, 1998).
At least one commentator has argued that broad congressional power over immigration limits
the force of the Tenth Amendment in that area. See Allison B. Feld, Section 434 of the Welfare
Act: Does the FederalImmigration Power Collide with the Tenth Amendment?, 63 BROOK. L.
REv. 551 (1997). Feld's suggestion that courts should balance the federal interest against the
intrusion of the law which targets State and local governments, however, is irreconcilable with
Printz's statement that only laws of general applicability should balance the federal and State
interests.
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analysis.4 52 During the same Term the Supreme Court decided Garcia,
it adopted the clear statement requirement in the Eleventh Amendment
context in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.45 3 If Congress intends
to alter the "usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government," it must make its intention to do so "unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute. '454 Commentators noted that "to
give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional
ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which
Garcia relied to protect states' interests. 4 5 In sum, a clear statement
requirement was precisely the type of process-oriented protection contemplated by Garcia. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,4 56 the Supreme Court
embraced that approach as an outgrowth of Garcia:
We are constrained in our ability to consider the limits that the
state-federal balance places on Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause. See Garcia. But there is no need to do so if we hold
that the ADEA does not apply to state judges. Application of the
plain statement rule thus may avoid a potential constitutional problem. Indeed, inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to
the political process the protection of States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely
certain that Congress intended such an exercise.45 7
This clear statement requirement was the first step in the Supreme
Court's identification of process-oriented protections under the Tenth
Amendment. "Such a system ensures fair notice to states when legislation affecting their interests is proposed" so that "states have the opportunity to oppose undesirable legislation before it becomes law. 45 8
Last Term, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified the Gregory
452. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 438, at 516; Process-BasedProcedual Protection,supra note

438, at 1676-77; Rapaczynski, supra note 426, at 418-19.
453. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
454. Id. at 242.

455. TRIn, supra note 417, § 6-25, at 480. "'A rule like the clear statement requirement is
therefore essential: Congress must be prevented from resorting to ambiguity as a cloak for its
failure to accommodate the competing interests bearing on the federal-state balance."' Russell
Chapin, Harmonizing Federal Preemption Doctrine with Garcia's Cession of State and Local
Interests to the Political Process, 23 URB. LAW. 45, 58 (1991) (quoting TRIBE, supra, and citing
Process-BasedProceduralProtections, supra, note 438); see also Hartman & McCoy, supra note

175, at 11 (arguing that Garciaonly cedes "to Congress the ultimate power to adjust federal-state
relationships where Congress speaks absolutely unambiguously"). If States are aware that their
interests will be affected by pending legislation, they are enabled to politically mobilize in order to
protect their interests. Without a "clear statement," States may be unable to identify threats to
their interests before enactment, and the national political process may fail to consider the
proposed legislation's impact on States.
456. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
457. Id. at 464 (citation omitted).
458. Process-Based ProceduralProtections, supra note 438, at 1685.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:71

clear statement requirement in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
v. Yeskey. 4 59 Gregory contained language which could support the view

that the required statement demanded specific statutory enumeration of
State activities and programs subject to the federal law 46 ° as well as an
alternative view that a broad provision addressing "all" or "any" State
activities and programs was sufficient.4"6 ' Yeskey clarified that Gregory

is satisfied by broad statutory language that unambiguously encompasses States; no enumeration of specific State programs is required;
and, congressional intent to reach any specific State program need not be

demonstrated.462 Because Yeskey reaffirmed that the statute must unam459. 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998). For further discussion of the Yeskey decision, see Thomas H.
Odom, The Supreme Court Revisits the Clear Statement Requirement in Tenth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 39 MUNICIPAL LAw. 20 (Sept./Oct. 1998) [hereinafter Court Revisits].
460. See Bruce Dayton Livingston, Gregory v. Ashcroft: The Supreme Court Announces a New
Rule of Statutory Construction in Deference to Constitutionally Recognized Principles of
Federalism, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 243, 244-45 (1992) (arguing Gregory "requires more
than a plain statement of congressional intent to preempt state law by making legislation
specifically applicable to the states;" rather it "also requires explicit mention of the particular
results of applying the underlying statute to the states in what the Court deems to be
constitutionally significant instances") (footnote omitted); Deanna L. Ruddock, Note, Gregory v.
Ashcroft: The Plain Statement Rule and JudicialSupervision of Federal-StateRelations, 70 N.C.
L. REV. 1563, 1589 (1992) (Gregory "now requir[es] a clear expression of legislative intent not
only to determine whether the statute applies to the states, but also to determine to whom the
statute applies"); see also Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1346 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1071 (1996) (interpreting Gregory to require the ADA to specifically mention
State prisons before the statute would apply in that context).
461. See Michael P. Lee, How Clear is "Clear"?: A Lenient Interpretation of the Gregory v.
Ashcroft Clear Statement Rule, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1998) [hereinafter Michael P. Lee]
(arguing Gregory does not require an enumeration of specific State programs and activities); see
also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding the ADA had sufficiently
clear statutory language despite no specific reference to State prisons and explicitly rejecting
Torcasio), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998); Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118
F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1997) (same), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998).
462. This clarification follows from the following observations. The Supreme Court stated
that:
The situation here is not comparable to that in Gregory. There, although the ADEA
plainly covered state employees, it contained an exception for "'appointee[s] on the
policymaking level' which made it impossible for us to "conclude that the statute
plainly cover[ed] appointed state judges." Here, the ADA plainly covers state
institutions without any exception that could cast the coverage of prisons into doubt.
Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. at 1954 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467). The statutory language that plainly
covers State institutions was the ADA's general anti-discrimination provision with respect to
exclusion from, or denial of, the benefits of "the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity" in conjunction with the statutory definition of "public entity." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132). A "public entity" is "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." Id. at 1954-55 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1213 1(1)(B)). The Court also assumed both that the ADA did not expressly refer to prisons and
that this omission indicated Congress did not contemplate that application of the ADA. Id. at
1955. The Court held that those assumptions did not dictate a different result as long as the
statutory text was unambiguous. Id. at 1956. It is thus evident that Gregory is satisfied by broad
statutory language that unambiguously encompasses States; no enumeration of specific State pro-
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biguously indicate to States they will be covered by the statute, the process-oriented rationale continues to be satisfied.46 3
Commentators also asserted that even under Garcia, the federal
government would not be permitted to require State legislatures to enact
laws or follow a dictated federal agenda.
[T]here are some state governmental functions so directly related to
the federalist concern with preventing tyranny that they present rather
easy cases for judicial intervention .... [F]or example, federal interference with the agenda of the highest state legislative ... organs is
likely to undermine the overall autonomy of the political processes in
the states .... 464
A careful reading of Garciashows that it did not displace precedent
holding that a "congressional command based on the commerce power
would be unconstitutional." 46' 5 As noted above, the Supreme Court took
this second step in developing a process-oriented Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence in New York v. United States. 466 Thus, Printz v. United
States467 broke little new ground, holding that Congress could commandeer officials of a State's executive branch no more so than it could the
State's legislature.46 8 While New York and Printz may be seen to rest on
a pre-Garcialimitation on commanding or "commandeering" the States,
it is more fruitful to identify the process-failure that justifies judicial
invalidation of congressional efforts to commandeer the States so as to
present a unified, principled view of the Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Little attention has been paid to the process-oriented justification
for New York and Printz.4 69 The DPPA litigation shines a spotlight on
grams is required, and congressional intent to reach any specific State program need not be
demonstrated.
463. Of course, requiring enumeration would provide an increased level of protection for
States in the national political process. Moreover, in other contexts greater specificity such as
enumeration may be required. To the extent spending power jurisprudence is premised on
contract theory, states may legitimately demand that the federal government identify which state
programs are subject to limitation. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
464. Rapaczynski, supra note 426, at 415-16; accord Process-BasedProcedural Protections,

supra note 438, at 1664 n.37.
465. Process-BasedProceduralProtections,supra note 438, at 1664 n.37 (discussing Coyle v.

Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)) (emphasis added).
466. See supra Part IV(A). But cf Watkins, supra note 324, at 996 (suggesting the New York
line of cases heralds a return to National League of Cities).

467. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
468. Even prior to the Printz decision, scholars recognized that New York extended beyond
dictates directed to State legislatures. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.10, at 170 (5th ed. 1995) (stating New York "prevents Congress from
making the state governments, or the subdivisions or branches thereof, instruments for the
carrying out of congressional dictates").
469. At least one commentator has asserted that New York's distinction "between targeted and
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the underlying process-failure. Each argument that the DPPA survives
New York and Printz rests on a cramped reading of those decisions. The
logical response to each of those arguments reconciles the Tenth
Amendment cases and points the way to the next step in the development of process-oriented jurisprudence.
B. Alternative Tenth Amendment Analyses
In defense of the DPPA, it is argued that the DPPA does not require
States to regulate individuals on behalf of Congress. Based on that
assertion, the United States maintains that the DPPA automatically
passes scrutiny under the Tenth Amendment. This argument is flawed
for several reasons. First, even if the DPPA was considered to be a law
of general applicability that applies only incidentally to States, such laws
are still subject to Tenth Amendment review. Second, because the
DPPA cannot be considered a law of general applicability that applies
only incidentally to States, it falls within the process-oriented justification for New York and Printz. A Supreme Court holding adjusting either
of these alternative analyses would greatly clarify Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
1.

LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY THAT APPLY ONLY

INCIDENTALLY TO STATES ARE SUBJECT TO TENTH AMENDMENT REVIEW

The Garcia Court contemplated that where the political process
failed to protect the special and specific position of the States in the
federal system, judicial imposition of limits would be appropriate. The

facts of Garciadid not, however, require the Court "to identify or define
what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause."47 Printz
makes clear that the Constitution requires the burden from application of
a law of general applicability on a State to be balanced against the federal interests."7 1 In Printz, the Court noted that "such a 'balancing' analysis [was] inappropriate," 47 because the purpose of the Brady Act was
general laws" lacked any "doctrinal or theoretical justifications to explain why the distinction

made a difference." Yoo, supra note 432, at 1344-45. For a pre-New York recognition that the
distinction was significant, without proposing a process-oriented explanation, see R.IP., supra
note 175, at 161-63.
470. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
471. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997) ("Assuming all the mentioned
factors were true, they might be relevant if we were evaluating whether the incidental application
to the States of a federal law of general applicability excessively interfered with the functioning of
state governments."). In the Pryor appeal, the United States ignored this language and asserted:
"Alabama wrongly suggests that Garciaand Baker require a 'balancing test."' U.S. Alabama Br.,
supra note 94, at 26 n.7.
472. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383.
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"to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compro-

mise the structural framework of dual sovereignty."47' 3 In short, no balancing was appropriate in Printz because the challenged provisions of
the Brady Act were not laws of general applicability.

Even if the DPPA could be characterized as a law of general applicability, it would necessarily fail any such balancing test as any federal

interest in preventing stalking is already directly addressed.474 More-

over, the weight of the federal interest appears slight due to the numer-

ous federal sources of the same information addressed by the DPPA. By
contrast, requiring the States to administer a federal program without
in addition to disfederal funding imposes a heavy burden on the States
475
placing policies long held by a majority of States.

The Supreme Court has not applied this balancing approach to
strike down any statute since Garcia laid the groundwork for a new
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.4 7 6 If the Supreme Court somehow

characterized the DPPA as a law of general applicability, it would present a prime opportunity for the Supreme Court to demonstrate that the
balancing test exists in practice, and not merely in theory. The only
hurdle to such a development is the obvious fact that the DPPA is not a
law of general applicability.
2.

THE NEXT STEP: ADDRESSING LAWS THAT SINGLE OUT STATES

In defending the DPPA, the United States invites confusion by mischaracterizing the Printz decision's explanation of the balancing test
under Garcia.47 7 The United States fails to understand that Garcia and
473. Id.
474. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (1994).
475. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (W.D. Okla. 1997), rev'd,
161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, No. 97-6389 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999), stay pending
petition for a writ of certiorariissued, No. 97-6389 (10th Cir. Feb. 11, 1999); Travis v. Reno, 12
F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (W.D. Wis. 1998), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, No.
98-2881 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 1999), stay pending petition for a writ of certioraridenied, No. 982881 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 1999), stay of issuance of mandate pending filing of petition for a writ of
certiorarigranted sub nom. Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles v. Reno, No. A-795
(U.S. Mar. 31, 1999).
476. In Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 3 v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, Civ. No. B-921066, slip op. at 69 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 1996), Judge Black noted that the Supreme Court has
provided little guidance on how to perform a Garciabalancing test. In spite of evidence that the
Fair Labor Standards Act had been applied to the States and local governments due to a failures in
the national political process, the court declined to attempt Garciabalancing. Id. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not address the constitutional issues.
Instead, the court simply treated any constitutional challenge as foreclosed by Garcia. Id., No.
92-1066-B (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1998), reh'g denied, No. 92-1066-B (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1999). Any
petition for a writ of certiorari in that case is due on or before May 6, 1999. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1.
477. See U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 18-19; U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 1718.
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the other cases it cites47 8 analyzed challenges to statutes that were (or
were conceded to be by the parties) of general applicability rather than
directed solely to States.4 79 Three out of the four district courts to rule
on the subject properly recognized that distinction.4 8 ° While the United
478. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226
(1983); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
In Printz, the Supreme Court distinguished its decisions in Hodel, and FERC v. Mississippi.
456 U.S. 742 (1982).
[We] have made clear that the Federal Government may not compel the States to
implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs ....
In
Hodel, we... concluded that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act did
not present the problem because it merely made compliance with federal standards a
precondition to continued state regulation in an otherwise pre-empted field ....
In
FERC, we construed the most troubling provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, to contain only the "command" that state agencies "consider"
federal standards, and again only as a precondition to continued state regulation of
an otherwise pre-empted field. We warned that "this Court never has sanctioned
explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and
regulations."
117 S. Ct. at 2380 (citations omitted).
In EEOC v. Wyoming, the Court approved the extension of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") to include State and local governments. Applying the now-overruled
National League of CitieslHodel test, the Court balanced the federal interest against the State
interest as sovereiegn and concluded the State interest was sufficiently low as to allow the law to
pass constitutional muster. The Court specifically concluded that the State's compliance with the
federal act did "not 'directly impair' the State's ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions."' 460 U.S. at 239. Although the Court upheld the ADEA as a
proper exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power, it arguably could have upheld the ADEA
as a law of general applicability because after the 1974 amendments at issue, the ADEA applied to
private employers having at least twenty workers, and federal, State, and local governments. See
460 U.S. at 233 n.5.
Finally, South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), is also easily distinguished. In Baker,
the Court held only that the federal government could impose upon States substantially the same
obligation imposed on private issuers of bonds (that is, the Court viewed the provision at issue as
a law of general applicability): "Because § 310 aims to address the tax evasion concerns posed
generally by unregistered bonds, it covers not only state bonds but also bonds issued by the United
States and private corporations." Id. at 510. See supra notes 442-49 and accompanying text. As
discussed in Part V.B.1, supra, the DPPA may not be viewed as such a law of general applicability, and is not saved by the analysis of Baker.
479. In certain cases, the parties have failed to argue that a statute is not generally applicable.
It is thus true that "the statute at issue in Garcia was passed solely to subject states to federal
minimum wage and hour laws, which had been applied to private employers almost three decades
before." Yoo, supra note 432, at 1348. Yet, in Garcia, no party argued that the separately
enacted FLSA amendments should be viewed as anything other than a law of general applicability
from which States should be excluded by virtue of the Tenth Amendment.
480. See Condon v. United States, 972 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997) (distinguishing DPPA from
cases the Supreme Court has viewed as involving statutes of general applicability), aff'd, 155 F.3d
453 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied, No. 97-2554 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998) petition for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. Mar. 15, 1999) (No. 98-1464); Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F. Supp.
1358 (W.D. Okla. 1997) (same), rev'd, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, No. 97-6389
(10th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999), stay pending petitionfor certiorariissued, No. 97-6389 (10th Cir. Feb.
11, 1999); Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (addressing DPPA within the
framework of cases the Supreme Court has viewed as involving statutes of general applicability),

1998]

THE FEDERAL DRIVER'S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

155

States asserts that it takes issue with this distinction, its argument underscores the correctness of the district courts' approach.
Statutes that apply in the same way to state activity and private activ-

ity, by their nature, do not conscript the states into regulating an
activity on Congress's behalf. Statutes that act upon states and private entities alike plainly regulate conduct directly and do not require
states to implement a federal program-the impermissible command
at issue in New York and Printz.4 8 t

Here, the DPPA does not "apply in the same way" to States (who exclu-

sively license drivers and register motor vehicles) and to private activity
which has no counterpart. Consequently, the DPPA is not a statute that
acts upon States and private entities alike. 482 As such, the premise of the
United States' argument that the DPPA does not "regulate conduct
directly" fails and it appears, instead, that the Act regulates States,
thereby violating New York and Printz.4 83 The DPPA is not saved by the
484

fact that it "regulates private parties seeking to obtain information,"
because the DPPA does not "apply in the same way" to such individuals.

The fact that the Brady Act applied to handgun sellers and prospective

handgun purchasers did not prevent the Supreme Court from holding in
Printz that the Brady Act violated the Tenth Amendment.

Upon recognizing its strategic error, the United States backpedaled
and presented an additional, different argument on reply in Condon. The
United States now seems to suggest that unless a law is a "commandeering" under New York and Printz, the law raises no Tenth Amend-

ment issue. That approach ignores the Supreme Court's statement that
even laws of general applicability are subject to a balancing test under
argued on appeal, No. 98-6261 (11 th Cir. Nov. 30, 1998); Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp.2d 921
(W.D. Wis.) (distinguishing DPPA from cases the Supreme Court has viewed as involving statutes
of general applicability), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, No. 98-2881 (7th Cir.
Feb. 11, 1999), stay pending petitionfora writ of certioraridenied, No. 98-2881 (7th Cir. Feb. 19,
1999). Stay of issuance of mandate pending filing of a writ of certiorari granted sub nom.
Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles v. Reno, No. A-795 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1999)
(Stevens, Circuit Justice).
481. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 19 (emphasis added); see also U.S. Oklahoma Br.,
supra note 257, at 18.
482. At least one of the few publications to consider the issue recognized the DPPA is not a
law of general applicability, but rather, singles out States for a unique burden:
The DPPA is not a statute prohibiting private persons from disclosing information
and applying the same prohibition to the states. Nor does the DPPA regulate the
many private companies that routinely buy and sell personal information for direct
marketing and other purposes. The DPPA's title and its provisions are clearly
aimed at the states-and the states alone.
Watkins, supra note 324, at 994.
483. See supra note 100.
484. U.S. Condon Br., supra note 257, at 20-21; U.S. Oklahoma Br., supra note 257, at 20.
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Garcia and Baker.48 5 The existence of such a test precludes the argument that if a law is not a commandeering, it is constitutional as a matter
of law. The United States makes a more fundamental error. It ignores
the fact that even if a law does not compel States to regulate on behalf of
Congress, that fact alone does not establish that the law is one of general
applicability that applies only incidentally to States.
This argument that any non-commandeering statute is one of general applicability was previously advanced by the United States in Printz
as a basis for limiting the scope of New York in the same manner that the
United States now seeks to distinguish both those decisions.
[The Petitioners cite] this Court's observation in New York that the
statute then before it did not involve Congress's "subject[ing] a State
to the same legislation applicable to private parties." 505 U.S. at 160.
From that sentence, they infer that any federal statutory obligation
falling particularly on state or local officials is unconstitutional. That
argument, however, misapprehends the Court's concerns in New
York, and it does not explain why constitutional principles of federalism are not implicated when the States are subjected to generally
applicable legislation.
What is significant for constitutional purposes about a statute of
general application is that such an enactment, by its nature, cannot
constitute a directive to the States to formulate state policy in
response to a federal command. Rather, by such a provision, the
States (along with private 486
parties) are required to adhere to a clearly
articulated federal policy.
The Supreme Court declined to adopt that narrow reading of New York
in the Printz decision. Nonetheless, in the DPPA cases, the United
States repeats the same argument.
When the Supreme Court has discussed laws of general applicability in other contexts, it has not addressed the distinction between commandeering and direct regulation of individuals. Rather, the
constitutionally significant feature is precisely what the United States
concedes, that such laws apply "in the same way" to constitutionallyprotected entities or activities as well as to the population at large.48 7
When such broadly applicable laws are applied to protected entities or
activities they may be upheld as long as such applications are merely
485. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383.
486. Brief for the United States at 23, Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (Nos. 951478 & 95-1503), available in 1996 WL 595005.
487. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (upholding application of
promissory estoppel to press because that law imposes similar burdens on everyone); Employment

Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990) (upholding
application of prohibition of drug use to religiously inspired peyote use because that law imposes

similar burdens on everyone).
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"incidental effects."4'88 Printz itself followed this distinction by pointing

to "the incidental application to the States of a federal law of general
applicability.""'8 9 Even if the DPPA is not viewed as a "comman-

deering" of States, the DPPA cannot be characterized as a law that
imposes similar burdens broadly that only "incidentally" apply to

States."9 ' Rather, the States are singled out for a unique burden. The
text and history of the DPPA show that the imposition of that unique

burden was intentional rather than incidental.
Laws that single out constitutionally-protected entities and activities are subject to heightened standards of review.4 9 ' Thus, in Minneap488. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
489. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 (emphasis added).
490. There is no omnibus legislation applicable to federal, State and business holders of
personal information, although the original proposals for the Privacy Act contemplated application
to the private sector. Fortressor Frontier,supra note 130, at 209 n.67 (citing S. REP. No. 1183,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974)). "Instead, legal protection is accorded exclusively through privacy
Id. at 208. Even when aggregated, the industry specific
I..."
rights created on an ad hoc basis .
development of privacy protection has resulted in "strikingly limited legal protection" one author
described as "haphazard." Id. at 219; see Joy FISHER, Preface, in DATA TRANSMISSION AND
PRIVACY, supra note 359, at viii; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND THE Nil:
SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED PERSONAL INFORMATION Part I.D (Oct. 23,
1995), available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/ privwhitepaper.html> (last visited Feb.
22, 1999) ("The United States currently has no omnibus privacy law that covers the private
sector's acquisition, disclosure, and use of TRPI. Instead, American privacy law comprises a
welter of Federal and state statutes and regulations that regulate the collection and dissemination
of different types of personal information in different ways, depending on how it is acquired, by
whom, and how it will be used. Although these laws provide some level of privacy protection,
they are not comprehensive in the sense that they do not apply uniformly to all service
providers."); National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Inquiry on Privacy
Issues Relating to Private Sector Use of Telecommunications-Related Personal Information, 59
Fed. Reg. 6842, 6843 7 (1994); supra note 359.
One might view this piecemeal, ad hoc approach to personal information protection as
support for the view that it would be exceptionally difficult for Congress to address personal
information protection concerns in an omnibus statute that imposes relatively similar burdens on
the federal government, on States, and throughout the multiple segments of private sector. On the
other hand, the piecemeal approach has been criticized by European officials as "an obviously
erratic [system of] regulation full of contradictions, characterized by a fortuitous and totally
unbalanced choice of its subjects." Spiros Simitis, New Trends in National and International
Data Protection Law in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DATA PRIVACY LAW 22 (J. Dumortier ed.
1992), quoted in Robert Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure of
Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6 Software L.J. 199, 201 (1993).
The European Union required only twenty pages for the EU Data Protection Directive. See
Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281/31). Moreover, countries outside the EU have
adopted its approach. Personal information protection laws generally take an omnibus approach;
the United States is the exception where piecemeal legislation is promulgated on a sector-bysector basis and in an entirely ad hoc manner. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 124, at
5-17; Gellman, supra, at 202 (citing DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE
SOCImTIES 305 (1989)); Murray, supra note 126, at 941.
491. Under Garcia,judicial review is not proper unless there is evidence of "possible failings
in the national political process." Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554
(1985). The support upon which the Court constructed Garcia's process-oriented approach has
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been significantly undermined in the 34 years since the theories were first expounded. See Steven
G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States
v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 794-99 (1995) (listing campaign financing, pork-barrel
legislation, and buck-passing as ways in which the political process has changed); Friedman,
supra note 305, at 362 ("the Court's claim that state interests were adequately protected in the
political process was highly idealized and likely bad political science"). The authorities upon
which Garcia relied predated significant developments in national political process. See Garcia,
469 U.S. at 551 n.11, 554 n. 18 (citing JESSEE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux:
Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 779
(1982)).
For example, Professor Wechsler based his conclusion, in part, on the ability of States to
influence selection of members of the House of Representatives via control of voter qualifications
and redistricting. Wechsler, supra, at 548-52. Among the tools available to States when he wrote
in 1954 was the poll tax, abolition of which he thought faced no prospect of success. Id. at 549.
Poll taxes in federal elections were prohibited by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964.
In 1966, the Supreme Court held poll taxes were unconstitutional in State elections, overruling its
prior contrary precedent. See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
overruling Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). Professor Wechsler also pointed to the
significance of State delination of election districts for members of the House. Wechsler, supra,
at 550-52. When he wrote in 1954, States were not constrained by federal enforcement of the
equal representation principle later adopted in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The
JudicialRole, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 860-68 (1979). Thus, "contrary to Wechsler, it may not be
true today that [the interests of States as States] are represented adequately." Tushnet, supra note
433, at 1635; see also Yoo, supra note 432, at 1321 (noting the Supreme Court "federalized
control over the composition of the electorate, and presidential elections evolved into a
plebiscitary primary system"). Professor Wechsler wrote of a mindset resulting from these
mechanisms in which national programs were "regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion
to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case." Wechsler, supra, at
544. But "the sweeping federal environmental, economic, welfare and entitlement laws of the
1960s and 1970s replaced it with a mindset that seeks federal answers first." Yoo, supra note 432,
at 1321. Nonetheless, until the Court reconsiders this underlying premise of Garcia, it remains
the law of the land.
In this changed political climate, the States are subject to being singled out to their detriment,
as happened when Congress passed the DPPA. When this happens, the political process has
failed. While each State would appear to be fairly well organized, and even have some remaining
indirect influence on the selection of Senators and Representatives in Congress, modem political
realities are such that the States are quite weak in the national political arena. As Professor Yoo
observes, the very fact that States have bonded together into national lobbying groups undercuts
the notion that mere representation in Congress serves to protect the interests of the States. Yoo,
supra note 432, at 1400. The Court recognized in New York v. United States, 504 U.S. 144
(1992), that even State elected officials may not always have the State's best interests in mind:
Indeed, the facts of these cases raise the possibility that powerful incentives might
lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal structure to
be in their personal interests. Most citizens recognize the need for radioactive waste
disposal sites, but few want sites near their homes. As a result, while it would be
well within the authority of either federal or state officials to choose where the
disposal sites will be, it is likely to be in the political interest of each individual
official to avoid being held accountable to the voters for the choice of location. If a
federal official is faced with the alternatives of choosing a location or directing the
States to do it, the official may well prefer the latter, as a means of shifting
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olis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, the

Court held that a tax which "singled out the press for special treatment"
was not merely a law of "general applicability ... to all businesses" and
instead, placed "a heavier burden of justification" on the government.4 9 2

When the press is singled out, "the political constraints that prevent a
legislature from passing crippling [laws] of general applicability are
4 93
weakened, and the threat of burdensome [laws] becomes acute.
Laws that single out religion are similarly subject to the highest
level of scrutiny. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,49 4 the Supreme Court unanimously agreed with that proposi-

tion.4 95 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court explained that "the

principle of general applicability was violated because the secular ends
asserted in defense of the laws were pursued only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs."'4 96 "Official action that targets reliresponsibility for the eventual decision. If a state official is faced with the same set
of alternatives-choosing a location or having Congress direct the choice of a
location-the state official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the avoidance
of personal responsibility. The interests of public officials thus may not coincide
with the Constitution's intergovernmental allocation of authority. Where state
officials purport to submit to the direction of Congress in this manner, federalism is
hardly being advanced.
Id. at 182-83. In the facts underlying New York, public officials representing New York lent their
support to the Act's enactment-specifically a Deputy Commissioner of the New York Energy
Office and Sen. Patrick Moynihan. Nevertheless,
[t]he Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the
States or state government as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the
public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.
Id. at 181. See ResurrectingFederalism,supra note 259, at 958 ("Congress cannot impose special
burdens that single out the states."). In the case of the DPPA, no State officials participated in the
legislative process. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. Thus, if there was a process
failure justifying judicial intervention in New York, a fortiori judicial intervention is appropriate
with respect to the DPPA.
492. 460 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1983).
493. Id. at 585; see also Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670 (law at issue "does not target or single out the
press"); Srikanth Srinivasen, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A
Motive-Based Rationalizationfor the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY
401, 401 (1995) ("laws that aim at speech or that in most applications affect expressive activities
will always raise a First Amendment issue").
494. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
495. See also David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the FirstAmendment, 26 Sw. U.L.
REV. 201, 207 (1997) ("the Justices agreed that a city's ordinances forbidding animal sacrifices
were directed unconstitutionally at behavior only when the behavior was engaged in for religious
reasons").
496. 508 U.S. at 524. One commentator has explained: "General applicability analysis
invokes underinclusiveness-where religious exercise is burdened while non-religious behavior
threatening similar legitimate interests of government is not. The category used by the
underinclusive law is too narrow, even if a legitimate interest of government is satisfied. Of
course, the narrow categorization also indicates that the object of the law was to burden religion."
Bogen, supra note 495, at 209 (footnotes omitted).
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gious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere
compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. 4 97 Justice Kennedy observed that the laws were not generally applicable because they
were substantially (and not inconsequentially) underinclusive for the
governmental interests identified in support of the laws.4 98 Other
sources of the same harm were not covered by the laws. As a result, the

prohibition "only against conduct motivated by religious belief' gave
"'every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose
is
upon [Santeria worshipers] but not upon itself"' and that "precise evil499

what the requirement of general applicability is designed to prevent.

The Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment cases support this distinc-

tion between laws that intentionally impose a different burden on States,
and laws that apply "in the same way" to everyone so that they have
only incidental application to the States. As noted above, Garcia con497. 508 U.S. at 534. Justice Scalia concurred in this explanation: "the defect of lack of
general applicability applies primarily to those laws which, though neutral in their terms, through
their design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a particular religion for
discriminatory treatment." Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring).
498. Id. at 543 (Kennedy, J.). The same consideration demonstrated that the laws were not
neutral: "careful drafting ensured that, although Santeria sacrifice is prohibited, killings that are
no more necessary or humane in almost all other circumstances are unpunished." Id. at 536. In
addition, Justice Kennedy found "significant evidence of the ordinances' improper targeting of
Santeria sacrifice in the fact that they proscribe more religious conduct than is necessary to
achieve their stated ends." Id. at 538. Thus, overinclusiveness also served to demonstrate the
laws were invalid, although Justice Kennedy termed this flaw a lack of neutrality, rather than a
lack of generality. Justice O'Connor agreed that both underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness
demonstrated invalidity. Government "may no more create an underinclusive statute, one that
fails truly to promote its purported compelling interest, than it may create an overinclusive statute,
one that encompasses more protected conduct than necessary to achieve its goal." Id. at 578
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
499. Id. at 545-46 (Kennedy, J.). At least one other commentator has observed the parallel
between Printz and several of the Court's First Amendment decisions. In analyzing the views of
Justice Scalia, author of the Printz decision, Professor Caminker observes:
Indeed, the precise language and structure of Justice Scalia's argument call to
mind his First Amendment jurisprudence. He distinguishes doctrinally between
generally applicable regulations that incidentally burden free speech or religious
exercise, which receive no special scrutiny, and regulations whose very object is to
burden speech or religious activity, which receive strict scrutiny. This distinction is
not based on a concern about lawmakers' subjective motives; rather, Justice Scalia
simply interprets the First Amendment to establish a right to be free of regulations
whose object is to suppress speech or religious practice. Justice Scalia might
analogously understand state sovereignty to entail a right to be free from laws that
target that very sovereignty, but not from laws that incidentally interfere with
internal functions. Certainly, the former category, in which states are truly
regulated 'as states' rather than as a subset of employers or proprietors or anything
else, bespeaks a greater and more visible federal insensitivity to state sovereignty
than does the latter.
Caminker, supra note 441, at 246-47 (footnotes omitted).
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templates the development of process-oriented limitations. 500 By placing emphasis on the process failure (i.e., the fact that the DPPA singles
out States for a unique burden) rather than declaring a particular substantive area off-limits to federal regulation, challenges to the DPPA fit

squarely within the judicial role preserved in Garcia.
Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and Garcia's processoriented approach, a true law of general applicability would be one that
forbids all persons, including private parties, States, and federal agencies, from disseminating to a third party a non-consenting individual's
address or other identifying information. Congress did not consider

such a proposal for good reason. A bill proposing such a law of general
applicability would meet resistance from a broad range of interests,

including those who rely on credit reporting information, insurance companies, and businesses of every variety. It is unlikely that a general law

of this nature would have the necessary support to pass Congress. Congress avoided such opposition by framing a law that left States politically isolated in the national political process. Such evidence that States
were "singled out in a way that left [them] politically isolated" is precisely the type of process-oriented flaw that dooms a statute even under
Baker.5
Legislation enacted pursuant to such a "divide-and-conquer"

approach is subject to heightened scrutiny. Moreover, the scant federal
legislation regarding disclosure of information5" 2 does not compound to

form a law of general applicability.5"3 Few areas are addressed while
federal

agencies

themselves

freely

disseminate

the information

addressed by the DPPA.
The process-oriented justification for New York and Printz is that

the disputed legislation singled out States for a unique burden. The
cases themselves provide a textual foundation for such reading.504 In
New York, the Court made reference to this point: "this is not a case in
500. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
501. 485 U.S. at 513.
502. See supra notes 144-66 and accompanying text.
503. See supra note 359.
504. Justice Blackmun's initial draft opinion in Garcia explicitly laid a foundation for the
positions articulated in the final, published opinions in New York and Printz. Professor Tushnet
observes that the process-oriented approach led Justice Blackmun "to propose 'a requirement that
Congress not attempt to single out the States for special burdens or otherwise discriminate against
them."' See Tushnet, supra note 433, at 1629 (citation omitted). In doing so, Justice Blackmun
identified the same problem with such laws as is discussed above. "Where federal regulations
affect private parties as well as the states, '[t]he constitutional mechanisms for safeguarding the
role of the States are unlikely.to be at risk,' because 'the outcome will reflect not only the States'
own interests, but the interests of all those who are similarly situated. In those circumstances, the
structural features of the Constitution designed to protect the States can be trusted to have served
their purpose."' Id. (citing Justice Blackmun, 2d Draft of Opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio
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which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable
to private parties. 5 °5 In Printz, the Court found that "it [was] the whole
object of the law to direct the functioning of the state executive, and
5 6
hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty." 1
In an accompanying footnote, the Court addressed the dissent's assertion
that Congress could have placed reporting obligations on the States'

police officers if Congress had legislated generally so that those requirements fell only incidentally upon States' officers.5 °7 The Court adopted
Metro. TransitAuth. (June 13, 1984), in Brennan Papers, Box 666, file 5 (on file with the Library
of Congress)).
As Bruce LaPierre explained:
When a regulation applies to both state and private activity, the political checks
on Congress' power to regulate private activity provide vicarious protection for state
interests and make Congress politically accountable. Consider, for example, a
hypothetical amendment to the FLSA establishing a minimum wage of fifty dollars
per hour. If such a requirement was established for state and local governments as
employers, they would argue that it imposed a destructive burden on their function
of providing public services and that judicial intervention was required to protect
state autonomy. Nevertheless, there would be no need for judicial action in these
circumstances; the political process is entirely adequate to deal with this threat to
state interests. No statute establishing a fifty dollars per hour minimum wage would
be enacted because the FLSA also applies to private employers, and the affected
private interests would prevent the establishment of a minimum wage that would
destroy both private enterprise and state government.
The interests of state government are not protected because congressmen are
concerned about the abstract state interest in retaining political authority to control
the conditions of public employment or about the more concrete matters of
increased costs of employment and of providing governmental services. Instead,
these state interests are protected because they are included in the representation of
private interests. There is simply no practical danger that the minimum wage will
ever be set at a level high enough to impair significantly the conduct of state and
local government as long as the same requirements apply to private activity. Since
national authority is limited and Congress is politically accountable by virtute of the
application of the minimum wage to private employers, the application of the
minimum wage to state and local government employers is the decision of a
national majority. There is then no need or justification for judicial intervention to
protect state autonomy.
La Pierre, supra note 491, at 1000-01 (citations omitted).
Thus, where the law is one of general applicability, State interests are vicariously protected
by private actors. But where the States are singled out for a unique burden, they are isolated in the
political process. In such a case, judicial intervention is appropriate.
505. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
506. 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997) (emphasis in original).
507. Id. at 2383 n.17. Justice Scalia noted:
The dissent observes that 'Congress could require private persons . . . to provide
arms merchants with relevant information about a prospective purchaser's fitness to
own a weapon,' and that 'the burden on police officers [imposed by the Brady Act]
would be permissible if a similar burden were also imposed on private parties with
access to relevant data.'
Id. (emphasis added). The Court went on to say that "the suggestion that extension of this statute
to private citizens would eliminate the constitutional problem posits the impossible" because the
Act required CLEOs "to provide information that belongs to the State and is available to them
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that suggestion as "undoubtedly true" but explained that the Brady Act
imposed additional burdens on States officers for which there was no
private-sector counterpart.5 0 That dialogue demonstrates that the Brady
Act was not one that merely subjected States to the same obligations as
private parties. That reading naturally follows from the issue in Printz.
The law at issue in Printz applied to private individuals. It simply
did not apply to them in the same way that it applied to State and local
officials:
The Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.,
establishes a detailed federal scheme governing the distribution of
firearms. It prohibitsfirearms dealersfrom transferring handguns to

any person under 21, not resident in the dealer's State, or prohibited
by state or local law from purchasing or possessing firearms,
§ 922(b). It also forbids possession of a firearm by, and transfer of a

firearm to, convicted felons, fugitives from justice, unlawful users of
controlled substances, persons adjudicated as mentally defective or
committed to mental institutions, aliens unlawfully present in he
United States, persons dishonorably discharged from the Armed
Forces, persons who have renounced their citizenship, and persons
who have been subjected to certain restraining orders or have been
convicted of a misdemeanor offense involving domestic violence.
§§ 922(d) and (g).5" 9

The 1993 amendments, the Brady Act, similarly imposed obligations on
private individuals.
Under the interim provisions, a firearms dealer who proposes to

transfer a handgun must first: (1) receive from the transferee a statement ...(2) verify the identity of the transferee ...

and (3) provide

the "chief law enforcement officer" (CLEO) of the transferee's residence with notice of the contents (and a copy) of the Brady Form
....With some exceptions, the dealer must then wait five business
days before consummating the sale, unless the CLEO earlier notifies
the dealer that he has no reason to believe the transfer would be
illegal. t°
Adopting this reading of Printz, in which it is clear that the statute there
at issue applied to private individuals but imposed additional burdens on
States, demonstrates that the protection of State interests reaches the
broader set of laws that single out States rather than the narrower set of
only in their official capacity." Id. The information addressed by the DPPA is likewise solely in
the possession of the States and there can be no analogous regulation of private parties. Thus it
"posits the impossible" to suggest that the DPPA does anything but target the States for separate
regulation.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 2368 (emphasis added).

510. Id. at 2368-69 (emphasis added).
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laws that "commandeer" States.51 '
The prohibition on laws that target State and local governments
predated both New York and Printz. South Carolina v. Baker,5" 2 on

which the United States places so much weight in the DPPA litigation,5 13 actually supports a prohibition on laws that target State and local
governments. Baker held only that State and local governments are not
"immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax."5'14 The Court thus
expressly reaffirmed the holding in a much earlier case also captioned as
New York v. United States.5 15 In that case, the State of New York challenged a federal tax on the sale on mineral water as applied to the State's
sale of its own bottled water. The Supreme Court upheld the tax in an
opinion by Justice Frankfurter5 1 6 on the ground that federal taxation of
511. It is irrelevant to this analysis whether individual States actually support the legislation or
participate in the process that produces the legislation that targets State or local governments. In
New York, for example, it was clear that New York favored the later challenged legislation. See
New York, 505 U.S. at 188-94 (White, J., concurring in part); supra note 491; see also Powell,
supra note 426, at 637; Yoo, supra note 432, at 1349. The role of the individual State (or even all
of the States for that matter) in formulating the later-challenged legislation is irrelevant because
the constitutional structure seeks to prevent a State's surrender of its long-term interest in
autonomy for short-term benefits. Id. at 1400-03; supra note 491.
Professor Caminker suggests that Justice Scalia, author of Printz, may endorse this analysis:
It is conceivable that Justice Scalia would adhere to Garcia's conclusion that
generally applicable regulations should not receive special judicial scrutiny.
Although Justice Scalia surely recognizes that generally applicable laws can impose
the same type of burden on state executives as state-targeted commandeering
statutes, his focus [in Printz] on the 'whole object of the law' suggests that only
laws that particularlytarget state executives violate the 'very principle of separate
state sovereignty' he has constructed. On this view, the states' sovereign status
provides them with a right not to be singled out by Congress on the basis of their
statehood, and nothing more.
Caminker, supra note 441, at 246 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Professor Caminker further notes that in applying that analysis Justice Scalia focuses on the "object of the law" rather
than the subjective motives of lawmakers. Id.; see supra note 499.
512. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
513. See Reply Brief for the Appellants at 3-6, 8-10, Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir.
1998) (No. 97-2554) (arguing, for the first time on reply, that Baker constituted controlling
authority); Reply Brief for the Appellant at 3-7, 10-11, Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266
(10th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-6389) (same).
514. 485 U.S. at 524 (emphasis added).
515. 326 U.S. 572 (1946). For further discussion of this decision and the non-discrimination
principle in intergovernmental tax immunity, see Caminker, supra note 441, at 246-47,
Matsumoto, supra note 361, at 68-70, 73, R.IP., supra note 175, at 158-62, and John R. Vile,
Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth Amendment Since United States v. Darby, 27
CUMB. L. REV. 445, 480-82 (1996-97). See also Harvard Law Review Association, The Supreme
Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases -Intergovernmental Tax Immunity, 102 HARV. L. REV. 222,
229 n.53 (1987) (stating, after Baker: "The Court most likely would not leave matters to the
political process if Congress were to use its powers to discriminate against states.") (citing New
York, 326 U.S. 572).
516. Only Justice Rutledge joined in Justice Frankfurter's opinion announcing the judgment of
the Court. A plurality of the Court endorsed additional limitations on federal power.
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State governmental activities was valid as long as the federal tax was
non-discriminatory.

In order to pass this test, Justice Frankfurter

explained that the tax must not target States in either of two ways. First,
the tax must apply to both State and private enterprises of a similar
nature. "[F]or Congress to tax State activities while leaving untaxed the
same activities pursued by private persons would do violence to the

presuppositions derived from the fact that we are a Nation composed of
States. 517 Second, the tax may not be imposed exclusively on property
517. 326 U.S. at 575-76. See also id. at 581 ("If in its wisdom a State engages in the liquor
business and may be taxed by Congress as others engaged in the liquor business are taxed, so also
Congress may tax the States when they go into the business of bottling water as others in the
mineral water business are taxed even though a State's sale of its mineral waters has relation to its
conservation policy."); id. at 584-85 (Rutledge, J., concurring) ("For the present I assent to the
limitation against discrimination, which I take to mean that state functions may not be singled out
for taxation when others performing them are not taxed or for special burdens when they are.").
This first type of non-discrimination appears to completely address Professor Tushnet's
concern that a prohibition of laws targeting States proposed an adoption of a "governmental!
proprietary" distinction such as that rejected for intergovernmental tax immunity purposes. See
Tushnet, supra note 433 at 1638-39. The prohibition on imposing a tax or burden on States while
not imposing a tax on private entities engaged in the same activities does not call for any
classification of the burdened State activity. Professor Tushnet also suggests that "almost no
governmental function is performed only by governments," due to the trend to contract out
services previously performed by the State, so that such a nondiscrimination rule "would then
actually impose no limits on Congress' power." Id. at 1639. Again, in the context of the first
prong of the non-discrimination rule addressed in New York, Professor Tushnet's argument
as a general matter, States
actually lends further weight to the non-discrimination provision. If,
are not the only entities engaged in an activity, then a law directed only at the State when engaged
in that activity shows that they have been singled out. For example, the fact that numerous federal
agencies and private companies are permitted to disclose residential addresses and other
information reinforces the discrimination reflected in selecting only States for regulation in this
regard.
Professor Tushnet's final argument for rejecting nondiscrimination fares no better. He
asserts:
Consider an express preemption provision in its typical form, stating that "no State
may impose a requirement" inconsistent with the prescribed federal standards. Such
a provision "singles the states out" for special treatment. It bars them from doing
something-imposing a regulatory requirement-that no private entity is barred
from doing (because, of course, no private entity has the legal capacity to impose
such requirements).
Id. at 1639. This very example illustrates one of the important exceptions to Professor Tushnet's
assertion that "almost no governmental function is performed only by governments" so that such a
nondiscrimination rule "would then actually impose no limits on Congress' power." Id. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the example is correct in its conclusion. Under the Supremacy
Clause, the federal and State judiciaries are required to accept federal law pursuant to the Constitution in lieu of contrary State law. Congress need not include a legislative directive to States in
order to accomplish that end. There is a fundamental difference between requiring State judges to
adhere to the Supremacy Clause and instructing State legislatures that they may not legislate. See
Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2381; Prakash, supra note 441, at 2007-32; see also Tushnet, supra note 433
at 1642 n. 111(acknowledging "possible distinctions between national commands to state courts
and national commands to state legislatures") (citing Prakash supra note 441). Because the federal law will be enforced by the judiciary, the congressional command directed to the State legislatures is of no (or very little) legal effect. In light of that fact, it is unlikely States would bother to
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or activities that are unique to State governments. 51 8 "But so long as
Congress generally taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned and
not uniquely capable of being earned only by a State, the Constitution of
the United States does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls
also on a State. 51 9 The rest of the Court unanimously supported these
limitations and differed only with respect to whether the federal taxing
power was subject to additional restrictions.5 2 °

Although the Supreme Court in Baker52 subsequently cast aside
some of the broader limitations articulated by the plurality in New York,
the Baker court explicitly left intact the narrower non-discrimination
protection.522 The bar against a tax imposed exclusively upon States
challenge the federal directive. The fact that States may not find it an effective use of resources to
challenge federal legislation with little practical impact, however, does not provide a basis for
assuming that the States have no legal basis for such a challenge when an egregious case arises.
With that premise removed, it is not immediately apparent how a directive to the States not to pass
contrary laws on some issue could survive scrutiny under Printz and New York.
518. Justice Frankfurter explained:
There are, of course, State activities and State-owned properties that partake of
uniqueness from the point of view of intergovernmental relations. These inherently
constitute a class by themselves. Only a State can own a Statehouse; only a State
can get income by taxing. These could not be included for purposes of federal
taxation in any abstract category of taxpayers without taxing the State as a State.
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
519. Id.
520. The plurality opinion concurred that a federal tax levied only against an activity
conducted by a State, and not against a similar activity conducted by a private corporation, would
be unconstitutional: "Concededly a federal tax discriminating against a State would be an
unconstitutional exertion of power over a coexisting sovereignty within the same framework of
government." 326 U.S. at 586 (Stone, C.J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton,
JJ.). The plurality, however, went further, rejecting the non-discrimination principle as the sole
limit on congressional taxing power and suggesting that the federal taxing power did not permit a
tax that unduly interferes with the performance of the States' governmental functions. Id. at 58788.
Justice Rutledge, in a separate concurring opinion, sought to impose a rule of construction
parallel to that later adopted in Gregory. "[B]efore a federal tax can be applied to activities
carried on directly by the states, the intention of Congress to tax them should be stated expressly
and not drawn merely from general wording of the statute applicable ordinarily to private sources
of revenue." Id. at 585 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
The dissent adopted the narrowest view of the federal taxing power, arguing that the tax in
question exceeded congressional power. They proposed that no State activity was subject to
federal tax: "A state's project is as much a legitimate governmental activity whether it is
traditional, or akin to private enterprise, or conducted for profit." Id. at 591 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting, joined by Black, J.).
521. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
522. The Court stated: "Nor does § 310 discriminate against States. The provisions of § 310
seek to assure that all publicly offered long-term bonds are issued in registered form, whether
issued by state or local governments, the Federal Government, or private corporations." Baker,
485 U.S. at 526-27. The Court then explicitly relied on the premise that "a nondiscriminatory
federal tax on the interest earned on state bonds does not violate the intergovernmental tax
immunity doctrine" to uphold the challenged legislation. Id. at 527; see also NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF BOND LAWYERS, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BOND LAW § 2, at 7 (1998)
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when private corporations engaged in the same activity are left untaxed,
is simply a restatement of the bar against laws that target or single out
States. Authorities subsequent to Baker continue to recognize the nondiscrimination limit on federal taxing power.5 23
If the Supreme Court finds that the DPPA does not require the
States to legislate or to administer the Act on behalf of the federal government, it may clarify that singling out States for special burdens is
equally prohibited by New York and Printz. If the Court declines to read
its precedents to bar laws targeting States for a unique burden, the Court
would be required to recognize a new class of Tenth Amendment cases.
This new class would consist of laws neither requiring States to administer programs for Congress nor generally applicable laws that only incidentally apply to States. If the Court took the approach of recognizing
this new class of cases, it would be required to formulate appropriate
standards and safeguards to address such cases. Thus initially, any resolution of the DPPA litigation other than a straightforward application of
New York and Printz, promises to break new ground.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Litigation challenging the DPPA has taken the form of direct challenges between the dual sovereigns of our federal system: State governments are bringing actions directly against the United States. The
serious constitutional issues raised in these challenges highlight the
importance of these cases to the development of doctrine in several
emerging areas. The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Printz, City of
Boerne, and Lopez come into play. In addition, there is already a division among the courts which have ruled on the constitutionality of the
DPPA and a "circuit split" may soon follow.52 4 All of these factors indicate that the Supreme Court may soon consider the constitutionality of
the DPPA. When it does so, it may hold the DPPA unconstitutional
based on a relatively straightforward application of its recent precedents.
Or, the Court may take the next logical step in its development of process-oriented jurisprudence.
(noting that the "Court found that the immunity doctrine would only apply if a state were taxed
directly and in a discriminatory fashion").
523. See supra note 515.

524. As this article goes to press, it appears that the circuit split has come to fruition. See
supra note 18. The appellate decisions creating the circuit split are addressed in Thomas H. Odom
& Marc R. Baluda, The Development of Process-OrientedFederalism: Harmonizing the Supreme
Court's Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence From Garcia Through Printz, 30 URB. LAW. __

(Summ. 1999) (forthcoming).

